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1. Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Application 
of International Law
Some time ago scholars started to study domestic judicial decisions concern-
ing international law hoping to find in  them traces of  a  comparative method. 
The practice of using cross-references to reasoning and interpretation of law made 
by other judges became known as ‘judicial dialogue’.1 Obviously, the notion itself 
is elusive and gives rise to the conceptual confusion. Judicial dialogue may mean 
an exchange of ideas in judicial networks; it may refer to the meetings of judges on 
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1 On ‘transnational judicial dialogue’, ‘a global community of courts’ or ‘constitutional com-
parativism’ see e.g.: A.M. Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44, Harvard Inter-
national Law Review, pp. 191–219; Ch. McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Trans-
national Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, pp. 499–532; S. Choudry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory 
of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’ (1999) 74, Indiana Law Journal, pp. 819–892.
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a formal and an informal basis to discuss the law and the process of adjudication; 
it may denote instances when judges of national or international courts quote each 
other’s decisions when resolving cases before them; or when international and na-
tional courts enter into a  formalised dialogue (which could be an institutional-
ized one like in the case of the preliminary reference procedure in the EU which 
is a formal process through which courts can co-operate with the CJEU).2 Despite 
these approaches, the  term ‘judicial dialogue’ reflects a  basic idea according to 
which the courts communicate with one another, judges know their colleagues’ 
decisions and use them for inspiration, concur or dissent with them, both in an 
open and silent manner. 
Some authors, such as e.g. A.M. Slaughter, offer sophisticated typologies 
of  a  ‘transjudicial communication’. According to Slaughter, judicial dialogue 
can be classified on the  basis of  criteria of  its form, function, and  reciproci-
ty of communication.3 As to the  form, a dialogue can be vertical, horizontal, 
and a mixed vertical-horizontal (depending on the form of subordination be-
tween courts).4 As far as its functions are  concerned, the  dialogue could be 
attitudinal, strategic and normative. It, finally, may enhance the effectiveness 
of supranational or national courts, enhance the persuasiveness, legitimacy or 
authority of  individual judicial decisions or assure and  promote acceptance 
of reciprocal international obligations. A dialogue may vary also as to the de-
gree of reciprocity. 
It may be also argued that it is possible for a court to ‘communicate’ with oth-
er courts without necessarily being explicit about doing so and without drawing 
attention to the dialogue itself.5 That is the case not only in situations of a conflict 
2 Torres-Pérez enumerates six prerequisites for dialogue. In addition to the  ‘common enter-
prise’, dialogue also requires competing viewpoints, common ground for understanding, 
an absence of  competence authority for either party, equal opportunity to participate, 
and a conversation over time. See: A. Torres-Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: 
A Theory of Transnational Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2009), pp. 97–140.
3 A.M. Slaughter, ‘A  Typology of  Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29, University of  Rich-
mond Law Review, pp. 99–138.
4 E.g. N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of  European Human Rights’ (2008) 71, Modern Law 
Review, pp.  183–216. The author analysed German, Austrian, Spanish and French courts’ ap-
proach to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. He concluded that national courts seek to set lim-
its on the interpretive authority of the ECtHR. He therefore portrays the relationship as one 
that is more ‘horizontal’ than ‘vertical’. However, the different judiciaries adopt an approach 
of mutual accommodation to ensure that the practice of human rights law in Europe is more 
or less harmonious.
5 Similarly, Murphy introduces the  distinction between ‘implicit’ and  ‘explicit’ judicial dia-
logue. In implicit judicial dialogue, the courts engage in transnational judicial communica-
tion without being open or explicit about it. In  explicit judicial dialogue, the  courts open-
ly acknowledge that communication and  the role it plays in  resolving conflicting claims 
to authority. See: C.C. Murphy, ‘Human Rights Law and  the Challenges of  Explicit Judicial 
Dialogue’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/12. Similarly, Martinico refers in  the EU context 
to the  ‘hidden dialogue’. See: G. Martinico, ‘A  Matter of  Coherence in  the Multilevel Legal 
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between interpretations of norms. It is thus possible to distinguish indirect or ‘si-
lent’ dialogue and a direct one. 
In the research conducted within the framework of the project ‘International 
Law through National Prism’ we wanted to examine whether and  in what way 
the  Eastern and  Central European courts engage in  a  dialogue on internation-
al law. In this publication we are going to look at various instances of references 
to foreign and international courts decisions of the Central and Eastern Europe-
an judiciary to see what form they take or function they fulfil and whether there 
is a degree of reciprocity. 
In this contribution we use the concept of judicial dialogue as a tool to exam-
ine how courts of new European democracies apply international law. When we 
started the research few years ago, it seemed that the Central and Eastern Europe-
an judges who, in most cases, have started to apply international law are, in fact, 
not so open or prepared to adjudicate on international law and especially to dis-
cuss foreign and international courts’ decisions. It was thus necessary to look at 
the judgments containing any kind of reference to foreign or international courts’ 
decisions, independently of the level of involvement in the discussion. 
In our research we focused on the  examples of Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine; all of them are former communist coun-
tries.6 All of these States are now the members of the Council of Europe, share its 
values and have become the parties to the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and so are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), and, last but not least, have become parties to the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the legal orders of all the States under 
examination have experienced the  immense transition to a  liberal rule of  law 
and market economy. One of the important elements of this transition was a pro-
gressive openness to international law. In  some countries these processes have 
started earlier in the eighties of the 20th century, in other in the nineties, and they 
are much deeper in the countries which later acceded to the EU (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Lithuania) than in Russia or Ukraine. 
The transition necessitated the  elaboration of  entirely new constitutions. 
The  subsequent integration of  States within the  EU and  within other in-
ternational organizations has sometimes required further amendments to 
System: Are  the “Lions” Still “Under the Throne”?’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 16/08, New 
York University, New York.
6 The study is based on country reports prepared in the initial phase of this research project 
by P. Mikeš (the Czech Republic), N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós, T. Hoffmann (Hungary), V. Vaičai-
tis (Lithuania), M. Górski, I. Skomerska-Muchowska (Poland), E. Ivanov (the Russian Federa-
tion, with collaboration of A. Belyachenkova), and R. Khorolskyy (Ukraine; report distributed 
among the  authors and  included in  the project files, not published). The  country reports 
are published as e-book accompanying this volume and available at the University of Lodz 
Repository (RUŁ) website http://repozytorium.uni.lodz.pl:8080/xmlui/.
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the constitutions. Nowadays the constitutions of all the States under examina-
tion provide, however in different forms and to a varied extent, for the binding 
force of international law within the domestic sphere and sometimes explicitly 
recognize the primacy of international law over domestic law. Yet, that does not 
mean that international law is applied in an identical way in all these countries. 
Constitutional authorisation for the binding force of international law is only 
one of the prerequisites for domestic enforcement of international law, as well 
as for the use of  comparative method or further for judicial communication. 
This contribution starts with the  assumption that judicial dialogue depends 
primarily on a  legal system, a  legal basis for the  application of  international 
law in a domestic legal order and on a legal culture of a country. This includes 
the education of the judges, their judicial habits, independence from political 
authorities etc. 
The structure of  the contribution follows a  simple scheme. We present ac-
cording to the State by State order the most important features of a legal context 
in which international law is applied (generally, we do not discuss the EU law)7 
and on this ground we discuss some patterns of judicial dialogue characteristic 
for each country and  the most interesting identified examples of  judicial dia-
logue.  
2. Poland
2.1. The Legal Setting for Judicial Dialogue
The Polish modern history of international law application in the domestic legal 
order begins with the regaining of independence after the World War I. The judges 
started to apply treaties, which, under the Constitution of 1921, were ratified by 
the President upon the consent of the Parliament granted in a form of a statute. 
The Supreme Court based its reasoning on the concept of transformation when 
in 1928 it indicated that “a treaty, when ratified and duly published […] becomes 
a statutory instrument and gains a binding force in the domestic legal relations.”8 
7 On the  transformation of  the Central European judiciary under the  EU law see: M. Bobek 
(ed.), Central European Judges Under the European Influence. The Transformative Power of the 
EU Revisited, (Hart Publishing, 2015); see also idem, Comparative Reasoning in European Su-
preme Courts (Oxford University Press 2013); G. Martinico, O. Pollicino, The  Interaction be-
tween Europe’s Legal Systems Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws (Ed-
ward Elgar 2012).
8 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 14 December 1928; similarly, judgment of the Supreme 
Court of 23 October 1929.
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On the  date of  publication any ratified treaty started to function in  a  domestic 
legal system as a statue. This meant that a subsequent treaty prevailed only over 
legislative acts earlier in date (lex posterior derogat legi priori). This dualistic ap-
proach was confirmed in several judgments of ordinary courts and continued until 
1952.9 On several occasions, also after 1952, in disputes on diplomatic immunities 
and State immunity, the courts grounded their decisions on customary interna-
tional law.10
The Constitution of 1952 was silent on international law, reflecting the mod-
el developed in  the Soviet Union and  imposed on all countries of  Central 
and Eastern Europe where international law was not binding within the domes-
tic legal order. 
Since the Constitution lacked the provision requiring the consent of the Par-
liament for ratification, it was difficult to argue that a ratified treaty was trans-
formed into domestic law. There were thus divergent views within the academ-
ia on the  legality of  the direct application of  treaties in  Polish law with many 
scholars rejecting such a possibility. On the other hand, some scholars advanced 
the  idea that ratified international treaties entered the  domestic legal system 
through the process of ratification and official publication and should be applied 
ex proprio vigore.11 The  concept was implemented by the  Supreme Court only 
in  two cases but without success for the  applicants since the  treaties they had 
invoked, however binding upon Poland, were neither ratified, nor officially pub-
lished.12 The dominant position of  the judiciary was that the direct application 
of a treaty requires special authorization in a statute applicable to the subject mat-
ter of a treaty (e.g. Art. 1 of the Law on private international law of 1965 referred 
to international treaties as applicable law). Since there were not so many statutes 
with such endorsements, international law was in this period almost not applied 
9 L. Garlicki, M. Masternak-Kubiak, K. Wójtowicz, ‘Poland’, [in:] D. Sloss (ed.), The Role of Do-
mestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2013), 
pp. 370–409. Cf. A. Wyrozumska, ‘Poland’, [in:] D.L. Shelton (ed.), International Law and Do-
mestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press 
2011), pp. 468–499; eadem, ‘Umowy międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka’ [International Trea-
ties. Theory and Practice] Prawo i Praktyka Gospodarcza (2006), p. 538; R. Kwiecień, Miejsce 
umów międzynarodowych w porządku prawnym państwa polskiego, [The Position of Interna-
tional Treaties in the Legal Order of the Polish State] (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2000), p. 101. 
For an overview of monistic, dualistic or other models see J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles 
of Public International Law (8th ed., Oxford University Press 2012), pp. 48–59.
10 Cf. judgments of 22 October 1925 on diplomatic immunities, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich 
1926-V, no. 342; and  of 2 March 1926 (against Czechoslovakia) Orzecznictwo Sądów Pol-
skich 1926-V, no. 418, cases CR 1272/57 (Supreme Court, 15 May 1959), ICR 58/70 (Supreme 
Court, 18 May 1970), III CRN 139/79 (Supreme Court, 10 October 1979).
11 S. Rozmaryn, ‘Skuteczność umów międzynarodowych PRL w  stosunkach wewnętrznych’, 
[The Effectiveness of International Treaties in Poland’s Internal Relations], Państwo i Prawo 
(1962), 12, p. 954.
12 Bug river claims case, 2 CZ 70/61 (Supreme Court, 12 June 1961), Panonia case, III CZP 71/73 
(Supreme Court, 5 October 1974).
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by the courts. In 1987 in highly politicized judgment, the Supreme Court held 
that under the 1952 Constitution there are no grounds to recognise the  trans-
formation of  a  treaty into the  domestic legal order. The  treaty, which is  bind-
ing upon Poland has to be implemented by the  law, but is not binding as such 
on the courts.13 The position of the Supreme Court reflected an extreme version 
of the dualistic approach. 
In 1989 the process of democratic changes in the Polish legal system has be-
gun. One of its important features was the acceptance of direct application of in-
ternational law, especially human rights treaties, in the domestic legal order. This 
facet is  characteristic for the  democratization processes in  all the  other States 
of our concern. 
The present Polish Constitution was adopted in 1997. It contains several pro-
visions concerning the  relation between international and  domestic law.14 First 
of all, the Constitution refers to international treaties. It distinguishes between two 
general categories of treaties: the treaties ratified by the President and the other 
treaties concluded by the Government.15 The Constitution clearly declares that all 
the treaties, which are ratified by the President are a part of the law of the land 
and are generally binding.16 According to Art. 91(1) of the Constitution, they shall 
be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute. 
The position of a ratified treaty in the Polish legal order depends upon the pro-
cedure of  ratification. In  brief, the  Constitution differentiates between treaties 
ratified upon prior consent of both Chambers of the Parliament given in a form 
of statute (Art. 90, Art. 89(1) of the Constitution) and treaties, which are ratified 
without the consent of the Parliament (Art. 89(2) of the Constitution). The Con-
stitution is clear as to the position of the treaties ratified upon prior consent of the 
Parliament. In case of a conflict with domestic law, the treaty prevails over statutes 
but not over the Constitution which, pursuant to its Art.  8, is  the supreme law 
of Poland (Art. 91(2) of the Constitution). Further, Art. 188 of the Constitution 
stipulates for the competence of the Constitutional Court with reference to inter-
national law. Pursuant to this provision, the Constitutional Court adjudicates on 
the conformity of statutes and international treaties to the Constitution, the con-
formity of a statute to ratified treaties, which required a prior consent granted by 
13 Case I  PRZ 8/87 (Supreme Court, 25 August 1987). The  Supreme Court refused to apply 
the provisions of ILO Convention No. 87, which was ratified by Poland to the legalisation re-
quest of  the “Solidarity” trade union and  refused to assess whether the  domestic legisla-
tion on exclusion of trade unions pluralism was consistent with the international obligations 
of Poland.
14 There are also the references to international law (treaties or customary international law) 
in various statutes or acts of Government. Taking into account general rule enshrined in the 
Constitution, they are superfluous.
15 Under Art. 146(4)(10) of the Constitution the Council of Ministers may conclude agreements 
of an executive nature. 
16 Art. 87 of the Constitution.
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a statute, and the conformity of the legal acts of the Government to the Constitu-
tion, ratified treaties and statutes. 
If taken literally, treaties ratified without a  prior consent of  the Parliament 
do not prevail over statutes. As the Constitution contains in its first “Chapter on 
general principles on which the State is based”17 Art. 9, which states that “The Re-
public of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it”, the courts begun 
to understand the hierarchy differently, i.e. all ratified treaties prevail over stat-
utes.18 Over the years Art. 9 has been filled with substance by the courts. The judg-
es used to invoke it as a legal basis for domestic effects of all binding treaties oth-
er than the ratified ones, for the provisional application of treaties under Art. 25 
VCLT,19 treaties which are ratified but do not satisfy other conditions of Art. 91 
of the Constitution,20 customary law,21 and the decisions of  international organ-
izations or international organs established under the treaties.22 The Polish Con-
stitutional Court confirmed in the 2005 judgment on the constitutionality of the 
EU Accession Treaty, that “Art. 9 expresses an assumption of the Constitution that 
on the territory of Poland, a binding effect should be given not only to the acts 
(norms) enacted by national legislature, but also to the acts (norms) created out-
side the framework of national law-making authorities. The Constitution accepts 
that the Polish legal system consists of multiple components/elements.”23 Conse-
quently, Polish authorities, including the judges, should give full effect to interna-
tional law, i.a. they should develop an interpretation of national law as ‘friendly’ to 
international law as possible.24
17 The Constitution provides for more stringent conditions for amendment of this Chapter as 
provided for by its Art. 235(5–6).
18 Cf. e.g. case GSK 56/04 (Supreme Administrative Court, 21 April 2004). Some judges opposed 
to this effect e.g. the Warsaw Administrative Court held that the freedom of economic activity 
may not be restricted by a treaty which was ratified in a simplified procedure, i.e. without 
the consent of the Parliament. Such a treaty may not be invoked for imposing penalties on 
individuals (case II SA 4156/03, 16 November 2004). 
19 Cf. case I SA/Łd 1707/02 (Supreme Administrative Court, 26 March 2003), in which the Court 
found that because Poland and Estonia, the parties to the free trade agreement, agreed for 
its provisional application, to refuse to apply lower custom tariffs provided therein, would 
infringe upon Art. 9 of the Constitution.
20 For example treaties or the amendments to the treaties which were not officially published 
in the Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws). See to this effect e.g. case III SA/Lu 16/13 (Lublin 
Administrative Court, 30 April 2013).
21 See e.g. Natoniewski, III CSK 293/07 (Supreme Court, 13 March 2010).
22 E.g. cases I SA/Sz 414/07 (Szczecin Administrative Court, 3 October 2007) concerning the ef-
fects of the decision of the Mixed Commission EC/EFTA; I SA/Go 559/06 (Gorzow Administra-
tive Court, 22 March 2007); I GSK 813/07 (Supreme Administrative Court, 22 July 2008).
23 Case K 18/04 (Constitutional Court, 11 May 2005) on the EU Accession Treaty of 2003, para. 2.2.
24 Art. 9 of the Constitution became the basis of the consonant (friendly) interpretation (indi-
rect application of treaties), see to this effect e.g. case II PK 100/05 (Supreme Court, 29 No-
vember 2005) in which the Court recognised its obligation stemming from Art. 9 of the Con-
stitution to interpret domestic law as far as possible in concordance with the terms of the 
non-ratified treaty which is  binding on Poland; case V SA 859/99 (Supreme Administrative 
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The clear and complete provisions contained in the treaties, which are ratified 
and  officially published may be directly applicable (Art.  91(1) of  the Constitu-
tion). The concept of ‘directly applicable’ or ‘self-executing’ treaty provisions had 
been well established by the Polish courts long before the 1997 Constitution was 
adopted.25 The judges obviously drew from experiences of the US Supreme Court 
(the 1829 landmark decision in Foster & Elam v Neilson)26 but they had not men-
tioned the relevant cases. Similarly, when Poland became the member of the EU, 
they started to follow the formula devised by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) for conditions of direct applicability of EU law established in 26/62 
Van Gend en Loos and subsequent cases without references to these sources (si-
lent dialogue). For example, in the judgment of 2006 the Supreme Administrative 
Court found Art. 33 of  the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) to be a clear, unconditional and a complete provision, 
which may be invoked by an individual against the State.27 
The treaties concluded in any other procedure than ratification cannot be di-
rectly enforced by courts. They bind only the  State organs and  to impose obli-
gations on individuals they have to be implemented by universally binding acts 
of  the Parliament or the  Government. However, the  courts found several other 
effects these treaties may produce owing to the fact that they bind upon the State.28 
For example, if a treaty is inaccurately or not fully implemented, it may give rise 
Court, 1 February 2000) where the Court inaccurately assumed that since Poland acceded 
to the Refugee Convention of 1951, the Convention was not a ratified treaty under the Con-
stitution (the document of the President which was officially published had not referred to 
ratification but to accession). Consequently, it was not possible to apply it directly. However, 
the  Court assured effectiveness to the  provisions of  the Convention invoking Art.  9 of  the 
Constitution and interpreting domestic law consistently with the Convention. 
25 Cf. cases K 8/91 (Constitutional Court, 7 January 1990); I PRN 54/93 (Supreme Court, 15 June 
1993); II KRN 274/91 (Supreme Court, 17 October 1991).
26 Case 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), p. 254: “In the United States, a different principle is estab-
lished. Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be 
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever it operates 
of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation 
import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty 
addresses itself to the Political, not the Judicial, Department, and the Legislature must exe-
cute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”
27 Case II GSK 54/05 (Supreme Administrative Court, 8 February 2006); cf. A. Wyrozumska, ‘Po-
land’ (n. 10), p. 483. The provision of TRIPS reads: “The term of protection available shall not 
end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.” 
28 E.g. if a treaty had been executed, its legal effect could be irreversible, see to this effect case 
SK 31/99 (Constitutional Court, 24 October 2000) concerning the 1960 compensation agree-
ment concluded by Poland with the USA. Poland paid the US government in order to com-
pensate for financial claims of the US citizens linked to expropriation from land located on 
the Polish territory. According to the agreement, to obtain the compensation from the US 
government it was necessary to renounce property rights. The Constitutional Court found 
that the effect produced by this act is now irreversible. Cf. case II CSK 456/13 (Supreme Court, 
24 July 2014).
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to legitimate expectations of individuals. In the 2002 judgment concerning the so-
called Bug River claims the Constitutional Court held that although the treaties 
concluded by Poland after the World War II with the Soviet Republics (Lithua-
nia, Belarus and Ukraine) providing i.a. for compensation for a loss of property 
left by repatriates on the former Polish territories beyond the Bug river, though 
not ratified treaties, gave rise to legitimate expectations of the Polish citizens that 
internal law would regulate relevant financial settlements.29 The Court observed 
that the Parliament has been for many years trying to establish specific compen-
sation mechanisms but has not completely succeeded. Individuals therefore have 
still valid compensation claims against the  State. The  judgment goes in  hand 
with the position taken later by the ECtHR in the landmark Broniowski decision 
in which the ECtHR found a systemic problem connected with the malfunctioning 
of the Polish legislation and practice and applied for the first time the pilot-judg-
ment procedure.30 
Some courts gave effect to non-ratified treaties on the basis of a general clause 
in a statute pertinent to the subject matter of a treaty. The clause enumerated as 
applicable law international treaties, not specifying that they have to be ratified 
or concluded under a different procedure. Those courts argued that such clause 
is redundant if understood to encompass only ratified treaties since the same re-
sult stems from the Constitution. For the clause to be effective, it has to be treated 
as authorization to apply treaties which otherwise would not be used. It then in-
corporates a treaty into a statute. In consequence, the legal force of a non-ratified 
treaty is equal to a statute.31 
These few examples show that there is a good legal environment for application 
of international law in Poland and that many judges are open to international law.
2.2. Deference to International and Foreign Courts 
Decisions
2.2.1. References Prompted by Applicants or Made Proprio Motu 
In majority of cases the judges, especially of ordinary courts, apply internation-
al law without any reference to foreign or international courts’ decisions. However, 
sometimes they find it necessary to discuss such judgments, mostly to support 
or to distinguish their own argumentation. This practice, except for the  ECHR 
and EU law, is not common probably because it requires a much better expertise 
on international law of  both the  judges and  the parties to the  dispute, than an 
application of a treaty provision.32 This volume contains comprehensive analysis 
29 Case K 33/02 (Constitutional Court, 19 December 2002).
30 Broniowski v Poland, App. no. 31443/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004).
31 See to this effect e.g. case OSA 2/98 (Supreme Administrative Court, 17 May 1999).
32 On application of  the ECHR and  EU law see e.g. K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘Report on Poland’, 
[in:] G. Martinico, O. Pollicino (eds), The  National Judicial Treatment of  the ECHR and  EU 
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of the Polish practice, it seems thus enough to signal some problems and present 
few representative decisions here (see contributions by Skomerska-Muchowska, 
Górski, Matusiak, Czaplińska in this study). 
In contradictory court proceedings a lot depends on arguments of parties. If 
experienced lawyers represent them, the  arguments based on international law 
are  better substantiated. This happens frequently in  the area of  human rights. 
However, such approach cannot guarantee success as the  example of  the 2014 
Warsaw Administrative Court judgment confirms. It  concerned deportation 
of a foreigner on the basis of a classified report prepared by the Internal Security 
Agency.33 The applicant claimed that he was refused access to the case files since 
they were confidential; therefore, his right to court was infringed. He invoked 
and discussed several relevant judgments of the ECtHR34 and the CJEU decision 
of 3 September 2008 in C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commis-
sion to support the claim to the right to know the reasons of the decision issued 
against him. The Warsaw Administrative Court concluded from the  judgments 
presented by the  applicant that the  right to court, which includes the  principle 
of contradictoriness and as an essential element the possibility to get acquainted 
with the  information in  possession of  the authority or the  court is  not a  value 
overriding other values protected by the national legal order. Disclosing informa-
tion gathered by a specialised agency responsible for State security enables iden-
tification of the source of information, so it can pose a threat to other persons or 
even exclude the possibility of obtaining any further relevant information. In such 
situation the limitations on procedural rights of a person are justifiable on account 
of public interest. 
The Court made itself familiar with the classified case files and decided that 
the deportation decision was justified. This cannot be questioned, as the Court 
noted, neither by the applicant nor his legal representative because they cannot 
get acquainted with the said case files. At the same time the Court cannot include 
full argumentation in the reasons of the judgment because of the need to protect 
classified information. The Court finally observed that the present case does not 
concern fundamental issues such as protection of  life or health, long-term dep-
rivation of liberty or property rights. It concerns the possibility to limit the free-
dom of movement for a defined period (5 years) and for a defined geographic area 
(Schengen area, were neither the foreigner nor his family are citizens of any of the 
countries covered by it). Of course such a ban can impact upon an applicant’s pri-
vate or professional life, but it has to be weighed against the public interest – pro-
tection of State security. 
Laws, A Comparative Constitutional Perspective, (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2010), 
pp. 329–349.
33 Case IV SA/Wa 1074/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 7 October 2014).
34 C.G. v Bulgaria, App. no. 1365/07 (ECtHR, 24 July 2008); Lupsa v Romania, App. no. 10337/04 
(ECtHR, 8 June 2006); Liu v Russian Federation, App. no. 42086/05 (ECtHR, 6 December 2007); 
Chahal v the UK, App. no. 22414/93 (ECtHR, 15 November 1996). 
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It is a pity indeed that the Court did not refer to other judgments in Kadi saga 
issued after 2008, i.e. to the decisions of the General Court of 2010 and the EU 
Court of Justice of 2013.35 It must be acknowledged that even if they were not men-
tioned, the Warsaw Administrative Court did try to take part in a judicial dialogue 
pointing to specific circumstances of the case at issue.36 In a similar case, the same 
Court, albeit in different composition, did not recognise such a need. It only made 
a general remark (without giving any details of specific decisions) that in any of the 
judgments invoked by the applicant the CJEU neither condemned the use of clas-
sified information nor afforded to the applicants an unrestricted right to have ac-
cess to the files.
The second exemplary decision was authored by the Supreme Administra-
tive Court and demonstrates that judges refer to the judgments from other juris-
dictions also if not prompted by the applicants. The case at stake is interesting, 
since it addresses the problems concerning the legal effect of various interna-
tional law acts or instruments, which are not formally treaties. In the 2010 Su-
preme Administrative Court judgment, the Court had to answer the question 
whether the Administrative Regulations of the International Telecommunica-
tion Union may be directly applied in  Poland if they had not been officially 
published.37 Poland, at the same time did ratify and publish the 1992 Constitu-
tion and the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union. Pur-
suant to Art. 54 of the Constitution, the Administrative Regulations (adopted by 
the conference of all the members, the supreme organ of the Union) are bind-
ing. Moreover, the consent to be bound by the Constitution and the Convention 
is  tantamount to the  consent to be bound  by  the  Administrative Regulations 
adopted by the competent world conferences prior to the date of their signature. 
The specific issue in the case at hand was whether it is possible to impose taxes 
on individuals in accordance to the principles (more lenient than in the Polish 
tax law) elaborated by the ITU Administrative Regulation, which was not pub-
lished. The Supreme Administrative Court did not fully concur with the rea-
soning of  the first instance administrative court  that the acts of  international 
organisation, which under the treaty establishing that organisation are binding 
on its members, if not published in the Journal of Laws, may bind Poland only 
in external relations (as they do not satisfy the criteria established in Art. 91 
of  the Constitution). Such regulations may produce internal effects merely to 
the extent they were implemented in the domestic law. Contrary to this finding, 
the Supreme Administrative Court distinguished between two situations: where 
such provisions grant rights to individuals and when they provide for obliga-
tions. While it is not possible to impose obligations on individuals on the basis 
35 Respectively, T-85/09 Kadi v Commission (GC, 30 September 2010); Joined Cases C-584/10 P, 
C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and the United Kingdom v Kadi (CJEU, 18 July 
2013).
36 Case IV SA/Wa 1260/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 23 October 2014). 
37 Case I FSK 92/09 (Supreme Administrative Court, 11 March 2010).
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of  such an act, individuals may rely on it against the  State when their rights 
are concerned. To come to this conclusion the Court referred to the similarities 
of  the dispute before the CJEU in C-161/06 Skoma-Lux38 in which the Court 
found that the obligations contained in the Community legislation, which has 
not been officially published, cannot be enforced on individuals, even though 
those persons could have learned of  that legislation by other means. The Su-
preme Administrative Court concurred with that reasoning and  underlined 
that it may be applied also to the  situation, which is  not covered by EU law. 
Since the applicant (the company) relied on rights, the Court held that it may 
invoke the provisions of the relevant Administrative Regulation even if it had 
not been published.39 
2.2.2. Identification of Customary International Law 
– Skrzypek, Natoniewski and Nigerian Embassy  
There are several judgments of the Polish ordinary courts under the Consti-
tution of 1997 grounded in customary international law. In the majority of cases 
they determine customary law in a general (simplified) way referring to the con-
ventions codifying custom or the opinions of scholars. The decision of the War-
saw Provincial Court in Skrzypek v Germany is  special since the Court (in that 
case the lower court) referred to other jurisdiction, to the judgment of the CJEU: 
C-292/05 Lechouritou.40 It thus supported the finding that State immunity covers 
as an act de jure imperii – a legal action brought by natural person in one State 
against another State (namely Germany) for compensation in respect of the loss 
or damage suffered by the successors of the victims of acts perpetrated by armed 
forces in the course of warfare (World War II) on the territory of the first State. 
The Court observed that also the CJEU found the situation at issue to be a ‘civil 
38 C-161/06 Skoma-Lux sro v Celní ředitelství Olomouc (CJEU, 11 December 2007). 
39 It is not the first judgment of that kind, distinguishing between different effects in respect 
of rights or obligations, but probably the first one to refer to rights and to support the ar-
gument by the judgment from other jurisdiction. See e.g. Karin Galstyan, V SA 726/99 (Su-
preme Administrative Court, 7 December 1999) concerning unpublished diplomatic note 
of Armenia declaring discontinuation of the Soviet Union treaties after succession and the 
consequences of the lack of publication of official statement on termination towards Ar-
menia of the treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union on visa-free movement of per-
sons. The Court based its reasoning on the Constitution finding that Mrs Galstyan could not 
have be obliged to possess visa if she had not been duly informed of this duty by the State. 
In I GSK 813/07 (Supreme Administrative Court, 22 July 2008) the Court referred to Skoma 
Lux as well but the case concerned obligations of  individuals and only partly EU law, cf. 
case II GSK 640/13 (Supreme Administrative Court, 24 June 2014). In this context it is worth 
to note the  case I  SA/Bd 275/05 (Bydgoszcz Administrative Court, 20 July 2005) dealing 
exactly with a Skoma Lux type of a situation. The Court did not refer to the CJEU for pre-
liminary ruling but on the  ground of  the principle of  certainty of  law came to the  same 
conclusion as the CJEU. 
40 C-292/05 Irini Lechouritou et al. v Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias (CJEU, 
15 February 2007).
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matter’ (acta de jure gestionis). In the opinion of the Polish Court, even if the judg-
ment of the CJEU refers to a concrete dispute on the application of the Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters of 1968, it also expresses a general idea which is applicable like-
wise to the case at hand. 
Skrzypek concerns the same issues as Natoniewski v Germany41 discussed else-
where in this volume (see Matusiak, para. 2. B). The difference is that Mr. Skrzypek 
probably did not argue for the exception to State immunity in respect of acta de 
jure imperii and the Court did not detect the issue by itself. The plaintiff in Na-
toniewski maintained in the cassation procedure that Germany is not entitled to 
immunity applicable to the case before the Polish courts for two reasons. First, 
immunity as to acta de jure imperii does not extend to torts or delicts occasioning 
death, personal injury or damage to property committed on the territory of the 
forum State. Secondly, irrespective of where the relevant acts took place, Germany 
was not entitled to immunity because those acts involved the most serious viola-
tions of rules of international law of peremptory character for which no alternative 
means of redress was available. 
The Supreme Court took up the challenge to discuss timely and highly contro-
versial questions. To come to the same conclusion as in Skrzypek, the Court did not 
invoke one case, but carefully discussed various opinions expressed by the judges 
of international and foreign courts. The Supreme Court judgment in Natoniewski 
was subsequently discussed by other courts, the  International Court of  Justice 
(ICJ) in  Germany v  Italy42 and  by the  ECtHR in  Jones and  Others v  the  United 
Kingdom.43 No doubt owing to its English translation in Polish Yearbook of Inter-
national Law it took part in exchange of ideas and opinions on important issues 
of international law.
The judgment of the 2014 Warsaw Appellate Court on immunity from execu-
tion (Nigerian Embassy case) was not yet translated into English but it is equally 
worth mentioning. The Court repealed the judgment of the lower court rejecting 
the possibility of  the execution of  the judgment against the Embassy of Nigeria 
in an employment dispute providing for the renewal of employment contract un-
der the  threat of  financial penalty and  ordered the  reconsideration of  the case. 
The main reason was that the lower court inaccurately viewed the case in the light 
of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations instead of relying on cus-
tomary international law on State immunity. The Warsaw Appellate Court tried 
then to indicate that the claim against embassy of a foreign State is the claim against 
41 Case IV CSK 465/09 (Supreme Court, 29 October 2010).
42 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v  Italy: Greece Intervening) (ICJ, 3 February 
2012) paras 68, 74, 85, 96, citing English translation in (2010) XXX Polish Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 299.
43 Jones and Others v the United Kingdom, App. no. 34356/06 and 40528/06 (ECtHR, 14 Janu-
ary 2014) para. 144, citing English translation in (2010) XXX Polish Yearbook of International 
Law 299.
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a State and has to be viewed in the light of the rules determined i.a. in the 2010 
decision of the ECtHR in Cudak44 and in the 2012 CJEU judgment in C-154/11 
Mahamdia.45 Both Cudak and  Mahamdia are  premised on the  idea that under 
international customary law State immunity does not cover acts de jure gestion-
is such as contracts of employment with persons who do not perform functions 
which fall within the exercise of public powers. As concerns the immunity from 
enforcement, for general rules, the Appellate Court referred to the judgment of the 
ICJ in Germany v Italy. But the most interesting are the arguments developed by 
the  Warsaw Court on the  ground of  three decisions of  the courts of  Germany, 
the  United Kingdom and  France concerning the  execution from the  embassy’s 
bank account.46 The Court observed:
Having regard to the development of international law and the recent case law, as the CJEU 
judgment mentioned above, in which the need to protect the rights of employees was strong-
ly emphasised, it is crucial to consider the possibility of execution from the embassy bank 
account, used for payments for employees who are the citizens of a State forum, which have 
not carried out sovereign activities. If the embassy decides to employ workers and routinely 
uses its bank account to pay them salaries, it cannot be categorically held that their claims 
cannot be satisfied from such bank account. It is obviously a sensitive issue, which has to be 
analysed in the circumstances of each case but – in the opinion of the Appellate Court – such 
a solution may not be a priori rejected.47 
The suggestion of the Appellate Court addressed to the lower court to look for 
a possibility for execution from a bank account seems controversial. It  is disap-
pointing that the Court based itself on three judgments only and did not take into 
account the specificity of the judgment of the CJEU (which interpreted the rele-
vant EU regulation). The other problem with the decision of the Appellate Court 
is that the Court said nothing about the renewal of employment and referred sim-
ply to the threat of financial penalty. The Court found it to be ‘questionable’, “since 
it directly interferes in the principle of respect of States equality”48 but instructed 
the lower court to study this issue carefully.
The case proves that at least some judges, when confronted with issues not reg-
ulated by domestic law or new problems, are capable of making an effort to look 
for an answer or inspiration to other jurisdictions. The extent and the depth of the 
study of international or foreign judicial decisions pose a real problem as well as 
the accuracy of conclusions drawn from the relevant case law.
44 Cudak v Lithuania, App. no. 15869/02 (ECtHR, 23 March 2010).
45 C-154/11 Ahmed Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (CJEU, 19 July 2012).
46 Philippinische Botschaft, 2 BvM 1/76 (German Constitutional Court, 13 December 1977) 46, 
p.  342; Alcom Ltd. v  Republic of  Colombia (House of  Lords, 12 April 1984); Islamic Republic 
of Iran v Société Eurodif and others, 82–12462 (French Cour de Cassation, 14 March 1984).
47 Case XXI Pz 95/14 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 26 June 2014).
48 Ibidem.
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3. The Czech Republic
3.1. The Legal Setting for Judicial Dialogue
The history of  application of  international law and  the relevant provisions 
of  the 1991 Czech Constitution (as amended in 2002) bear many similarities to 
the Polish case study.49 
As in Poland under the communist regime, the 1949 Constitution of Czecho-
slovakia (similarly to the previous Constitution of 1920) was silent on a relation 
between international and national law (except for the final two years of the ex-
istence of the country).50 The scholars diverged in opinions as to the application 
of a treaty ex proprio vigore and international law was not applied if specific stat-
utes had not contained provisions authorising the application of a treaty or cus-
tomary law. After the Velvet Revolution in November 1989 the country opened 
significantly to international law, became a party to the ECHR and recognised 
the  jurisdiction of  the ECtHR. The  Constitution was amended to incorporate 
human rights treaties51 and  the Constitutional Court of  the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic established in 1991 started to invoke the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and  Cultural Rights. After the  dissolution of  Czechoslovakia (in effect 
of  1 January 1993) the  Constitution of  the Czech Republic retained the  same 
formula incorporating to domestic law only human rights treaties.52 In  2001 
the Constitution of 1993 was amended. The 1997 Polish Constitution inspired 
this so-called Euro-amendment. Article  19(2) of  the Czech Constitution cor-
responds to Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution stating that “[t]he Czech Repub-
lic shall observe its obligations resulting from international law.” There are also 
similarities between Art. 10 of the Czech Constitution and Art. 91 of the Polish 
Constitution. The former states that “[p]romulgated treaties, to the ratification 
of which the Parliament has given its consent and by which the Czech Republic 
is bound, form a part of the legal order; if a treaty provides something other than 
49 See P. Mikeš, ‘Czech Courts and International Law’ (2011) 2, Czech Yearbook of Internation-
al Law 290; A.J. Bělohlávek, ‘The Czech Republic’, [in:] D.L. Shelton (ed.), International Law 
and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford Universi-
ty Press 2011) pp. 195–206.
50 The Constitutional Act No. 23/1991 Coll. of 9 January 1991 adopted by the Federal Assem-
bly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic introduced the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms as a constitutional law, entered into force on 8 February 1991.
51 The  Constitutional Act No. 23/1991 Coll., section 2 reads: “International treaties on hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ratified 
and promulgated are generally applicable on its territory and take precedence over the law.”
52 The Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Coll., the Constitution of the Czech Republic − enacted on 
16 December 1992, with effect as off 1 January 1993.
Anna Wyrozumska30
that which a statute provides, the treaty shall apply.”53 The specific provision ad-
dressed to the judges of Art. 95(1) declares in a novel manner that “[in] making 
their decisions, judges are  bound by statutes and  international treaties which 
form a part of the legal order; they are authorized to judge whether enactments 
other than statutes are  in conformity with statutes or with such international 
treaties.” The Euro-amendment removed from the Constitution the provision on 
human rights treaties. 
There are also provisions in specific statutes authorising the application of in-
ternational law, some of them are relicts of the previous system and refer only to 
human rights treaties, obsolete after the constitutional amendment. Occasionally 
they may create confusion.54 
From the perspective of  judicial dialogue on international law it is worth to 
mention that the  Constitution gives the  Constitutional Court the  power to en-
force international courts’ decisions. In practice, however, it is rarely used.55 Under 
Art. 87(1)(i) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to de-
cide on the measures necessary to implement a decision of an international court 
which is binding on the Czech Republic, in the event that it cannot be otherwise 
implemented.56 The Constitutional Court Act in paras 118 and 119 specifies that 
the  Constitutional Court may adjudicate upon the  petition proposing the  an-
nulment of  the provisions found by an international court as violating interna-
tional law or the petition of rehearing if the Constitutional Court “have decided 
in  a  matter in  which an international court found that, as the  result of  the en-
croachment of a public authority, a human right or fundamental freedom was in-
fringed in conflict with an international treaty”. The term ‘international court’ was 
defined in para. 117 of the Act on the Constitutional Court as “any international 
body whose decisions are binding for the Czech Republic pursuant to an interna-
tional treaty which forms a part of the legal order”. The present formula of para. 
117 however referring not to the court but to any body, still could be interpreted as 
excluding the views adopted by the quasi-judicial body like the UN Human Rights 
Committee (HRC).57 
International treaties are a part of the legal order of the Czech Republic and can 
be directly applied by the courts. Czech courts distinguish between different cat-
egories of treaties and give them different position in the hierarchy of legal acts 
53 Art. 10a of the Czech Constitution resembles Art. 90 of the Polish Constitution, Art. 49 – Art. 89 
of the Polish Constitution etc.
54 See P. Mikeš, ‘Country Report Czech Republic’, para. I.2.
55 The examples are the Constitutional Court cases: Pl. ÚS 28/11 (24 April 2012); Pl. ÚS 13/06 
(6 May 2008); Pl. ÚS 1/07 (6 May 2008); Pl. ÚS 1/09 (28 July 2009); Pl. ÚS 19/12 (18 December 
2012). 
56 The provisions were amended in 2012 with the effect off 1 January 2013, they are inserted 
in part 8 of the Constitutional Court Act (no. 182/1993 Coll.) para. 117–119b. 
57 In the General Comment No. 33 (2008), the HRC noted that even though it is not a judicial 
body, its Views “exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision.”
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(different position than the  same treaties have in  Poland). The  highest place 
is  granted to treaties, which transferred certain powers of  public authorities to 
an international organization or institution (ratified under Art. 10a of the Con-
stitution with a prior consent of the Parliament given by qualified majority of 3/5 
in both chambers of the Parliament – 3/5 of all MP and 3/5 of present senators). 
These treaties take precedence even over the Constitution except for the so-called 
hard core of the Constitution. 
The second category is  made up of  human rights treaties. They are  not 
distinguished by the  wording of  the Constitution but their special position 
of acts having constitutional character originates in the doctrine developed by 
the  Constitutional Court.58 The  Constitutional Court observed also that di-
rect application of international treaties includes the obligation of Czech courts 
and  other public authorities to take into account the  interpretation of  these 
treaties by international tribunals as authorities called upon to pronounce au-
thoritatively on the interpretation of international treaties. This, of course, also 
applies to interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR. Moreover, “the relevance 
of  the ECtHR jurisprudence achieved constitutional law quality in the Czech 
Republic.”59 Since 2002 the Constitutional Court tried to put itself in a strong-
er position in relation to ordinary courts by obliging them to submit the case 
to the  Constitutional Court, if they find a  conflict between a  human rights 
58 Case I. ÚS 310/05 (Constitutional Court, 15 November 2006): “A  special position among 
them [international treaties] have international treaties on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which form part of  the Czech constitutional order with all the  resulting conse-
quences […].”
59 Ibidem: “The immediate applicability of international treaties also includes the obligation 
of Czech courts and other public authorities to take into account the interpretation of these 
treaties by international tribunals as authorities called upon to pronounce authoritatively 
on the interpretation of international treaties. This of course also applies to the interpreta-
tion of the ECHR by the ECtHR. The relevance of the ECtHR jurisprudence achieved constitu-
tional law quality in the Czech Republic. ECtHR decisions are for the Czech Republic and for 
public authorities on its territory binding in an individual case, which also comes from Arti-
cle 46, paragraph 1 of the ECHR […]. For the reasons mentioned above, however, have pub-
lic authorities a general duty to take into account the interpretation of the ECHR carried out 
by the ECtHR. […] Public authorities, in the first place then the courts, are therefore obliged 
to take into account the case law of the ECtHR as well as in the cases where decisions con-
cerned the  Czech Republic as well as in  the cases that concerned another Member State 
of  the ECHR when these cases were, by its nature, significant also for the  interpretation 
of the ECHR in the Czech context. This duty is of special importance if a party before a Czech 
court points out to such case law. If such an argument is omitted by a court then the court 
commits a misconduct, which could lead to the infringement of the fundamental right to 
judicial protection under Article 36 paragraph 1 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms, Article 6 paragraph 1 of the ECHR, eventually of the respective fundamental 
right guaranteed by the ECHR. In any case also Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Czech Constitu-
tion is affected.”
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treaty and domestic law.60 The Constitutional Court will then have an exclusive 
competence to adjudicate upon such conflict and repeal domestic norm if rel-
evant.61 This doctrine was, however, opposed to. The Supreme Administrative 
Court refused to apply it on several occasions and adjudicated on the conflict 
giving precedence of application to a treaty norm.62 The Supreme Administra-
tive Court observed “that the conclusion of the Constitutional Court was stated 
obiter dictum without any connection with the decided case. The conclusion 
was not justified in  detail and  in the  following scholarly discussions strong 
critique was voiced against the  judgment. In  this situation, the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court finds it impossible to give regard to the clear wording of the 
constitutional guideline.”63
In its practice the Constitutional Court considered obligations under the hu-
man rights treaties as prevailing over any other treaty obligations. These cases 
concerned extradition resulting in a risk that the person concerned would be ex-
posed to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.64 For example, in the decision 
of 2013, referring to its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court observed that if 
the non-refoulement principle under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees collides with the obligation to extradite, the conclusion expressed ear-
lier that “the respect and protection of fundamental rights are defining elements 
of  the  substantively understood state governed by the  rule of  law” shall apply. 
“[T]herefore, in a case where a contractual obligation protecting a  fundamental 
right and a contractual obligation which tends to endanger that same right exist 
side by side, the first obligation must prevail.”65
The third category of international treaties encompasses those, which were rat-
ified upon a prior consent of the Parliament and promulgated in the Czech Official 
Journal (Art. 10 of the Constitution). Their norms are directly applicable and have 
a priority over conflicting statutory provisions (laws). 
All the  other treaties, concluded under other procedures, ratified without 
a consent of the Parliament or concluded by the Government, may be directly ap-
plicable, if a statute provides for their direct application and only if this application 
would not be contrary to the Constitution. This restriction refers to the constitu-
tional requirement that only statutes may determine certain matters. As it is the 
case in Poland, a treaty norm, in order to be directly applicable, has to fulfil formal 
60 Cf. P. Mikeš, ‘Czech Courts and International Law’ (2011) 2 Czech Yearbook of International 
Law, pp. 294–296.
61 Case Pl. ÚS 36/01 (Constitutional Court, 25 June 2002).
62 E.g. cases 2 Azs 343/2004 (Supreme Administrative Court, 4 August 2005); 9 Azs 23/2007 (Su-
preme Administrative Court, 14 June 2007).
63 Case 6 As 55/2006 (Supreme Administrative Court, 11 July 2007).
64 Cases of  the Constitutional Court: I. ÚS 752/02 (15 April 2003); I. ÚS 733/05 (20 December 
2006); III. ÚS 534/06 (3 January 2007). 
65 Case III. ÚS 665/11 (Constitutional Court, 10 September 2013).
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and substantive conditions. A treaty/or a treaty norm, which is not directly appli-
cable, may be still applied indirectly to interpret domestic law.66 
Similarly as in  the Polish legal system, customary international law could 
be applied either on the  basis of  the authorisation of  a  concrete act or under 
the general clause of Art. 1(2) of the Constitution. Cases adjudicated on the ba-
sis of  customary law are, however, extremely rare. They concern citizenship,67 
State succession,68 diplomatic immunity,69 State immunity,70 status of  refugees 
and other persons.71 It is evident from this practice that the judges do not iden-
tify customary norms through reference to usus and opinio iuris. They do not 
even explain why they consider a specific rule a customary one or they base their 
determination on an opinion of only one scholar.72 Occasionally, the courts refer 
to norms of the treaties codifying customary law as customary norms for a sole 
purpose only: to underline their exceptional nature (e.g. norms of the Refugee 
Conventions).
66 E.g. the Supreme Administrative Court found the Aarhus Convention on Access to Informa-
tion, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
not self-executing, however, it interpreted relevant domestic law as far as possible in con-
cordance with the  Convention: Cases 1 Ao 1/2006 (18 July 2006), 2 As 12/2006 (29 March 
2007), 1 As 39/2006 (14 June 2007), 1 As 13/2007 (29 August 2007).
67 Cases of  the Constitutional Court: Pl. ÚS 9/94 (13 September 1994) on the  State power to 
grant citizenship under international law, IV. ÚS 580/06 (3 April 2007) on discrimination re-
garding granting of citizenship, II. ÚS 120/2000 (31 May 2000) on military service of a person 
holding dual citizenship.
68 Cases of the Constitutional Court: II. ÚS 214/98 (30 January 2001) on succession of the Czech 
Republic to the  international obligations of  former Czechoslovakia, I. ÚS 420/09 (3 June 
2009) on succession to treaties between former USSR and Czechoslovakia.
69 Cases 11 Tcu 95/2003 (Supreme Court, 17 July 2003) on privileges and immunities of a per-
son holding diplomatic passport but not being a member of a diplomatic mission, 11 Tcu 
167/2004 (Supreme Court, 16 December 2004) on privileges and  immunities of  a  member 
of  a  wider royal family on private trip, I. ÚS 173/04 (Constitutional Court, 4 May 2004) on 
a duty of an ambassador of the Sovereign Order of the Knights of Malta to serve as witness 
in a criminal proceedings. 
70 In case 21 Cdo 2215/2007 (Supreme Court, 25 June 2008) on employment in Polish em-
bassy in Prague, the Court briefly described the historical development of State immu-
nity referring to the book of Czech scholar J. Malenovský and the Report of the Working 
Group on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.576, 
Annex at p. 58). The Court concluded that Poland had not acted as a sovereign (de jure 
imperii). Acta de jure gestionis are  not covered by State immunity. The  Supreme Court 
confirmed its understanding of  the exception to State immunity in  30 Cdo 2594/2009 
(24 March 2011) on non-admission to the readings held at the Austrian Cultural Institute 
in Prague.
71 Cases of  the Supreme Administrative Court: 9 Azs 23/2007 (14 June 2007); 1 Azs 40/2007 
(19 September 2007); 6 Azs 215/2006 (24 October 2007); 5 Azs 28/2008 (13 March 2009). 
72 P. Mikeš, ‘Country Report Czech Republic’, para. III.2.
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3.2. Deference to International and Foreign Courts 
Decisions
3.2.1. General Remarks
Since the ECHR and the decisions of the ECtHR acquired constitutional sta-
tus in  the Czech Republic,73 the  Constitutional Court often relies on the  Con-
vention and often finds Czech law or Czech courts decisions contrary not only 
to the Constitution but also to the Convention.74 In these cases the Court looks 
to the decisions of the ECtHR to support its own argumentation (concurring dia-
logue). However, there are many, especially earlier judgments, where the case law 
is only briefly or superficially mentioned. The same refers to ordinary or admin-
istrative courts. 
Exceptionally, the Czech courts refer to other international courts decisions 
than the ECtHR. Mikeš points to the  judgment of  the Supreme Administrative 
Court in which the court discussed the decisions of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Court of Justice, the opinions of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, and the decision of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in order to define the  term ‘internal armed conflict’ in  the Czech 
Asylum Act.75
Sometimes the courts, mostly the Constitutional Court, look up to the deci-
sions of foreign courts for guidance in interpreting domestic law or to determine 
the  standard of  protection of  certain rights.76 The  citation is  usually very short 
and often not direct but through literature that analyses foreign jurisprudence.77 
73 Case I. ÚS 310/05 (Constitutional Court, 15 November 2006).
74 Cf. recent decisions of the Constitutional Court e.g. 1 ÚS 860/1520 (27 October 2015) on ex-
pulsion of a foreigner and ill-treatment; 3 ÚS 1136/13 (8 December 2015) on indirect discrimi-
nation of Roma children – special schools; I. ÚS 2482/13 (26 May 2014) on joint custody; II. ÚS 
3626/13 (18 January 2016) on the right to effective investigation in cases of human traffick-
ing. Cf. P. Mikeš (n. 61), p. 296.
75 Case 5 Azs 28/2008 (Supreme Administrative Court, 13 March 2009). P. Mikeš, ‘Country Report 
Czech Republic’, para. II.6.
76 For a general overview see: Bobek M., Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 152–173.
77 P. Mikeš, ‘Country Report Czech Republic’, para. II.6., gives following examples. In  case Pl. 
ÚS 19/93 (Constitutional Court, 21 December 1993): “From among the European judicature, 
we can refer to the same point of view of the Federal Constitutional Court of the FRG, which 
in 1969 ruled that the prohibition on the retroactivity of statutes did not apply to the statute 
of limitations: the subsequent designation of criminality or of a higher possible punishment 
fall under this prohibition, but not the limitation of actions, governing the period of time dur-
ing which an act which is declared to be criminal may be prosecuted and leaving the crim-
inality of an act unaffected. (Volume 25, page 269 and following, Collection of Decisions).” 
In  case I. ÚS 453/03 (11 November 2005): “The requirement that the  critic himself prove 
the claimed facts is a European constitutional standard (e.g. decision of the House of Lords 
of 28 October 1999 in the matter Reynolds v Times News Papers Limited, or the decision of the 
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Recently the analysis of foreign judgments seems to be more insightful, e.g. in case 
concerning the  producers of  removable energy.78 There the  Court referred to 
the jurisprudence of the courts in Germany, Poland, Spain, Italy, Austria, Croatia 
and the United States of America. Another example is the judgment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court in which the Court discussed thoroughly the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ, ICTY, ICTR, CJEU and domestic courts of the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, New Zeeland, and  the United States of America i.a. to interpret Art. 1F(c) 
of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the possibility 
to exclude a refugee seeker from protection if he had been guilty of acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In the mentioned case the asy-
lum seeker informed in 1980s Cuban authorities of suspicious activities of other 
Cubans living in Czechoslovakia.79
The Czech judges quote mostly the  German Constitutional Court but there 
are also many references to the Polish Constitutional Court, as e.g. in cases con-
cerning wages of  judges,80 to the  Austrian Constitutional Court,81 or to the  Su-
preme Court of  the United States.82 The Constitutional Court sometimes refers 
to the jurisprudence of the Slovak Constitutional Court, e.g. in the judgment on 
the judicial review of security clearances in which the Court studied carefully also 
the case law of the ECtHR and of the Polish Constitutional Court.83
German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) of 3 June 1980, 1 BvR 797/78 in the case of Böll, which 
is also confirmed by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – the ECHR – e.g. 
decision of the Grand Chamber of 17 December 2004 in the matter Pedersen and Badsgaard 
v Denmark).” In case Pl. ÚS 19/98 (3 February 1999) the Constitutional Court referred to two 
decisions of the German Constitutional Court on refusal of mandatory military service and ci-
vilian alternative service. In  case 23 Cdo 888/2011 (31 January 2013), the  Supreme Court 
briefly referred (three sentences) to two judgments of the Austrian Supreme Court and the 
German Supreme Court on interpretation of Art. 13 of CMR Convention, excerpts of which 
were published in Czech commentary to the CMR Convention.
78 Case Pl. ÚS 17/11 (Constitutional Court, 15 May 2012).
79 Case 6 Azs 40/2010-70 (Supreme Administrative Court, 29 March 2011). Mikeš P., ‘Country 
Report Czech Republic’, para. VIII.3. 
80 Cases of  the Constitutional Court: Pl. ÚS 11/04 (26 April 2005); Pl. ÚS 34/04, Pl. ÚS 43/04 
and Pl. ÚS 9/05 (passed on the same day, 14 July 2005), Pl. ÚS 33/11 (3 May 2012), Pl. ÚS 
28/13 (10 July 2014). 
81 E.g. case 8 Ob 657/87 (Supreme Court, 28 June 1988).
82 E.g. cases of the Constitutional Court: I. ÚS 367/03 (15 March 2005) on freedom of speech, Pl. 
ÚS 17/11 (15 May 2012) on retroactivity of taxation of solar power plants, Pl. ÚS 39/01 (30 Oc-
tober 2002) on sugar quotas.
83 Case Pl. ÚS 6/02 (Constitutional Court, 27 November 2002) in which the Slovak court decision 
was only mentioned; for broader discussion see Pl. ÚS 11/04 (26 April 2005). In case Pl. ÚS 
33/11 (3 May 2012) the Court observed: “The comparative arguments include a reference to 
the case law of European constitutional courts. The Constitutional Court of  the Polish Re-
public permits interference in judges’ salaries only in a situation when the Polish Constitu-
tion forbids general indebtedness of  a  State [that is, a  situation when the  public debt ex-
ceeds ⅗ of the annual gross domestic product (decision file no. K 12/03)]. The Constitutional 
Court of the Slovak Republic, in judgment file no. Pl. ÚS 12/05, pronounced unconstitutional 
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3.2.2. The Foreigner Requesting Asylum in a Transit Area Case
The 2014 decision of  the Czech Supreme Administrative Court concerning 
the possibility of expulsion of a foreigner who was kept by the police in a transit 
area is possibly one of  the most interesting cases from the point of view of  this 
study. The foreigner in question was heading for a connecting flight and allegedly 
had used the passport belonging to another person. When stopped, he asked for 
asylum.84 The answer whether such foreigner could be expelled relied on the inter-
pretation of Art. 31(1) of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
which reads: 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or pres-
ence, on refugees who, coming directly from a  territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorisa-
tion, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause 
for their illegal entry or presence.
The Supreme Administrative Court analysed two judgments of the UK courts 
for clarification of the term ‘present themselves without delay to the authorities’. 
The first was the decision of the High Court of Justice concerning the detention 
of  foreigners having false passports.85 The  UK Court found that the  protection 
of Art. 31 of the Refugee Convention extends to those foreigners who applied for 
asylum after their detention if they had been detained during a  trip to another 
country where they wanted to apply for asylum. The Czech Court explained that 
the High Court based its conclusion on the premise that the main purpose of the 
Convention is to provide protection to refugees. Foreigners are basically allowed 
to choose the  country where they want to seek protection; they cannot be de-
prived of this right just because they were detained during a short stop in the trip.86 
The second one was the decision of the House of Lords87 in which the UK Court 
of  a  statute (statutes) that for several years (2003–2006) postponed the  entry into effect 
of a statute under which judges were entitled to remaining salary. In the opinion of that Con-
stitutional Court, with reference to the principle of legitimate expectation, clarity, stability, 
and legal certainty, arising from the general principle of a state governed by the rule of law, it 
is not possible to speak of measures being ‘temporary’ if they last several years. These argu-
ments were also used by the Constitutional Court of the Latvian Republic (file no. 2009-11-0), 
in an economic situation substantially worse than in our country, and in a situation where 
the  relationship of  a  judge’s salary at the  beginning of  his career and  the average salary 
showed a more positive trend than in the Czech Republic [per the report from the Council 
of Europe – the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 2010 – appendix 
no. 8].”
84 Case 9 Azs 107/2014-43 (Supreme Administrative Court, 29 May 2014). 
85 Adimi, R v Uxbridge Magistrates Court & Anor (High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 
29 July 1999), EWHC Admin 765.
86 Case 9 Azs 107/2014-43 (Supreme Administrative Court, 29 May 2014) para. 25. 
87 R v Asfaw (House of Lords, 21 May 2008).
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carefully examined the drafting history and the function of Art. 31 of the Conven-
tion and observed that the drafters of the Convention did not expect the massive 
development of air transport (refugees were originally only those persons who met 
the definition of a refugee as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951) 
and could not have foreseen the difficulties associated with transfers during inter-
national flights. It is therefore necessary to ensure the protection of Art. 31 also to 
those foreigners who were detained in the transit country in order to enable them 
to continue their journey to the destination country where they intended to apply 
for asylum.88 The Czech Supreme Administrative Court concurred with the opin-
ion of both courts. 
The case is interesting also on account of the Supreme Administrative Court 
observations on judicial dialogue. The Court noted that nowadays when interpret-
ing treaties more and more frequently the courts look for inspiration to the de-
cisions of the courts of other contracting parties. It is even required by the basic 
principle of interpretation enshrined in Art. 31(1) VCLT that the parties to a treaty 
should give the same meaning to the terms of the treaty and apply them uniformly. 
Thus, if a high court of a State party to a given treaty interprets certain provisions 
of a treaty, the courts of another State party should take it into account, provided 
that they know about it. This is especially true when the conclusions of high courts 
of  another State party to a  given treaty are  based on reasonable interpretation 
of the relevant treaty provisions. 
3.2.3. A Dissenting Dialogue
The Czech courts sometimes disagree with the opinions of foreign or interna-
tional bodies. For instance in several judgments the Constitutional Court refused 
to follow the  Human Rights Committee decisions against the  Czech Republic, 
invoking the ECtHR case law on the  same issues or applied the Human Rights 
Committee’s own jurisprudence on discrimination but reaching a result different 
to that the Committee itself had reached.89 The cases seem to illustrate common 
practice of not precise but simplified, general references or quite free accommoda-
tion of the ruling to the needs of the domestic court argumentation. 
The cases concerned sensitive issues of  recovery of  the property confiscat-
ed by the  communist government. In  the decision of  199790 the  Constitutional 
Court found Extrajudicial Rehabilitation Act (Law no. 87/1991) compatible with 
the  Constitution and  the Czech Charter on Human Rights which was contrary 
to the  findings of  the HRC in Šimůnek et. al v The Czech Republic91 and Adam 
88 Case 9 Azs 107/2014-43 (Supreme Administrative Court, 29 May 2014) para. 26. 
89 Cf. Final Report on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004) paras 51–56.
90 Case Pl. ÚS 33/96 (Constitutional Court, 4 June 1997).
91 Simunek, Hastings, Tuzilova and  Prochazka v  The  Czech Republic, Communication 
No. 516/1992 (Human Rights Committee, 19 July 1995). 
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v The Czech Republic.92 In line with this Act the right to restitution of property ex-
propriated by the communist regime was granted only to Czech citizens. The HRC 
had concluded that the differentiation between non-citizens and Czech citizens 
in  the legislation was arbitrary and  infringed upon the prohibition of discrimi-
nation under Art. 26 ICCPR. The Constitutional Court argued that in analogous 
cases the  European Commission on Human Rights had come to different con-
clusions. These references, however, are not compelling since the Constitutional 
Court indicated the decisions on admissibility in which the Commission had not 
examined the violation under Art. 14 ECHR – the prohibition of discrimination.93 
The  Constitutional Court invoked as well the  HRC opinion in  Zwaan de Vries 
v Netherlands94 for authority that a differentiation in treatment, if based on reason-
able grounds, does not necessarily have to violate Art. 26 ICCPR. Consequently, 
the Court considered the restriction in question to be justified. 
In the decision of 199895 the Constitutional Court adjudicating on the provi-
sions of  the same Act which made the  restitution of  property contingent upon 
the  relevant nationalisation having taken place between 25 February 1948 
(the date of the Communist take-over) and 1 January 1990, referred to the HRC 
opinion in Šimůnek et. al v The Czech Republic96 as holding that the national le-
gal order could not differentiate between former and later victims of nationalisa-
tion (though the opinion said nothing on the issue). The Court emphasized that 
the setting of the time limits had an objective and reasonable basis, and any other 
approach could lead to a chain of restitution claims.97 
In the  2003 decision the  Constitutional Court mentioned the  views of  the 
HRC only in general terms and referred to the “numerous decisions of the con-
trol organs” existing under international human rights instruments on princi-
ple of  equality. The  Court held that the  preferential treatment of  miners in  the 
92 Josef Frank Adam v The Czech Republic, Communication No. 586/1994 (Human Rights Com-
mittee, 23 July 1996).
93 Cases of  the European Commission on Human Rights: Brežný v  Slovak Republic, 
App. no. 23131/93 (4 March 1996); Pezoldová v Czech Republic, App. no. 28390/95 (11 April 
1996); Nohejl v  Czech Republic, App. no. 23889/93 (13 May 1996); Jonas v  Czech Republic, 
App. no. 23063/93 (13 May 1996).
94 Zwaan de Vries v  Netherlands, Communication No. 182/1984 (Human Rights Committee, 
9 April 1987) para. 13. 
95 Case Pl. ÚS 45/97 (Constitutional Court, 25 March 1998). 
96 Simunek, Hastings, Tuzilova and  Prochazka v  The  Czech Republic, Communication 
No. 516/1992 (Human Rights Committee, 19 July 1995).
97 Cf. the other judgments of the Constitutional Court on constitutionality of the precondition 
of holding the Czech citizenship for the restitution of nationalised property of those persons 
whose property had been expropriated under the communist regime on the basis of crim-
inal proceedings and who had been rehabilitated by the courts on the basis of the Act on 
Judicial Rehabilitation of 1991. See e.g. case Pl. ÚS 24/98 (22 September 1999) on the limited 
to citizenship eligibility for restitution of the land by the Act No. 229/1991 Coll. on the Reg-
ulation of the Property Relations to Land and Other Agricultural Property, case Pl. ÚS 9/99 
(6 October 1999). 
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legislation is justified, since for years they had performed work, which was physi-
cally and mentally extremely demanding and conducted under very harsh condi-
tions.98
The most famous Czech example of a dissenting judicial dialogue is the Con-
stitutional Court decision on Slovak pension rights concerning the  obligations 
in international law and EU law.99 The case was broadly commented upon,100 also 
in this volume (see the contribution by Skomerska-Muchowska). The commen-
tators underline the internal conflict between the Supreme Administrative Court 
and the Constitutional Court, which led to a curious judgment of the latter, based 
on emotions rather than reason, proclaiming disobedience towards the CJEU pre-
liminary ruling. Ironically, the CJEU decision to a large extent supported previous 
findings of the Constitutional Court. The case provides an example of a situation 
where the occurrence of a horizontal dialogue (the discourse between domestic 
courts) may subsequently lead to a vertical dialogue between international and do-
mestic courts.
98 Case Pl. ÚS 15/02 (Constitutional Court, 21 January 2003).
99 Slovak Pensions, Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Constitutional Court, 31 January 2012).
100 A. Dyevre, ‘Domestic Judicial Non-Compliance in the European Union: A Political Economic 
Approach’ (2013) 2 LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers. pp. 1–34; R. Zbíral, ‘A Le-
gal Revolution or Negligible Episode? Court of Justice Decision Proclaimed Ultra Vires’ (2012) 
49 Common Market Law Review, p. 1457; J. Komárek, ‘Czech Constitutional Court Playing 
with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice 
of the EU Ultra Vires’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review, p.  323; G. Anagnostaras, 
‘Activation of the Ultra Vires Review: The Slovak Pensions Judgment of the Czech Constitu-
tional Court’ (2013) 14(7) German Law Journal, pp. 959–973; P. Molek, ‘The Court that Roared: 
The Czech Constitutional Court Declaring War of Independence against the ECJ’ (2012) 6 Eu-
ropean Law Reporter, pp. 162–170. Molek observes that: “After the ECJ’s judgment in Marie 
Landtová, the Czech legal doctrine as well as practitioners interested in social security law 
were eagerly expecting the CCC’s reaction. Accepting its own mistake in Czech-Slovak Agree-
ment’s interpretation and admitting that its previous case-law was discriminating against 
non-Czech EU citizens did not seem feasible. Nonetheless, the CCC could try to keep face 
while obeying the ECJ by distinguishing the new cases from its previous case-law, on the ba-
sis that it did not apply to cases in which a pension was granted after the Czech Republic 
had entered the  EU. A  second option would be to enter into a  real dialogue with the  ECJ 
treating it as an equal partner and thereby fulfilling the dream of constitutional pluralists 
of the mutual respect of courts at different levels. The CCC showed that there is ‘a third way’, 
this third option resembling a declaration of war of  independence (or ignorance?) against 
the ECJ, forgetting that the Czech Republic limited its sovereignty, as the CCC would suppos-
edly define it, voluntarily on 1 May 2004” (166). See also: K. Wójtowicz, Constitutional Courts 
and European Union Law (Wrocław 2014), p. 98. 
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3.2.4. The Slovak Pensions Rights Case – Horizontal 
and Vertical Dialogue
The case was resolved against the background of dissolution of Czechoslo-
vakia and  unclear provisions of  the Agreement between the  Czech Republic 
and the Slovak Republic on social security of 29 October 1992 which determines 
the State that would be responsible for the payment of old age benefits corre-
sponding to the periods of insurance under the previous legal regime. Pursuant 
to Art. 20 of the Agreement the applicable scheme and the authority with com-
petence to grant old age benefits would be linked to the State of residence of the 
employer at the  time of  dissolution of  Czechoslovakia. Consequently, Czechs 
whose employer had had residence in  the Czech part acquired Czech old age 
pensions and Czechs whose employer had had residence in the Slovak part ac-
quired Slovak old age pensions. Since Slovak pensions were significantly lower 
than Czech ones, the question arose whether they should not be supplemented 
by the Czech authorities to the level corresponding to that of other Czech citi-
zens’ pensions. 
The Czech Social Security Administration, supported by the  Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court, adopted a rather literal interpretation of Art. 20 of the Agree-
ment.101 People who were not satisfied with this approach addressed the Consti-
tutional Court. The  Constitutional Court (for the  first time in  the judgment 
of 2003) found that the right to adequate material security in old age and the 
principle of equality guarantee similar pensions to all Czech citizens.102 There-
fore, Art. 20 of the Agreement must be applied in such a way that the amount 
of the retirement pension paid by the other contracting party be supplemented 
to be equivalent to the higher entitlement set by national legislation.103 In subse-
quent decisions the Constitutional Court concluded that the supplements are re-
served only for Czech citizens residing on the Czech territory.104 The series of de-
cisions found no acceptance on the part of the Supreme Administrative Court. 
In the opinion of this Court the supplements were incompatible with the Agree-
ment and  EU law and, in  particular, with the  Council Regulation 1408/71 on 
the application of social security schemes to employed persons moving within 
the Union. The Czech Constitutional Court rejected these arguments without 
having referred for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, although the  interpreta-
tion of  EU law was also at stake.105 When the  Supreme Administrative Court 
asked the CJEU for the ruling, the Constitutional Court warned that it is its in-
terpretation of the Regulation that would prevail in the case at stake regardless 
of the ruling of the CJEU. The Constitutional Court held, furthermore, that sus-
pending the proceedings before the administrative court to await the judgment 
101 Case 6 Ads/2003 (Supreme Administrative Court, 23 February 2005).
102 Case II. ÚS 405/02 (Constitutional Court, 3 June 2003).
103 Case III. ÚS 252/04 (Constitutional Court, 25 January 2005).
104 Case I. ÚS 294/06 (Constitutional Court, 24 June 2008) paras 25, 33.
105 Case Pl. 4/06 (Constitutional Court, 20 March 2007). 
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of the Luxemburg Court violated the right to a fair trial.106 In C-399/09 Land-
tová, the CJEU held that the payment by the Czech Republic of a supplement 
to old age benefit is not contrary to EU law, however, it is contrary to EU law to 
pay it solely to Czech nationals residing on the territory of the Czech Republic.107 
The Court added that it does not necessarily follow, under EU law, that persons 
benefiting from supplementary social protection (satisfying these two require-
ments) should be deprived of it.108 
Whilst the  Parliament adopted an act, which excluded the  future payment 
of supplements, the reaction of the courts to the CJEU decision is rather surpris-
ing.109 The Supreme Administrative Court which asked for a preliminary ruling 
instead of awarding Mrs. Landtová with the supplement held that as the Consti-
tutional Court created this special supplement in violation of EU law (also by not 
referring the case to the CJEU), the decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot 
be binding on the Supreme Administrative Court. The only possibility to resolve 
the case at stake lied in the Constitutional Court finding relevant provisions of EU 
law incompatible with the Constitution. In the decision, the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court referred as well to the judgments of the Constitutional Court (cases 
Pl. ÚS 50/04 and Pl. ÚS 19/08), in which the Constitutional Court concurred with 
the Solange doctrine developed by the judgments of the German Constitutional 
Court and emphasized that the Constitutional Court has the undoubted authority, 
not questioned by anyone at the national level, arising from its role as the guard-
ian of the constitutionality and the sovereignty of the Czech Republic. The Con-
stitutional Court is, therefore, free to review again a disputed legal issue, which 
had been the  subject matter of  a  preliminary ruling of  the CJEU. Such a  judg-
ment would be directly binding as a precedent both for the Czech pension insurer, 
and for all ordinary courts.110 
The Constitutional Court, provoked by the  Supreme Administrative Court, 
answered with a highly emotional, ‘revolutionary’ judgment, finding for the first 
time in the history of the EU, the ruling of the CJEU to be ultra vires.111 Without 
106 Case III. ÚS 1012/10 (Constitutional Court, 12 August 2010). 
107 C-399/09 Marie Landtová v Česká správa socialního zabezpečení (CJEU, 22 June 2011) paras 40 
and 54.
108 Ibidem, para. 54.
109 Para. 106a of the Act No. 155/1995 Coll., as amended by the Act No. 428/2011 Coll.
110 Case 3 Ads 130/2008-204 (Supreme Administrative Court, 25 August 2011).
111 The  Constitutional Court held that: “[f]ailure to distinguish the  legal relationships arising 
from the dissolution of a state with a uniform social security system from the legal relation-
ships arising for social security from the free movement of persons in the European Commu-
nities, or the European Union, is a failure to respect European history, it is comparing things 
that are not comparable” and “that in that case there were excesses on the part of a Euro-
pean Union body, that a situation occurred in which an act by a European body exceeded 
the powers that the Czech Republic transferred to the European Union under Art. 10a of the 
Constitution; this exceeded the scope of the transferred powers, and was ultra vires.” Slovak 
Pensions, Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Constitutional Court, 31 January 2012).
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entering into deep discussion of  the judgment, we confine ourselves to the ex-
pression of  the doubts concerning the  reasoning of  the Constitutional Court. 
The Court seems to have based its judgment on a false assumption that the sit-
uation at stake is  purely internal, i.e. that EU law is  not applicable to the  legal 
relations regulated by the Agreement between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
In fact, however, the argumentation should be contrary, since the Agreement be-
came a part of EU law following the accession of both States to the EU. It was listed 
in the third Annex of  the Regulation 1408/71 as still applicable but interpreted 
in accordance with the general principles of EU law (there is another Annex in the 
Regulation enumerating agreements that may introduce measures of  unequal 
treatment of certain groups, the Czech-Slovak Agreement is not listed there). For 
the Constitutional Court this only means that the Agreement falls entirely outside 
the scope of the Regulation. 
The case has some other aspects as well. One is an evident opposition of the 
government to the  Constitutional Court judgments (before the  CJEU the  gov-
ernment clearly stated that the Constitutional Court violated EU law). The other 
is a doubtful behaviour of the CJEU whose judicial office returned the statement 
of the Constitutional Court sent to the CJEU explaining the Constitutional Court 
standing on the issues under the consideration of the European court. The note 
of the CJEU reminded the Constitutional Court that “pursuant to established cus-
toms, members of the ECJ do not correspond with third persons regarding cases 
that have been submitted to the ECJ.”112
The Constitutional Court ruling certainly is not legally compelling. It illustrates 
a mistaken use of ultra vires argument and will not serve as a precedent. But, on 
the other hand, the CJEU, having probably in mind to force constitutional courts 
to ask for preliminary rulings instead of  sending informal letters to the  Court, 
missed the opportunity to keep friendly relations with the Czech Court. All this 
shows that judges are only humans and they are subject to competition, and are 
neither devoid of emotions nor of judicial egoism.113
112 As recorded by the Constitutional Court, ibidem. 
113 G. Anagnostaras, ‘Activation of the Ultra Vires Review: The Slovak Pensions Judgment of the 
Czech Constitutional Court’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal, pp. 959–973, 972.
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4. Hungary
4.1. Dualistic Approach to International Law 
Similarly as in the other countries under our review, the Hungarian Consti-
tution refers to international law.114 Since 1 January 2012 Hungary has had a new 
Fundamental Law.115 The new Constitution replaced the Constitution of 1949.116 
Both acts contain similar provisions on international and EU law, especially as 
to their purpose and function. Article Q(2) of the Fundamental Law, which re-
placed Art. 7(1) of the Constitution of 1949 declares that in order to comply with 
obligations under international law, Hungary shall ensure that Hungarian law 
be in conformity with international law (the so-called ‘harmony clause’). Article 
Q(3) states that “Hungary shall accept the generally recognised rules of interna-
tional law. Other sources of international law shall become part of the Hungarian 
legal system by promulgation in legal regulations.” Adjudicating in the context 
of the 1949 Constitution, the Constitutional Court underlined that Art. 7 reg-
ulates the relations between national and international law, and that it is a spe-
cial constitutional provision that follows from the principle of the rule of law.117 
In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, this also means that the participation 
of the Republic of Hungary in international community is a constitutional im-
perative for domestic law. In the 2013 decision, which confirmed the relevance 
of its previous case law based on the 1949 Constitution to the present context, 
the Constitutional Court explained that every obligation of Hungary under in-
ternational law is an ‘assumed’ or an ‘undertaken’ obligation. International law 
is a distinct legal system (dualistic approach)118 and has to be somehow intro-
duced into domestic law. Article Q of  the Constitution regulates the  relations 
between the two systems. According to this provision, the universally recognised 
rules of international law are transformed into domestic law (assumed) in a gen-
eral way by the Constitution, while “other sources of international law” need to 
114 For general overview, see: N. Chronowski, T. Drinóczi, I. Ernszt, ‘Hungary’, [in:] D.L. Shel-
ton  (ed.), International Law and  Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, 
and Persuasion (Oxford University Press 2011), pp. 288–327. On judicial dialogue in Hungary 
see e.g. K. Kovics, ‘Cooperative Decision-making: The Relation between Hungary and Stras-
bourg’ (2011) 5(2) Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, pp. 188–199; L. Blut-
man, N. Chronowski, ‘Hungarian Constitutional Court: Keeping Aloof from European Union 
(2011) 5(2) Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, pp. 329–348; N. Chronowski, 
E. Csatlós, ‘Judicial Dialogue or National Monologue? The International Law and Hungarian 
Courts’ (2013) 1 ELTE Law Journal, pp. 7–28.
115 The Fundamental Law of Hungary was adopted on 25 April 2011.
116 The Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary as revised in 1989–1990. 
117 Case 7/2005 (III. 31.) AB (Constitutional Court, 29 March 2005).
118 See N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115) 9, 12. 
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be transformed individually with a use of special legal acts. The Constitutional 
Court observed that:
3.2. According to Article Q) para. (3) of the Fundamental Law, Hungary shall accept the gen-
erally recognised rules of international law. The first part of Article 7 para. (1) of the previous 
Constitution contained a rule with the same essential content, and the Constitutional Court 
attributed special importance to it, with consequences on the interpretation of the law as well: 
“The first sentence of Article 7 para. (1) of the Constitution, according to which the legal sys-
tem of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized rules of international law, 
states that the generally recognized rules are part of Hungarian law, even without separate 
(further) measure of transformation. An act of general transformation – one without a defi-
nition or enumeration of those rules – was performed by the Constitution itself. According 
to it, the  generally recognized rules of  international law are  not part of  the Constitution 
but they are assumed obligations. The fact that the assumption and transformation is con-
tained in the Constitution does not affect the hierarchical relationship of the Constitution, 
international and domestic law. […] Article 7 para. (1) of the Constitution also means that 
by the Constitution’s order, the Republic of Hungary participates in the community of na-
tions; this participation, therefore, is a constitutional command for domestic law. It follows 
therefrom that the Constitution and domestic law must be interpreted in a manner whereby 
the generally recognized international rules are truly given effect” [Decision 23/1993 (X. 13.) 
AB, ABH 1993, 323, 327].119
119 Case 1/2013 (I. 7.) AB on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Act on Election Proce-
dure (Constitutional Court, 4 January 2013) para. III.3.2. The Decision 23/1993 (X. 13.) AB cit-
ed in  this judgment belongs to fundamental judgments of  the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court on the relationship between international and Hungarian law, between international 
criminal law and national criminal law, and the non-applicability of statutory limitations to 
international crimes under customary and treaty law. The Constitutional Court was request-
ed by the President to review the constitutionality and compatibility with international law 
of a law enacted by the Parliament in order to extend the non-applicability of statutory limi-
tations to offences committed during the 1956 revolution. The Court concluded that the Con-
stitution requires the non-applicability of statutory limitations to be used only to offences, 
which were not subject to statutory limitations under the law in force at the time the offences 
were committed, unless those offences were regarded as war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity under international law. In the latter case, the application of Hungarian law would 
be precluded. Grave breaches of  the Geneva Conventions and  violations of  common Arti-
cle 3, as crimes against humanity, were not subject to statutory limitations under the New 
York Convention of 1968 and thus precluded the application of statutory limitations under 
Hungarian law in force at the time when the offences were committed. Finally, the Constitu-
tional Court held that provisions under its review were unconstitutional. In 1996, the Consti-
tutional Court dealt with an amended law. The Court held that the law was unconstitutional 
because it was contrary to international law (case 36/1996 (X. 13.) AB, 4 September 1996). 
Cf.  T.  Hoffman, ‘Trying Communism through International Criminal Law? The  Experiences 
of the Hungarian Historical Justice Trials’, [in:] K.J. Heller, G. Simpson, The Hidden Histories 
of War Crimes Trials (Oxford University Press 2013), pp. 229–247.
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As the generally recognised rules of international law are directly transformed, 
they are equal to constitutional norms in the hierarchy of sources of Hungarian 
law and even prevail over the Constitution since the Constitution has to be inter-
preted in concordance with these rules.120 
The concept of the generally recognised rules of international law encompasses 
customary international law and general principles of law.121 There are no examples 
of the determination of customary international law by reference to State practice 
and opinio iuris by Hungarian courts. Chronowski and Csatlós observed that cus-
tomary international law is rarely applied and if so, the Constitutional Court relies 
on codifying treaties.122 
It is interesting to note that under the heading of the generally recognized prin-
ciples of international law, the Constitutional Court referred to jus cogens. It de-
fined the term according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.123 Adju-
dicating upon the constitutionality of the draft amendment of the Criminal Code 
and its conformity with international norms relating to the prescription of crimes 
committed in violation of common Articles 2 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, the Constitutional Court derived the legal basis for punishability of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes without time limit from the fact that the pro-
hibition of these crimes is considered to be jus cogens as they threaten the whole 
mankind. The Court emphasised that “national law shall not be applied as against 
an explicit peremptory norm of international law contrary to it.”124 The Constitu-
tional Court enumerated as jus cogens also the principles nullum crimen sine lege125 
and pacta sunt servanda.126
120 Case 53/1993 (X. 13.) AB (Constitutional Court, 13 October 1993). 
121 The Constitutional Court explained that the term “generally recognised rules of international 
law” covers universal customary international law, peremptory norms (jus cogens) and gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations – case 30/1998 (VI. 25.) AB (Constitution-
al Court, 22 June 1998). It also observed that “[t]he constitutional criteria of a democratic 
State under the rule of law are at the same time constitutional values, principles and funda-
mental democratic freedoms enshrined in international treaties and accepted and acknowl-
edged by communities of democratic States under the rule of law, as well as the ius cogens, 
which is partly the same as the foregoing. As appropriate, the Constitutional Court may even 
examine the free enforcement and the constitutionalization of the substantial requirements, 
guarantees and values of democratic States under the rule of  law” (case 45/2012 (XII. 29.) 
AB (28 December 2012) on the unconstitutionality and annulment of certain provisions of the 
Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, para. IV.7). In case 5/2001 (II. 28) 
AB of 12 March 2001 the Constitutional Court qualified the provisions of the UN Charter as 
reflecting generally accepted principles of international law. Cf. M. Dezső et al., Constitutional 
Law in Hungary (Kluwer Law International 2010), p. 57.
122 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115), pp. 19–20.
123 Case 30/1998 (VI. 25.) AB (Constitutional Court, 22 June 1998). Cf. case 45/2012 (XII. 29.) 
AB (Constitutional Court, 28 December 2012). 
124 Case 53/1993 (X. 13.) AB (Constitutional Court, 13 October 1993).
125 Ibidem.
126 Case 4/1997 (I. 22.) AB (Constitutional Court, 22 January 1997).
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Other sources of international law (the most obvious ones are treaties ratified 
or approved by the Government)127 have to be separately transformed by the ap-
propriate legal act (promulgated) into domestic law.128 For example, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties was promulgated in Law: Decree 12 of 1987, 
the ECHR, on the other hand was promulgated in Act XXXI of 1993. Their pro-
visions can be directly applicable. The courts recognised in practice that promul-
gation is a formal condition of direct applicability while the substantive condition 
is whether the rights, duties and sanctions enshrined in the provisions of a treaty 
are sufficiently defined for judges to apply them in a case at hand.129 The position 
of a treaty in the hierarchy of legal acts depends on the legal character of the trans-
formation act (whether it is  an act of  the Parliament or of  the Government).130 
These rules apply to all treaties, including to the treaties containing self-execut-
ing norms. Whether the norm is self-executing, that is whether it may be applied 
in Hungarian law without separate implementing norm, is a question of interpre-
tation.131 
Article E(1) and  (2) of  the Fundamental Law (Art.  6(4) of  the Constitution 
of 1949) provides for Hungarian participation in the European cooperation, in-
cluding the membership in the EU. What is interesting from our perspective is the 
novel Art. E(3), which authorizes the application of EU law in the domestic con-
text. The formula is rather general. The provision states that EU law “may stipulate 
a generally binding rule of conduct.” There exists no other provision on applica-
tion of EU law in domestic legal system. It is understood that the rules of primacy 
of application of EU law or the rights and duties of domestic courts stem from 
the EU founding treaties and they should be applied as such.132  
The Fundamental Law has not solved the uncertainties concerning interna-
tional law, moreover, certain constitutional provisions, permitting exceptions to 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights, could come 
127 The  rules on procedure concerning the  conclusion, modification, suspension, termination 
of treaties etc. are regulated by the Act L of 2005 (2005. évi L. törvény a nemzetközi szerződése-
kkel kapcsolatos eljárásról).
128 Under Art.  10(1) of  the Act L of  2005 the  promulgating act should contain all the  relevant 
data for application of a treaty, e.g. the date of coming into force, reservations, declarations, 
statements, indication of the organ which is responsible for the execution, and, if necessary, 
amendments to existing Hungarian regulations or any other implementing provisions neces-
sary to harmonize international and national law.
129 E.g. case 7/2005 (III. 31.) AB (Constitutional Court, 29 March 2005); 116/B/2006 AB (Con-
stitutional Court, 2007) ABH 2007, 1936, 1938; Fejer County Court 25.P.22.432/2008/61; 
25.P./2008/80. Cf. case 116/B/2006 AB (Constitutional Court) ABH 2007, 1936, 1938.
130 The Constitutional Court did not declare the priority of treaties over domestic law but only 
held that international law is not to be adjusted to the conditions of domestic law, but rath-
er domestic law should be adjusted to comply with international law. Case 53/1993 (X. 13.) 
AB (Constitutional Court, 13 October 1993).
131 Case 7/2005 (III. 31.) AB (Constitutional Court, 29 March 2005). Cf. M. Dezső et al., Constitu-
tional Law in Hungary (Kluwer Law International 2010), p. 56.
132 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115), p. 10.
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into conflict with international obligations.133 Especially, the  Fourth Amend-
ment to Fundamental Law of  2013134 was highly criticized, e.g. by the  Venice 
Commission,135 the  European Parliament and  the European Commission.136 
The  Amendment i.a. restricts the  power of  the Constitutional Court, enables 
the criminalization of homelessness, restricts the definition of  family, and up-
holds the arbitrary registration process for churches. It has to be emphasized that 
the Fourth Amendment excluded the application of the previous case law of the 
Constitutional Court to the  new Constitution. Art.  19 of  the Fourth Amend-
ment reads: “[d]ecisions and their reasoning of the Constitutional Court prior 
to the coming into force of the Fundamental Law cannot be used for interpreting 
the  Fundamental Law.” Furthermore, under Art.  24(3)(c) of  the Fundamental 
Law the conflict between a domestic provision and an international treaty need 
not be solved by the annulment of the former. The Constitutional Court is not 
obliged to annul the domestic legislation (only ‘may’). The provision certainly 
weakens the effects of  the treaties and gives rise to doubts as to the harmony 
between two legal orders. Much depends thus on judges of  the Constitutional 
Court and judges of other courts. It is up to them to continue the tradition or to 
develop new interpretations. 
In fact, the Constitutional Court gave the first signals of continuity in its judg-
ment of 2012. The Court observed that “[i]n the new cases the Constitutional 
Court may use the arguments included in  its previous decision adopted before 
the Fundamental Law came into force in relation to the constitutional question 
ruled upon in the given decision, provided that this is possible on the basis of the 
concrete provisions and  interpretation rules of  the Fundamental Law, having 
the same or similar content as the provisions included in the previous Constitu-
tion.”137 According to this decision, the Constitutional Court’s statements made on 
133 Ibidem. 
134 The Fourth Amendment was adopted on 11 March 2013, entered into force on 1 April 2013. 
It  was the  response to the  Constitutional Court Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) AB (n. 1) which 
invalidated all the  provisions of  the Transitional Provisions of  Fundamental Law not hav-
ing the character of provisional regulations. The Fourth Amendment incorporated majority 
of the quashed provisions into the Constitution.
135 Opinion 720/2013 of the Venice Commission on the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamen-
tal Law of Hungary, Strasbourg 17 June 2013, <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/docu-
ments/?pdf=CDL-AD%282013%29012-e> (access: 17 June 2013).
136 On constitutional crisis in Hungary see A. von Bogdandy, P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional 
Crisis in the European Constitutional Area, Theory, law and Politics in Hungary and Romania 
(Hart Publishing 2015) 5; R. Uitz, ‘The illusion of  the constitution in  Europe: The  Hungari-
an Constitutional Court after the  Fifth Amendment of  the Fundamental Law’, [in:] J. Bell, 
M.-L. Paris (eds), Right-Based Constitutional Review: Constitutional Courts in a Changing Land-
scape (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016), pp. 374–408. 
137 Case 22/2012 (V. 11.) AB on the interpretation of paras (2) and (4) of Article E) of the Funda-
mental Law (Constitutional Court, ‘without specified date’) paras 40–41. Confirmed in case 
1/2013 (I. 7.) AB on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Act on Election Procedure 
(Constitutional Court, 4 January 2013) para. III.4.
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the fundamental values, human rights and freedoms and on the constitutional in-
stitutions that have not been changed essentially by the Fundamental Law remain 
valid. In  2013 the  Constitutional Court indicated that the  obligations of  Hun-
gary that arise from international treaties, the  EU membership, the  generally 
recognized rules of international law and the fundamental principles and values 
compose such a coherent system that cannot be left out of consideration during 
the law-making process (including constitution-making) and the constitutional 
review of the Constitutional Court.138 Against this background, the literal inter-
pretation of Art. 19 of  the Fourth Amendment seems inaccurate. However, we 
cannot verify the practice of the Constitutional Court after the entry into force 
of the Fourth Amendment since the new decisions of the Constitutional Court 
are not available in English. 
4.2. ‘International Legal Comparisons’ of Hungarian Courts
It seems that Hungarian courts broadly refer to international law instruments139 
and this tendency will be probably retained despite present constitutional prob-
lems. As in the other EU countries, the European Convention of Human Rights 
is  the most frequently invoked treaty.140 Naturally, when applying the  Conven-
tion, the courts, even if not all of them, refer to the ECtHR case law and the deci-
sions of foreign courts. Just as in other countries there is a difference in regularity 
and quality of references between the Constitutional Court and the other courts.141 
The practice of the latter was found to be “neither unambiguous nor consistent”142 
(see also in this volume the contribution by Górski). 
4.2.1. The Abortion and the Status of a Foetus Case
In order to illustrate the practice of inserting legal comparisons by the Hun-
garian courts, we would like to highlight three judgments of the Constitutional 
138 Case 12/2013 (V. 24.) AB (Constitutional Court, 21 May 2013), cf. 13/2013 (VI. 17.) AB (Constitu-
tional Court, 11 June 2013). 
139 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115), pp. 7–28.
140 Cf. P. Sonnevend, ‘Report on Hungary’, [in:] G. Martinico, O. Pollicino (eds), The National Ju-
dicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws, A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (Gronin-
gen: Europa Law Publishing 2010), p. 258.
141 J. Bóka, ‘Use of the Comparative Method by the Hungarian Constitutional Court – Conceptual 
and Methodological Framework for an Ongoing Research Project’, [in:] A. Badó, W.B. Detlev, 
J. Bóka, P. Mezei, Internationale Konferenz zum zehnjährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Re-
chtsvergleichung der Universität Szeged (Acta Iuridica Universitatis Potsdamiensis, Univer-
sitätsverlag Potsdam 2014), pp.  93–107. See in  the same volume E. Csatlós, ‘The Applica-
tion of International Law as an Instrument of Interpretation in Hungary – The Practice of the 
Constitutional Court and Ordinary Courts in a Comparative Approach’, <https://publishup.
uni-potsdam.de/opus4.../S127-142_aiup01.pdf> (access: 25 September 2016), pp. 127–142.
142 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115), p. 17, 16. The authors quote the decisions refusing appli-
cation of  the ECtHR case law, decisions wrongly invoking cases or invoking cases only for 
decoration etc. (see e.g. 18).
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Court. The  first decision, issued in  1998, concerns the  highly controversial 
issues of abortion, the status of a foetus, the right to dignity and the right to 
life.143 To answer the  question whether abortion should be permitted in  ex-
ceptional situations the Court broadly discussed the ECHR and the case law 
of the European Human Rights Commission, foreign legislation and decisions 
of  German, Polish and  the United States courts. The  Hungarian Court dis-
tanced itself from the Polish Constitutional Court judgment on the constitu-
tionality of the Polish 1997 abortion law,144 borrowing instead in some respects 
from the US Supreme Court145 and  the German Constitutional Court’s deci-
sions on abortion adopted between 1975 and 1993.146 Yet, in fact, the judgment 
is based on the assessment of the Hungarian legislation and the previous judg-
ments of the Constitutional Court. 
The Hungarian Court i.a. observed that the  right to life and  human dignity 
is ranked at the top in the hierarchy of constitutional fundamental rights. The State 
has an objective duty to protect life, which includes also that of a conceived indi-
vidual human life. In other legal systems, as the Court noted, the special individual 
fundamental rights are distinguished as the human dignity of an unborn human 
life and the unborn man’s own right to life. For example, the German Constitution-
al Court found that a foetus has its own individual right to life.147 However, this 
does not mean that a foetus can be declared a legal person (subject of law), since 
any special legal status not reaching the legal status of a human would practical-
ly offer only a relative protection to a foetal life. Furthermore, “among the rights 
to be weighed against the State’s duty to give increased protection to foetal life, 
143 Case 48/1998 (XI. 23.) AB (Constitutional Court, 18 November 1998). Cf. case 21/B/2008, 
154/2008 (XII. 15.) AB concerning the constitutionality of the Act of 2007 No. CLXXXIV on reg-
istered partnerships (Constitutional Court, 15 December 2008).
144 The Constitutional Court of Hungary indicated the case only by the date of the judgment: 
5  May 1997. It  seems that the  Court meant the  case K 26/96 (Polish Constitutional Court, 
28 May 1997). 
145 The judgment refers generally to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the right to pri-
vacy as a constitutional ground for the right to abortion and mentions the recognition of the 
use of contraceptives falling under the right to privacy in Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 
(1965).
146 The German Constitutional Court Cases Schwangerschaftsabbruch I 1 BvF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6/74 
(25  February 1975) BVerfGE 39, 1 and  Schwangerschaftsabbruch II 2 BvF 2/90 and  4, 5/92 
(28 May 1993) BVerfGE 88, 203. For discussion of comparisons between Hungarian and Ger-
man approach see Ch. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and  Judicial Interpretation of  Human 
Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of  International Law, pp. 655–724. C. Dupré, Importing 
the Law in Post-Communist Transitions: The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to 
Human Dignity (Oxford: Hart 2003).
147 Case 48/1998 (XI. 23.) AB (Constitutional Court, 18 November 1998) para. III.1.a. The Court 
referred to the German Constitutional Court decision Schwangerschaftsabbruch II 2 BvF 2/90 
and 4, 5/92 (28 May 1993) BVerfGE 88, 203.
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the mother’s right to self-determination – as a part of the right to human dignity 
is the most important one.”148 
The Court concluded that a provision permitting abortion in case the preg-
nant woman is in a situation of a serious crisis is not unconstitutional. The rea-
soning is certainly grounded in the former decisions from other jurisdictions, but 
not identical with them. For example, by contrast to the German Constitutional 
Court’s abortion decisions it does not link the woman’s right to self-determination 
and the foetal right to life to the protection of human dignity.149
4.2.2. The Election Rights Case – the Limits of International 
Comparisons
The second example is  the 2013 judgment of  the Constitutional Court150 
concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Election Procedure 
Act. The decision is interesting from our perspective, since it explains the use 
of – as the Court called it – ‘international legal comparison’ in practice of the 
Court. Firstly, the  Constitutional Court enumerated all previous decisions 
in which the method was applied151 and observed that “[t]he constitutionality 
of a  specific legal institution in another country depends on the constitution 
of a given State, the fitting into the legal system, and on the historical and polit-
ical background. Therefore, the Constitutional Court – though acknowledging 
that taking into account foreign experiences may help to evaluate certain regu-
latory solutions – does not consider the example of any foreign country in itself 
as a determining factor with regard to the review of constitutionality (compli-
ance with the Fundamental Law).”152 The Constitutional Court did not invoke 
any foreign judgments but referred broadly to the ECtHR case law. It started by 
general observance:
According to the electronic search engine (HUDOC) of the judicial practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights […], 82 cases out of the 15 thousand judgements on the merit were 
connected to Article 3 of the Amending Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
148 Ibidem, III.3.B.
149 S. Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy, A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Inter-
vention (Routledge 2016) 113.
150 Case 1/2013 (I. 7.) AB on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Act on Election Pro-
cedure (Constitutional Court, 4 January 2013).
151 The Court enumerated following decisions in which it discussed foreign regulations and ex-
amined their usefulness in constitutionality review at hand: “Decision 13/2000 (V. 12.) AB on 
the symbols of the State, Decision 57/2001 (XII. 5.) AB on the right of reply, Decision 22/2003 
(IV. 28.) AB on euthanasia, Decision 50/2003 (XI. 5.) AB on investigative committees, Decision 
6/2007 (II. 27.) AB on the questions 8 related to the prohibition of the publication of opinion 
poll results, Decision 20/2007 (III. 29.) AB on the radio and TV broadcasting of the sessions 
of the Parliament, Decision 53/2009 (V. 6.) AB on domestic violence and restraining order”, 
ibidem, para. III.3.4.
152 Ibidem, para. III.3.4.
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Rights. Some of the complaints were related to active suffrage, but most of them concerned 
exercising the passive right to vote. In assessing the complaints, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights […] used a well-elaborated set of criteria, applied in almost all the election cases 
in the past years.153
In the ensuing passages the Court carefully determined the standards used 
by the ECtHR for the obligation of the State to guarantee the conditions for exer-
cising the right to vote and registration of voters.154 The Court took these stand-
ards into account but underlined that its competence is  limited by the  scope 
of the petition.
4.2.3. The Status of the Decisions of Foreign and International Courts
The third example is the case decided in the same year as in the previous ex-
ample, 2013, involving the constitutionality of the criminalization of the display 
of totalitarian symbols – ‘five-point red star’.155 The case is the example of the ac-
commodation of the European standard in spite of the contrary ruling of the Con-
stitutional Court. In the previous decision issued in 2000 the Constitutional Court 
held that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code do not restrict the freedom 
of expression unnecessarily and disproportionately.156 In the meantime the ECtHR 
found in several cases that Hungary violated Art. 10 ECHR.157 The Constitutional 
Court agreed to accept the ECtHR decision against Hungary as ‘a new circum-
stance’ under Art.  31(1) of  the Act on the  Constitutional Court and  ultimately 
found the contested provisions unconstitutional (on this case see in this volume 
contribution by Csatlós).
The Court observed that the judgments of the ECtHR have a declaratory char-
acter; they do not change the existing law. Viewed from this perspective, the find-
ings of the ECtHR may help to clarify the content and the meaning of constitu-
tional rights. The  level of  the constitutional protection should never fall below 
the  standards provided by the ECHR, as interpreted in  the case law of  the EC-
tHR. Nevertheless, a national constitution may provide a higher level of protec-
tion than the ECHR. To establish this proper level the Constitutional Court re-
ferred to the laws of Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Poland 
and  Ukraine and  shortly referred to the  decisions of  the constitutional courts 
of Germany, Italy and Poland.158
153 Ibidem, para. III.3.5.2.
154 Ibidem, III.3.5.3–3.5.4.
155 Case 4/2013 (II. 21.) AB (Constitutional Court).
156 Case 14/2000 (V. 12.) AB (Constitutional Court).
157 The leading case is Vajnai v Hungary, App. no. 33629/06 (ECtHR, 8 July 2008).
158 Cases of the German Federal Constitutional Court: 1 BvR 680/86 (3 April 1990); 1 BvR 204/03 
(23 March 2006); 1 BvR 150/03 (1 June 2006); 2 BvR 2202/08 (18 May 2009); case 74/1958 
(Italian Constitutional Court, 20 December 1958); case K 11/10 (Polish Constitutional Court, 
19 July 2011). It is interesting to note that the Polish Constitutional Court in its judgment on 
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The reasoning concerning the effect of the judgments of the ECtHR displayed 
by the Court is in concordance with its previous 2003 ruling on effects of the judg-
ment of the ICJ. The case concerned the complaint of the Member of the Parlia-
ment against the  Government on the  legislative omission: failure to implement 
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the ICJ decision in the famous 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros159 in which the ICJ found Hungary in breach of the treaty 
with Slovakia and obliged both States to negotiate. The Constitutional Court, re-
ferring to its constitutional powers, held that the judgment of the ICJ cannot be 
considered “a generally recognized principle of international law” or compared to 
the obligations stemming from the treaties that had become Hungarian law. Even 
though the jurisdiction of the International Court is based on the consent of the 
States parties to the treaty establishing the Court, its decision is neither a norm, 
nor a contract, but the resolution of a specific dispute, even if some of its state-
ments are  of significant general value. The  International Court has no compe-
tence to annul domestic laws or to oblige the States to enact new laws even if this 
is the only way to fulfil the obligation.160 The Hungarian Court continued that also 
the Constitutional Court has no competence to force the Parliament or the Gov-
ernment to enact a law or conclude a treaty. 
N. Chronowski and  E. Csatlós observe that since the  decisions of  interna-
tional courts are not recognised in Hungary as sources of international law they 
can be regarded only as reflecting interpretation of relevant treaties and as such 
can be taken into account by Hungarian courts.161 The authors invoke the deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court mentioned above (988/E/2000) and the decision 
of  the Constitutional Court 18/2004 (V. 25.) AB in  which the  Court declared 
that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR “crafts and obliges the Hungarian practice” 
in a sense that Hungarian courts are bound by interpretation of the Convention, 
not a judgment as such.162 They also note that the Act on international treaties 
(Act L 2005) clearly states that the decisions of the international court rendered 
against Hungary are binding and shall be executed in Hungary. Such judgments 
have to be published in  the Hungarian Official Journal (Magyar Közlöny). But 
it does not follow that the courts are bound by the judgment. In their opinion, 
the status of international courts decisions defined by the judgments of the Con-
stitutional Court and the 2005 Act on international treaties determines the way 
fascist, communist and totalitarian symbols discussed broadly the judgments of the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court, the German Constitutional Court and also the ECtHR Vajnai v Hun-
gary case (para. 3).
159 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v Slovakia (ICJ, 25 September 1997).
160 Case 988/E/2000 (Constitutional Court, 7 October 2003) para. 3.3.
161 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115), p. 26.
162 Similarly, the Constitutional Court in case 61/2011 (VII. 13.) AB emphasised that the prin-
ciple of pacta sunt servanda obliges the Constitutional Court to follow the ECtHR practice 
and its level of fundamental rights protection even if it is contrary to the previous practice 
of Hungary.
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the domestic courts refer to these decisions. They conclude, citing relevant judg-
ments of  Hungarian courts, that ordinary courts frequently cite international 
courts decisions (mainly the ECtHR), but they rarely really use them in their own 
argumentation. In  many cases, the  citation is  only decorative or general with-
out invoking expressis verbis the relevant judgment or indirect through the judg-
ments of  the Constitutional Court (common practice of  the Municipal Court 
of Budapest).163 This technique seems to result from the specificity of Hungarian 
law, which does not allow the courts other than the Constitutional Court to ad-
judicate on constitutionality of  a  treaty or on a  conflict between international 
and national law norms. Domestic courts have to refer in such cases to the Con-
stitutional Court.164  
5. Lithuania
5.1. The Legal Setting for Judicial Dialogue
Three other countries under our review: Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine share 
a common past of the former Soviet republics and the common legal culture. Post-
1991 they have started to function in  a  new environment and  have undergone 
163 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115), pp. 27–28.
164 The Act on the Constitutional Court of 2011 Section 32(2): “Judges shall suspend judicial pro-
ceedings and initiate Constitutional Court proceedings if, in the course of the adjudication 
of a concrete case, they are bound to apply a legal regulation that they perceive to be contra-
ry to an international treaty.” Under Section 42: “(1) If the Constitutional Court declares that 
such a legal regulation is contrary to an international treaty which, according to the Funda-
mental Law, shall not be in conflict with the legal regulation promulgating the international 
treaty, it shall – in whole or in part – annul the legal regulation that is contrary to the interna-
tional treaty. (2) If the Constitutional Court declares that such a legal regulation is contrary 
to an international treaty which, according to the Fundamental Law, shall not be in conflict 
with the  legal regulation promulgating the  international treaty, it shall –  in consideration 
of the circumstances and setting a time-limit – invite the Government or the law-maker to 
take the necessary measures to resolve the conflict within the time-limit set.” This is the offi-
cial translation of the Act (<http://www.mkab.hu/rules/act-on-the-cc>, access: 25 September 
2016), the Hungarian text more clearly shows that the two situations are distinct. Paragraph 
1 refers to a conflict between a treaty promulgated by the act of the Parliament and the act 
of government while para. 2 – to the conflict between a treaty promulgated by governmental 
decree and the act of government. The Act of 2011 does not answer the question of the same 
rank sources collisions, i.e. if a treaty is promulgated by the act of Parliament, and the do-
mestic legal act conflicting with it is also the act of Parliament. N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós, 
Hoffmann T., ‘Country Report Hungary’ para. IV.1; N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 115) 25, 
n. 107. 
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the process of adaptation. Lithuania has experienced the deepest and the fastest 
changes striving hard to become the member of the Council of Europe and, later, 
the member of the EU.
The first constitutional Act “On re-establishment of  independence” adopt-
ed on 11 March 1990 declared Lithuania’s commitment to democracy, human 
rights and  the rule of  law by stating that “Lithuania stresses its adherence to 
universally recognised principles of international law.” In the 1992 Constitution 
Art. 135 repeated: “in implementing its foreign policy, the Republic of Lithua-
nia shall follow the universally recognized principles and norms of international 
law.” According to Art.  138 of  the Constitution, “international treaties which 
are ratified by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania shall be the constituent 
part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania.” In 1999 Lithuania adopted 
the Law “On international treaties”. The Law explains that ratified internation-
al treaties and agreements may be directly applicable and  in a case of conflict 
prevail over national law.165 The  Constitutional Court confirmed the  primacy 
of ratified international treaties, stressing, nevertheless, “the legal system of the 
Republic of Lithuania is based on the fact that no law or other legal act as well as 
international treaties (in this case the European Convention on Human Rights) 
may contradict the  Constitution.”166 The  2004 Constitutional Act “On mem-
bership in the EU” (which is a part of  the Constitution) declared the primacy 
of  EU primary law and  secondary law over domestic legislation maintaining 
the superior position of the Constitution in the determined hierarchy.167 In 2006 
165 A  treaty is  ratified by parliament in  a  form of  ratification act (statute) and  published later 
in the official gazette (Valstybės žinios). There are delays lasting in some cases for several 
years. The international treaties and agreements, which were not ratified, but approved by 
the Government – have a status lower than statutes and higher than governmental decrees 
and should also be applied directly by the courts. Cf. V. Vaičaitis, ‘Country Report Lithuania’ 
para. 1. 
166 Case 22/94 (Constitutional Court, 24 January 1995) on the  Convention for the  Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court added: “This general requirement 
is  directly connected with the  relation between the  international law and  domestic (na-
tional) laws of  the states in general and with respect to separate problems, specifically to 
the problem of human rights and freedoms. Nowadays, the system of the so-called parallel 
adjustment of international and domestic law is perhaps the most widely spread in Europe; 
it is based on the rule that international treaties are transformed in the legal system of a state 
(i.e. are incorporated in it). Such a way of the realisation of international treaties, the Con-
vention among them, is established in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Cf. 8/95 
(Constitutional Court, 17 October 1995).
167 In case 17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04 (Constitutional Court, 14 March 2006) on the limitation on 
the rights of ownership in areas of particular value and in forest land the Court recalled its 
previous case law confirming that the treaties ratified by the Seimas “acquire a force of a law”. 
“This doctrinal provision cannot be construed as meaning that, purportedly, the  Republic 
of Lithuania may disregard its international treaties, if a different legal regulation is estab-
lished in its laws or constitutional laws than that established by international treaties. Quite 
to the contrary, the principle entrenched in the Constitution that the Republic of Lithuania 
observes international obligations undertaken of its own free will and respects universally 
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the Constitutional Court summed up that “the observance of international ob-
ligations undertaken on its own free will, respect to the universally recognized 
principles of  international law (as well as the  principle pacta sunt servanda) 
are a legal tradition and a constitutional principle of the restored independent 
State of Lithuania.”168
The references to international law are not only in the Constitution but they 
could be found likewise in some statutes, e.g. Art. 33 of the Law on Courts169 un-
der the heading “Sources of law for adjudicating cases”, stipulates that the courts 
are to follow the Constitution, national laws, “international treaties of the Republic 
of  Lithuania”, acts of  the Government and  other acts, under the  condition that 
they do not contradict with the laws. Article 4(1) of the Administrative Proceed-
ings Act170 lays down a general rule that the court must not apply any law, which 
contradicts the Constitution. Article 4(3) of the Law on Administrative Proceed-
ings states that the administrative courts are bound by the judgments and prelim-
inary rulings of the CJEU and obliges them in cases provided for by law to refer to 
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on questions of application and validity of EU 
law. The same Law in Art. 6(6) in cases of lack of relevant legislation authorises 
the courts to rely on general principles of law (including international law prin-
ciples) and the principles of fairness and reasonableness.171 The similar technique 
of specific authorisations for the courts to apply international law, which function 
aside the Constitution, is practiced in other States as well. However, in Lithuania, 
Russia and Ukraine the technique is used probably more frequently than in Poland 
or in the Czech Republic. The reason could be that their courts before 1990s have 
not applied international law at all and they were used to follow binding guidelines 
of the higher courts. 
After the experience of the Soviet totalitarian regime, Lithuania had to change 
not only its political or judiciary system, but the  judges had also to adjust their 
legal thinking. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania established in 1993 played 
recognised principles of international law implies that in cases when national legal acts (in-
ter alia,  laws or constitutional laws) establish a  legal regulation which competes with that 
established in  an international treaty, then the  international treaty should be applied” 
(para.  III.9.2). The  Court further added: “Thus, the  Constitution consolidates not only 
the principle that in cases when national legal acts establish the legal regulation which com-
petes with that established in an international treaty, then the international treaty should be 
applied, but also, in regard of European Union law, establishes expressis verbis the collision 
rule, which consolidates the priority of application of European Union legal acts in the cases 
where the provisions of the European Union arising out of the founding Treaties of the Euro-
pean Union compete with the legal regulation established in Lithuanian national legal acts 
(regardless of what their legal force is), save the Constitution itself” (para. III.9.4).
168 Ibidem, para. III.9.1.
169 The Law on Courts (Lietuvos Respublikos teismų įstatymas), Official Gazette, 1994, no. 46–851; 
2002, no. 17–649.
170 The Law on Administrative Proceedings (Lietuvos Respublikos administracinių bylų teisenos 
įstatymas), Official Gazette, 1999, no. 13–308; 2000, no. 85–2566.
171 V. Vaičaitis, ‘Country Report Lithuania’ para. 2.
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in  that process a  vital role. It  adapted many concepts from other jurisdictions, 
especially from the ECtHR and the CJEU case law, e.g. to substantiate the prin-
ciple of  the rule of  law (teisinės valstybės principas), enshrined in  the Preamble 
to the Constitution, the principle of certainty of law, proportionality or the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations. In the majority of cases, this was done without 
invoking any foreign or international decisions (silent dialogue). 
For example in the 2002 judgment on state social insurance pensions the Con-
stitutional Court found the  provisions of  Lithuanian law reducing the  amount 
of  elderly pensions after so called 1999–2000 “Russian economic crises” to be 
contrary to the rule of law which encompasses, according the Court, the respect 
of human rights and the protection of legitimate expectations.172 The Court made 
the reference as well to Art. 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights as the basis for the right to social security including social 
insurance.173 
In the 2010 judgment “on the right of the persons, who sustained damage due to 
genocide, to demand that the natural persons who committed this crime compen-
sate such damage” the Court observed that “[d]uring the occupations of Lithuania 
carried out both by the USSR and by the Nazi Germany, not only democracy was 
denied, but also crimes against the residents of an occupied State were commit-
ted, inter alia genocide was perpetrated. It is obvious that, during the years of the 
occupation, the persons who had suffered from crimes of genocide perpetrated 
by the natural persons who were serving the occupation regimes were unable to 
implement their right to demand that the  natural persons who had perpetrat-
ed the  crimes of  genocide compensate the  damage.”174 The  Court determined 
the claimed right referring for support of its argumentation to international law 
instruments and the concept of the rule of law.175
The Constitutional Court made also important contribution in  clarifying 
the way the international treaties have to be applied. It distinguished various kinds 
of treaties and their different legal effects relying strongly on the VCLT. In the rul-
ing “On the Law ‘On International Treaties of the Republic of Lithuania’” the Con-
stitutional Court, even the priority over the Constitution, explained referring to 
the Convention:
The legal system of the Republic of Lithuania is grounded on the fact that any law or other 
legal act, as well as international treaties of  the Republic of  Lithuania, must not contra-
dict the Constitution, because Paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Constitution prescribes: “Any 
law or other statute which contradicts the Constitution shall be invalid.” This constitution-
al provision of itself cannot invalidate a law or an international treaty but it requires that 
172 Case 41/2000 (Constitutional Court, 25 November 2002) para. II.2.1. 
173 Ibidem, para. II.1.4. See also e.g. for the  concept of  democracy case 19/94 (Constitutional 
Court, 20 April 1995). 
174 Case 09/2008 (Constitutional Court, 29 November 2010) para. III.7.
175 Ibidem, para. III.5.
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the provisions thereof would not contradict the provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise 
the Republic of Lithuania would not be able to ensure legal defence of the rights of the par-
ties of international treaties, which arise from those treaties, and this in its turn would hin-
der from fulfilling obligations according to the concluded international treaties. This would 
contradict the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaty, which was un-
dertaken to respect and execute by the Republic of Lithuania according to the 29 January 
1991 Declaration of the Supreme Council “On the Obligations of the Republic of Lithuania 
Arising out of International Treaties in the Spheres of Diplomatic and Consular Relations.” 
At the same time the most important principles of said Convention would be also violated, 
namely: pacta sunt servanda, i.e., “every treaty is binding to be performed” (Article 26 of the 
Convention) and “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty” (Article 27 of the Convention). It is important therefore 
that consecutive order of concluding, implementing and terminating international treaties 
would be established and that it would be in conformity with the provisions of the Con-
stitution concerning international treaties as well as principles and norms of  this sphere 
of international law.176
In the same ruling the Constitutional Court made a distinction between the rat-
ified and the not ratified treaties. According to the Court, only the ratified treaties 
have the status of a parliamentary statute and they have to comply with the Con-
stitution, while the non-ratified treaties have to comply with laws and the Consti-
tution.177 The Court defined also the notion of a treaty (relying on the VCLT) to 
distinguish treaties and other agreements of ministries or institutions of the Gov-
ernment, which are not governed by international law.178
5.2. Deference to International and Foreign Courts 
Decisions
There are many judgments of all kinds of courts, the ordinary courts, the ad-
ministrative courts or the Constitutional Court applying international treaties di-
rectly or for the purpose of interpretation of domestic law.179 But the references to 
the decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions are not frequent and in majority 
of cases they concern case law of the ECtHR180 and the CJEU.
176 Case 8/95 (Constitutional Court, 17 October 1995), English translation <http://www.lrkt.lt/
en/court-acts/search/170/ta983/content> (access: 25 September 2016).
177 Ibidem, para. II.3.
178 Ibidem, para. II.4.
179 See e.g. cases reproduced in Republic of Lithuania Materials on International Law contained 
in Baltic Yearbook of International Law volumes 6/2006, 449–478; 7/2007, 453–473; 8/2008, 
347–384; 9/2009, 295–349; 10/2010, 457–506; 11/2011, 517–598; 12/2012, 377–462.
180 See e.g. case 1/2013 (Constitutional Court, 26 February 2013) on the prohibition on corre-
spondence between convicts. 
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5.2.1. The Judges Salaries Case
In the  judgment of  2001 concerning the  reduction of  the salaries of  judg-
es the  Constitutional Court made an inquiry into international documents on 
the independence of judiciary (i.a. UN GA resolution of 13 December 1985 which 
adopted the Basic Principles on the  Independence of  the Judiciary, the Council 
of Europe Recommendation on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges 
of  13 October 1994, the  European Charter on the  Statute for Judges of  10 July 
1998)181 and the decisions of the constitutional courts of democratic States dealing 
with the  salaries of  the judges as an element of  their independence. The Court 
observed:
It needs to be noted that the principle that the salary of the judge during his continuance 
in office may not be diminished was entrenched as far back as in the 1787 USA Consti-
tution (Section 1 of Article III). Later on it was taken over by constitutional law of other 
democratic countries. In some countries it is directly stated in the texts of basic laws, while 
in others it is considered an integral element of the principle of independence of judges 
and courts established in the Constitution. In the constitutional doctrine various aspects 
of the element of the principle of independence of judges and courts have been disclosed. 
For instance, in its decision of 15 September 1999, the Constitutional Court of the Czech 
Republic emphasised the inalienable right of the judge to undiminished salary and the pro-
hibition against the categorisation of judges as public servants. In its decision of 17 Sep-
tember 1997, the  Supreme Court of  Canada noted that it is  impermissible to diminish 
salaries of judges in an attempt to evade the budget deficit. In the decision of 4 October 
2000 of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland it is held that the salaries of judges must be 
especially protected against unfavourable fluctuations in  case of  difficulties in  the area 
of state budget, etc.182 
The ruling is certainly one of the examples of the concurring dialogue.183 
5.2.2. The Concept of Family in State Policy Case
In the 2011 judgment on the State family policy concept the Constitutional 
Court dealt with a sensitive issue of the modern notion of family. To construct 
the  constitutional conception of  family the  Constitutional Court relied inter 
alia on international law commitments of Lithuania, especially on the ECHR. 
The  Court analysed Marckx v  Belgium,  Kroon and  others v  The  Netherlands, 
181 Case 13/2000-14/2000-20/2000-21/2000-22/2000-25/2000-31/2000-35/2000-39/2000-8/01-
31/01 (Constitutional Court, 12 July 2001) on the reduction of judges’ salaries, para. III.4.3.
182 Ibidem, para. III.4.5.
183 The Constitutional Court like e.g. the Hungarian Court (cf. n. 139) referred to foreign deci-
sions providing only dates, in this case the dates are correct. The Court referred to case Pro-
vincial Judges Reference (Supreme Court of Canada, 17 September 1997) 3 S.C.R.; case P/8/0 
(Polish Constitutional Court, 4 October 2000). 
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Keegan v Ireland, El Boujaïdi v France184 to conclude that “the concept of fam-
ily analysed in  the jurisprudence of  the ECHR is  not confined to the  notion 
of the traditional family founded on the basis of marriage. The ECHR has held 
more than once that other types of the relationship of living together are also 
protected under Art. 8 of the Convention, as those, which are characterised by 
a  permanence of  the relationship between persons, the  character of  assumed 
obligations, common children, etc. It  also needs to be noted that the  ECHR 
jurisprudence does not provide any comprehensive list of the criteria defining 
the family.”185 Moreover, the judgment contains a thorough inquiry into the de-
cisions of  the constitutional courts of  the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Hungary, France, and  of Germany. The  Constitutional Court observed that 
the practice of constitutional courts is not uniform, “the family is defined by 
taking into consideration the plurality of forms of family life prevailing in soci-
ety at a particular period of time, as well as the demographic, economic and so-
cial changes in the life of society.”186 On these basis the Constitutional Court de-
termined the constitutional standard. It found that the concept of family under 
Lithuanian Constitution may not be reduced to “such notions of family under 
which only a man and a woman who are married or were married, as well as 
their children (adopted children), are regarded as a family” but it has to extend 
to “other family relations, inter alia those of the life of a man and a woman, who 
are not and were not married, as well as their children (adopted children) living 
together, that are based on the permanent bonds of emotional affection, recip-
rocal understanding, responsibility, respect, shared upbringing of the children 
and similar ones, as well as on the voluntary determination to take on certain 
rights and responsibilities, which are characteristic of the family as a constitu-
tional institute.”187
184 Marckx v  Belgium, App. no. 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979), Kroon and  others v  The  Neth-
erlands, App. no. 18535/91 (ECtHR, 27 October 1994), Keegan v  Ireland, App. no. 16969/90 
(ECtHR, 26 May 1994), El Boujaïdi v France, App. no. 25613//94 (ECtHR, 26 September 1997). 
185 Case 21/2008 (Constitutional Court, 28 September 2011), English translation <http://www.
lrkt.lt/data/public/uploads/2015/04/2011-09-28_n_ruling.pdf> (access: 25 September 2016), 
para. III.2.
186 Ibidem, para. III.3.
187 Ibidem, para. IV.14. In respect of the notion of family it is interesting to compare case re Kostro-
ma Region Law 987-АПГ 12-2 (Supreme Court, 7 November 2012) in which the Russian Court 
referred only to Art. 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and treaties that re-
quire to protect the family as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment 
for the  growth and  well-being of  all its members and  particularly children (e.g.,  Art.  10(1) 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, preamble to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989). It did not invoke any decisions of foreign or 
international courts noticing that pursuant to federal law, in accordance with the national 
traditions and subject to international law, the family values do not include homosexual rela-
tions, bisexuality and transgender. Therefore, by adopting the law in question the Kostroma 
region did not impose unreasonable restrictions on rights but acted within the scope of its 
competence as the  disputed law prohibits the  propaganda of  homosexuality, bisexuality, 
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The decision of the Constitutional Court is largely grounded in domestic law. 
The  references to international instruments or foreign jurisdictions have sub-
sidiary character with the  sole purpose, as it seems, to strengthen and  support 
the findings of the Court. 
5.2.3. The Paksas Case – the Status of the Decisions of Foreign 
and International Courts and the Dissenting Dialogue
In Lithuanian practice it is also possible to find the judgment opposing the rul-
ing of the international court. The Paksas case is well known and studied elsewhere 
in this volume (see Skomerska-Muchowska). Therefore, in this introductory sec-
tion we confine ourselves to a brief account. 
In 2012 the Constitutional Court had an occasion to react to the 2011 ECtHR 
Paksas v Lithuania188 judgment which evaluated Lithuanian law differently than 
it had been previously done by the Constitutional Court.189 In 2004 the Constitu-
tional Court held as constitutional the provisions of Lithuanian law prohibiting 
a person who had been removed from the office of the President for a gross vio-
lation of the Constitution or a breach of the oath to be again elected the President 
of the Republic or a member of the Seimas or hold an office for which it was nec-
essary to take an oath.190 
Dealing with President Paksas, who had been removed from the office as a re-
sult of the impeachment proceedings, the ECtHR, taking account of the perma-
nent and irreversible prohibition for the applicant to stand in elections to the par-
liament, recognised that this restriction was disproportionate and  that Art.  3 
of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention was violated.
transgender as relations negating the family values and imposes administrative liability for 
the propaganda thereof within the constituent entity of the Russian Federation, which is in 
compliance with the applicable federal laws.
188 Paksas v Lithuania, App. no. 34932/04 (ECtHR, 6 January 2011). 
189 Paksas 8/2012 (Constitutional Court, 5 September 2012) on the prohibition for a person, who 
was removed from office under procedure for impeachment proceedings, to stand in elec-
tions for a Member of the Seimas,  <http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1055/con-
tent> (access: 24 September 2016).
190 Case 24/04 (Constitutional Court, 25 May 2004) para. III.6: “The Constitution does not pro-
vide that, after a certain time has elapsed, a president whose actions have been recognised 
by the Constitutional Court as having grossly violated the Constitution, and who has been 
found to have breached the oath and has been removed from office by the Seimas [on that 
account] […] may [subsequently] be treated as though he had not breached the oath or com-
mitted a gross violation of the Constitution […]. [A person] […] who has been removed from 
office by the Seimas, the body representing the people, will always remain someone who has 
breached his oath to the nation and grossly violated the Constitution, and who has been dis-
missed as President for those reasons […]. [A person removed from the office of President] 
may never again […] give an oath to the nation, as there would always exist a reasonable 
doubt […] as to its reliability […].” English translation: The Constitutional Court of the Re-
public of Lithuania on the Law on Presidential Elections, <http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/
search/170/ta1269/content> (access: 24 September 2016).
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In 2012 the  Constitutional Court reviewed the  constitutionality of  the 
amendments to Lithuanian law implementing the ECtHR judgment. The Con-
stitutional Court confirmed the doctrine in regard to the impeachment proce-
dure and the consequences of the breach of oath. The Court insisted that it can-
not change the doctrine firmly grounded in the Constitution on the basis of the 
ECtHR judgment.191 The doctrine could be changed only with an amendment 
of  the Constitution.192 The  Constitutional Court did not question the  argu-
ments of the ECtHR but discussed rather the potential legal consequences of the 
ECtHR judgment. The Court pointed first to the different roles of both Courts. 
The Constitutional Court is the guardian of the Constitution while the ECtHR 
is responsible for the effective implementation of the ECHR. However, the role 
of the ECtHR is subsidiary to that of a State party to the ECHR, which is pri-
marily obliged to apply the  Convention. The  obligation is  the one of  result, 
so a  State may choose the  way of  the implementation of  the Convention or 
the judgment of the ECtHR taking into account its national law, and especially 
the Constitution. In a situation at hand, the Constitutional Court is obliged to 
respect the Constitution; therefore, the incompatibility between the Lithuanian 
law and the ECHR may be removed only by the adoption of the corresponding 
amendment(s) to the Constitution.193 Despite several efforts, the Constitution 
has not yet been amended.194
Paksas is certainly a political case and so a unique one as Judge Costa rightly 
emphasised in a partly dissenting opinion annexed to the ECtHR decision. Judge 
Costa found the ECtHR judgment ‘moderate and balanced’ and shared the con-
viction of the majority that the lifelong disqualification from standing for election 
191 Paksas 8/2012 (Constitutional Court, 5 September 2012) para. III.5: “Consequently, in  it-
self the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights may not serve as the constitu-
tional basis for reinterpretation (correction) of  the official constitutional doctrine (provi-
sions thereof) if such reinterpretation, in  the absence of  corresponding amendments to 
the Constitution, changed the overall constitutional regulation (inter alia the integrity of the 
constitutional institutes – impeachment, the oath and electoral right) in essence, also if it 
disturbed the system of the values entrenched in the Constitution and diminished the guar-
antees of protection of the superiority of the Constitution in the legal system.” English trans-
lation available at <http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1055/content> (access: 
24 September 2016).
192 Ibidem, para. III.6: “In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue it needs to be not-
ed that from Para. 1 of Art. 135 of the Constitution a duty arises for the Republic of Lithuania 
to remove the aforesaid incompatibility of the provisions of Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the 
Convention with the Constitution, inter alia the provisions of Para. 2 of Art. 59 and Article 74 
thereof. While taking account of the fact that, as mentioned, the legal system of Lithuania 
is grounded upon the principle of superiority of the Constitution, the adoption of the corre-
sponding amendment(s) to the Constitution is the only way to remove this incompatibility.”
193 Ibidem, para. III.2.
194 See the  Council of  Europe information on the  monitoring of  the execution of  judgments 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTi-
tleOrNumber=&StateCode=LIT&SectionCode= /> (access: 23 June 2016).
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is excessive and unacceptable. However, he emphasised that the impeachment pro-
ceedings are rarely instituted not only in Europe but elsewhere in the world and are 
hardly ever carried through to completion. The allegations against President Pak-
sas were not trivial and he was removed from the office by the Parliament who 
followed the ruling of the Constitutional Court. “In such a specific and delicate 
field as electoral law, and in a case involving the complex relations between the dif-
ferent public authorities, subject to the ultimate scrutiny of the electorate, and thus 
the  sovereign people” Judge Costa advocated restraint noting that the State has 
a wide discretion, and therefore “the legitimate European supervision in this case 
should be restricted or limited.”195 
6. The Russian Federation
6.1. The Legal Setting for Judicial Dialogue
Prior to the adoption of the Russian Constitution in 1993 both in Russian the-
ory and  in practice the  issue of  the relationship between international and na-
tional legal systems had been neglected.196 International law was not taken into 
account by national law or it was treated similarly to national law without con-
sidering its peculiarity.197 The idea of priority of national law dominated. It was 
understood that “[t]he national legal system is as sovereign as the State because 
on the  territory of  the country without the  sanction (in one form or another) 
of national State power norms cannot operate created besides by the  law-crea-
tion agencies thereof.”198 Against this background, Art. 15(4) of the 1993 Russian 
195 Paksas v Lithuania, App. no. 34932/04 (ECtHR, 6 January 2011), the partly dissenting opinion 
of Judge Costa joined by Judges Tsotsoria and Baka, para. 12. 
196 Cf. L. Mälksoo, Theory of International Law in Contemporary Russia (Oxford University Press 
2015), p.  111. On the  specific attitude and  its reasons of  the Russian scholarship towards 
foreign and international courts practice see: L. Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2015), p. 77. For a general overview see R. Tkatova, ‘Russian 
spirit, soviet heritage and Western Temptation: “UN-‘Peaceful Coexistence” in Russia’s Inter-
national Doctrine and Practice’ (2012), p. 12, Baltic Yearbook of International Law, pp. 1-28; 
S.Yu. Marochkin, ‘Contemporary Approaches of  the Russian Doctrine to International Law: 
Identical to Western Ones?’ (2012) 12 Baltic Yearbook of  International Law, pp.  29–56. 
L.  Mälksoo, ‘International Law in  Russian Textbooks: What’s in  the Doctrinal Pluralism?’ 
(2009) 1 Goettingen Journal of International Law, pp. 279–290.
197 N. Babai, V.S. Timoshenko, ‘General Principles and Norm of International Law in the Russian 
Legal System’ (2007) 1 Russian Law: Theory and Practice, p. 78, see also, pp. 77–82.
198 A.M. Vasilev, ‘On the Systems of Soviet and International Law’ (1985) 1 Sovietskoje gosudarst-
wo i prawo, p. 69, cited by N. Babai, V.S. Timoshenko, ‘General Principles and Norm of Inter-
national Law in the Russian Legal System’ (2007) 1 Russian Law: Theory and Practice, p. 77.
I. The Central and Eastern European Judiciary… 63
Constitution declaring priority of international law marks an important change.199 
The opening of the Constitution to international law was brought about not with-
out a strong conceptual debate in Russian scholarship and opposition from schol-
ars, politicians and  judges.200 The  majority view is  that the  provision provides 
the grounds for the application of international law in domestic sphere. It binds 
equally in law-creation as in law-application. Since the provision is located in the 
first Chapter of the Constitution, which is under more stringent conditions for 
amendment than the other provisions of the Constitution, it is perceived as one 
of the fundamental principles of the Russian constitutional legal order.201 The pro-
vision reads: 
199 The  Constitution of  1977 contained Art.  29 which i.a. expressed the  intention to honour 
obligations stemming from generally recognized principles and  norms of  international 
law in  good faith. The  provision was understood only as enumerating the  principles that 
the USSR intended to follow in its foreign policy. Cf. L. Mälksoo, Theory of International Law 
in Contemporary Russia (Oxford University Press 2015), p. 112. On general overview of con-
stitutional bases for application of  international law see W.E. Butler, ‘Russian Federation’, 
[in:] D. Sloss (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, A Comparative Study 
(Cambridge University Press 2014), pp. 410–447; S.Yu. Marochkin, ‘International Law in the 
Courts of the Russian Federation: Practice of Application’ (2007) 6(2) Chinese Journal of In-
ternational Law, pp. 239–344. 
200 L. See Mälksoo, Theory of  International Law in  Contemporary Russia (Oxford University 
Press 2015), p.  111. The  relationship between international and  Russia’s domestic law 
is  one of  the main topics of  debates in  the post-Soviet Russian theory of  international 
law closely linked to the  question whether individuals can be subjects of  international 
law. The author concludes that Russian theory of international law on such issues tends 
to have different accents and positions than what have become mainstream in the post-
World War II ‘liberal’ west. 
201 Cf. A. Abashidze, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law: Signifi-
cance of Monism and Dualism Concepts’ Basic Concepts of Public International Law, Mon-
ism & Dualism, Faculty of  Law of  Belgrade University (May 2013), p.  25. The  author clas-
sifies the Russian system as monistic. However, the approach taken by the Constitutional 
Court in Markin case (n. 228) is rather dualistic. See case 27-П/2013 (Constitutional Court, 
6 December 2013). Cf. O.V. Belianskaia, O.A Pugina., ‘Implementation of International Legal 
Norms in  Russian Legislation’ (2006) 1 Russian Law: Theory and  Practice, pp.  82–89. For 
Russian scholarly discussion on the issue see L. Mälksoo, Theory of International Law in Con-
temporary Russia (Oxford University Press 2015), p. 112. The author observes i.a.: “Russia’s 
constitution may be monist but conservative scholars continue to interpret the  position 
of international law in Russia in a dualist fashion. Moreover, the more the Russian govern-
ment has run into conflicts with norms of international law, the more audible has become 
the voice in the country’s politics that demands amendment of the constitutional provision 
stipulating the priority of international law over domestic law. As the deputy Yevgeny Alek-
seevich Fedorov (b. 1963) from the governing ‘United Russia’ fraction argues populistically, 
currently the priority of  ‘international law’ actually means the priority of  ‘American law’.” 
Ibidem, p. 122. For general overview see Y. Tikhomirov, ‘Russia’, [in:] D.L. Shelton (ed.), In-
ternational Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion 
(Oxford University Press 2011), pp. 517–525.
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Universally recognized principles and  norms of  international law as well as international 
agreements of  the Russian Federation should be an integral part of  its legal system. If an 
international agreement of the Russian Federation establishes rules, which differ from those 
stipulated by law, then the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.202 
This principle is elaborated in the Federal Law “On International Treaties of the 
Russian Federation” of  1995 which concerns the  conclusion, implementation 
and termination of  international treaties in Russia. It was repeated almost in all 
codes and Federal Laws.203
Additionally, the  Constitution recognizes the  special status of  human rights 
norms stating in Art. 17(1) that: “In the Russian Federation recognition and guar-
antees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen according 
to the universally recognized principles and norms of  international law and ac-
cording to the  present Constitution.” Moreover, the  Russian courts recognized 
the obligation to apply the ECtHR case law (legal positions of the ECtHR).204 
202 Translation available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstEng1.shtml (access: 
20 June 2016). There is no single official translation of the Constitution of the Russian Feder-
ation in English.
203 E.g E. Ivanow, A. Belyachenkova, ‘Country Report Russian Federation’ para. 1.2: “Pursuant 
to Article 3 of  the Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ ‘On the  Judicial System  of  the 
Russian Federation’ dated 31 December 1996, the  integrity of  the judicial system 
of the Russian Federation is ensured through the application by all courts of the generally 
recognised principles and rules of international law and the international treaties of the 
Russian Federation. As set out in Article 11.4 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, where 
an international treaty of the Russian Federation provides for the rules other than those 
provided for by law, the court in considering a civil case shall apply the rules of the inter-
national treaty. A similar provision is contained in the Civil Code. In criminal law, the rules 
of international treaties that require states to consider certain acts as criminal ones shall 
not be applied directly. In Russia, the crimes and the punishment for criminal acts are de-
termined solely by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Russian Criminal Code). 
New components of crime shall be included in the Russian Criminal Code based on the in-
ternational treaties. Certain articles of  the Russian Criminal Code contain references to 
the international treaties. For instance, Article 356 of the Russian Criminal Code establish-
es criminal liability for using the prohibited means and methods of warfare. The concept 
of the ‘prohibited means and methods of warfare’ is defined in the Geneva Conventions. 
Pursuant to Article 1.3 of  the Russian Code of  Criminal Procedure ‘the generally recog-
nised principles and rules of international law and the international treaties of the Rus-
sian Federation shall form an integral part of the criminal procedure laws and regulations 
of  the Russian Federation. If an international treaty of  the Russian Federation sets out 
the rules other than those provided for by this Code, the rules of the international treaty 
shall apply’. Finally, as set out in Article 1.1(2) of the Russian Code of Administrative Of-
fences, the Code is based on the generally recognised principles and rules of international 
law, and sets out the prevailing nature of the rules of international treaties over the provi-
sions of law on administrative offences.”
204 See the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5 
(10 October 2003) “On Application of the Universally Recognized Principles and Norms of In-
ternational Law and International Treaties of the Russian Federation by the Courts of General 
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From the other provisions of the Constitution it is possible to infer that treaties 
do not prevail over the Constitution (Art. 15(1)205 and Art. 125(6)206). Some fur-
ther restrictions concerning the application of the different kinds of treaties were 
elaborated in statutes and by the practice.207
It is  important to note that the  Russian Constitutional Court as early as 
in 1995 based the priority of international norms on the principle of the rule 
of law. The Court held that “In accordance with the principles of the rule of law 
State consolidated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the agencies 
of power are bound in their activity by both municipal and international law. 
Generally-recognized principles and  norms of  international law and  inter-
national treaties should be complied with in  good faith, including by means 
of taking them into account by municipal legislation.”208 In 1997 the same Court 
Jurisdiction”, paras 10–15, the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Rus-
sian Federation no. 23 (19 December 2003) para. 4, the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the 
Supreme Court of  the Russian Federation no. 3 (24 February 2005) “On Judicial Practice 
in Cases of Protection of Honour and Dignity and Business Reputation of Citizens and Le-
gal Entities”, the Preamble and paras 1 and 9. Cf. Vorontsova I.V., ‘Problems of International 
Law Interpretation (on the example of  the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and  Fundamental Freedoms) in  the lights of  the ECHR judgment in  the case of  K. Markin’ 
(2015) 1 Russian Law: Theory and  Practice 100. On the  attitude of  judges and  of litigators 
towards the  ECHR see A. Burkov, ‘Motivation for Direct Application of  the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Russian Courts’ (2012) 12 Bal-
tic Yearbook of International Law, pp. 229–247.
205 Article 15(1) of  the Constitution provides for the  primacy of  the Constitution, it reads: 
“The  Constitution of  the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal force, direct effect 
and shall be applicable on the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and other le-
gal acts, which are adopted in the Russian Federation, must not contradict the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation.” 
206 Art. 125(6) of the Constitution stipulates: “Acts or certain provisions thereof, which are recog-
nized as unconstitutional, shall lose force; international treaties of the Russian Federation, 
which do not correspond to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, shall not be imple-
mented or used.”
207 The Supreme Court stated in the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation no. 8 (31 October 1995) para. 5: “The court shall not apply the govern-
ing law in  determining the  case where an international treaty of  the Russian Federation 
which has consented to be bound by the treaty by adopting the federal law and for which 
the treaty is in force sets out the rules other than those provided for by law. In these cases, 
the  rules of  the international treaty of  the Russian Federation shall apply.” Paragraph  8 
of the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5 
(10 October 2003) explains the hierarchy. It states that the treaty ratified upon the consent 
in the form of a federal law, has priority of application over the laws of the Russian Feder-
ation. The treaty for which the consent was given in a form other than a federal law, shall 
prevail over the subordinate legislation and regulations issued by the State authority con-
cluding a treaty. 
208 Decree of the Constitutional Court (31 July 1995) cited by A.N. Babai, V.S. Timoshenko, ‘Gen-
eral Principles and Norm of International Law in the Russian Legal System’ (2007) 1 Russian 
Law: Theory and  Practice 78. In  the same token see e.g. O.A. Ishchenko, E.G. Ishchenko, 
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ruled that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation “is not entitled 
to either fill the gaps in  the legal regulation or solve the problem of whether 
the international legal act can be applied to a specific case if any inconsistency 
is found in the domestic law – it is the responsibility of courts of general juris-
diction.”209
In Article 7 of the Russian Civil Code it is noted that international treaties ap-
ply directly.210 The meaning of this term is developed in the Federal Law on Inter-
national Treaties by reference to the concept of self-executing and non-self-ex-
ecuting treaties. A  self-executing treaty does not require any clarification or 
implementation in internal law and it is thus directly applicable. Article 5 of the 
Federal Law on International Treaties specifies that only provisions of official-
ly published treaties may be applied directly.211 Article 3 of the Criminal Code 
of the Russian Federation excludes direct applicability of international treaties 
in  certain aspects of  criminal law. This does not mean that the  international 
treaties are not applied in other spheres of criminal law and criminal proceed-
ings. The provision reads: “The criminality of an act, and also the punishability 
thereof and other criminal consequences, shall be determined only by the pres-
ent Code.”
To ease the application of international law by general courts, in concordance 
with the Russian tradition, the plenary of the Supreme Court enacted the detailed 
Ruling no. 5 of 10 October 2003 (amended in 2013) on application of internation-
al law.212 The  Ruling is  addressed to the  ordinary courts and  its main objective 
is to ensure the correct and uniform application of international law by the courts. 
The resolution of the Supreme Court interprets relevant legislation and is binding 
for lower courts. It is a general interpretative ruling with obvious significance for 
the development of the courts practice.213
‘Implementation of International Law in Russian Legislation’ (2008) 2 Russian Law: Theory 
and Practice 196. 
209 Case 87-O  (Constitutional Court, 3 July 1997) “On Refusal to Accept the  Request of  the 
Moscow Regional Court, Judge N.V. Grigorieva for Consideration.” Cited by Vorontsova I.V. 
(n. 205).
210 O.A. Ishchenko and E.G. Ishchenko (‘Implementation of International Law in Russian Legisla-
tion’ (2008) 2 Russian Law: Theory and Practice 197) argue that the term ‘directly applicable’ 
does not mean direct operation of international law, but incorporation of international trea-
ties into the Russian legal system.
211 Ibidem, 197. 
212 The Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5 “On 
the Application of Universally Recognized Principles and Norms of International Law and of 
International Treaties of the Russian Federation by Courts of General Jurisdiction” (10 Octo-
ber 2003) amended by the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation no. 4 (5 March 2013), available at <http://www.supcourt.ru/catalog.php?c1=Eng-
lish&c2=Documents&c3=&id=6801> (access: 26 September 2016).
213 It was referred to and followed in other resolutions of the Supreme Court on implementa-
tion of international law in specific fields, e.g. in cases concerning maritime law, labour law, 
honour and  dignity of  citizens, drug substances, adoption. The  Supreme Arbitrazh Court 
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The Ruling no. 5 refers to Art.  15(4) of  the Constitution and  Federal Law 
No.  101-FZ of  15  July 1995 “On International Treaties of  the Russian Federa-
tion” emphasizing that they confirm the commitment of the Russian Federation 
to the  observance of  treaties and  customary norms, i.a. the  principle of  fulfil-
ment of international obligations in good faith. It guides the courts and explains 
the terms “universally recognized principles and norms of international law”, “in-
ternational treaties”, and  requirements for direct application of  a  treaty norm214 
such as publication, entry into force, need of  implementing measures etc.,215 
the specificity of the application of international treaties in criminal cases, diplo-
matic immunities, the scope of primacy of international norms, the interpretation 
of a treaty on the basis of Articles 31–33 of the VCLT, and the obligations of the 
Russian judiciary stemming from the ECHR.216
followed the same pattern. The Court enacted several ‘circulars’ to render recommendations 
for lower Arbitrazh courts and  general interpretative resolution “On the  Implementation 
of the International Treaties of the Russian Federation Referring to the Questions of Arbitra-
tion Procedure” (11 June 1999). See S.Y. Marochkin, ‘International Law in the Courts of the 
Russian Federation: Practice of Application’ (2007) 6(2) Chinese Journal of International Law, 
pp. 331–332. 
214 The Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5 
(n. 213) para. 3: “When considering civil, criminal or administrative cases, a court should 
directly apply such international treaties of  the Russian Federation that entered into 
force and became binding for the Russian Federation, if their provisions do not require 
the adoption of national acts for their application and are capable of giving rise to rights 
and  obligations for the  subjects of  national law (Part 4 of  Article 15 of  the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation, Parts 1 and 3 of Article 5 of Federal Law «On International Trea-
ties of the Russian Federation», Part 2 of Article 7 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federa-
tion).” 
215 These rules are quite detailed: “5. International treaties that have a direct and  immediate 
effect in the legal system of the Russian Federation can be applied by the courts (including 
military courts) in the consideration of civil, criminal and administrative cases, in particular: 
in the consideration of civil cases, if an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipu-
lates other rules than the law of the Russian Federation, regulating the relations that are the 
subject matter of  proceedings; in  the consideration of  civil and  criminal cases, if an inter-
national treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules of judicial proceedings than 
the civil procedural or criminal procedural law of the Russian Federation; in the considera-
tion of civil and criminal cases, if an international treaty of the Russian Federation regulates 
the relations, that are the subject matter of proceedings, including relations with foreign per-
sons (e.g. in the consideration of cases listed in Article 402 of the Civil Procedure Code of the 
Russian Federation, motions for the enforcement of foreign court decisions, appeals against 
decisions on the extradition of  individuals accused of committing a crime or convicted by 
a foreign court); in the consideration of cases on administrative offences, if an international 
treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated in the legislation 
on administrative offences”, ibidem.
216 See also the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
no. 21 “On the Application of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms of  4 November 1950  and Protocols thereto by the  Courts of  General 
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It must be noted that the Ruling no. 5 in its 2003 version defined the term 
“universally recognized principles and norms of international law” in Art. 15(4) 
of  the Constitution as amounting to jus cogens norms. It  emphasised that 
the generally recognised principles of  international law should be understood 
as the basic imperative norms of international law, accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole, deviation from which is inad-
missible.217 Such norms include, but are not limited to, the principle of universal 
respect for human rights and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under inter-
national law. Other jus cogens norms may be found in particular in documents 
of the United Nations and its specialised agencies.218 
As the practice evolved, the concept appears now broader as encompassing 
the  norms of  international customary law.219 For example, such conclusion 
may be drawn from the 2015 judgment in Inpredserwis v The Consulate Gen-
eral of the Republic of Poland220 where the St. Petersburg Arbitrazh Court adju-
dicated on the execution of a rent for a house hosting the seat of the Consulate 
and  the request to leave the building. The Court recognized that the action 
against the Consulate constitutes the action against the State and consequent-
ly, the  norms on State immunity apply. The  Arbitrazh Court noticed that, 
however, according to general rules of Russian law, Poland is entitled to im-
munity from Russian jurisdiction, but since under Art. 15(4) of the Constitu-
tion, generally recognised rules and principles of international law and treaties 
of the Russian Federation are the part of the Russian legal system the Court 
has to apply customary international law.221 The Court referred to the rules on 
Jurisdiction” (27 June 2013), <http://www.supcourt.ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Docu-
ments&c3=&id=9155> (access: 25 September 2016).
217 Ibidem, para. 1. Cf. O.A. Ishchenko, E.G. Ishchenko, ‘Implementation of  International Law 
in Russian Legislation’ (2008) 2 Russian Law: Theory and Practice 200.
218 According to para 16 of  the Ruling: “[i]f courts encounter difficulties when interpreting 
the universally recognized principles and norms of international law or international treaties 
of the Russian Federation, it is recommended to them to use the acts and decisions of inter-
national organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as 
to contact the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
and the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation (e.g.  in order to clarify any issues re-
garding the duration of an international treaty, the list of states participating in the treaty, 
the international practice of its application).”
219 Cf. S.Yu. Marochkin, V.A. Popov, ‘International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law in Rus-
sian Courts’ (2011) 2 International Humanitarian Legal Studies, pp. 216–249. The authors ob-
served: “In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court did not word the definition ‘the generally 
recognized principles and  norms’ quite correctly, it offers guidelines to lower courts […]”, 
p. 230. See the literature and Russian case law cited therein.
220 Case A56-48129/2014 (3783/2015-44531(1)) (St. Petersburg Arbitrazh Court, 9 February 2015). 
The courts of arbitration deal in Russia with business and commercial matters.
221 On the approach of the Russian academia to the doctrine of absolute or restrictive State im-
munity see: L. Mälksoo, Theory of International Law in Contemporary Russia (Oxford Universi-
ty Press 2015), pp. 130–131.
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restrictive State immunity from jurisdiction in respect of commercial transac-
tion enshrined in Art. 4 of the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity, 
Art. 2(1)(c) and Art. 10 of the 1991 ILC Draft Articles, and the 2004 United 
Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-
erty (Art.  2(1)(c) and  Art.  10) as well as the  ECtHR decisions in  Oleynikov 
v Russia, Cudak v Lithuania, Sabeh El Leil v France and Wallishauser v Austria. 
The  latter were invoked to argue that the  ILC Draft Articles now reflected 
in the 2004 UN Convention are applicable as customary international law even 
if the concerned State has not ratified the Convention, as long as this State had 
not protested against the content of the Convention. The case certainly is an 
interesting follow-up to the ECtHR case law illustrating the use of  the same 
method of determination of customary law as employed by the ECtHR deci-
sions. But what is curious about the case is the way it classifies as a commer-
cial transaction the rent of a public building administered by a State-owned 
company specifically established for the  diplomatic and  consular service 
and  performed on the  basis of  the international agreement with Poland as 
a part of a broader deal.222
Despite of the disappointing practice, there are certainly good legal basis for 
the  application of  international law in  Russian legal system. But as it appears 
much depends on judges223 and on the general attitude of  the broader public, 
including scholars224 and  politicians. There is  still the  opposition in  all those 
groups, growing, as it seems, with the number of decisions passed by the ECtHR 
against Russia where the violation of the ECHR is found.225 
222 See e.g. ‘Rosyjski sąd zezwolił na udział komorników w eksmisji polskiego konsulatu’ (Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 17 March 2015), <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,17582164,Rosyjski_sad_zezwolil_
na_udzial_komornikow_w_eksmisji.html#ixzz3UezjHrrn> (access: 22 July 2016). On the bas-
es of the same agreement the Russian Federation may use for diplomatic purposes several 
buildings situated mainly in Warsaw. 
223 For example, the application of the ECHR by Russian courts in the period of 1998–2004 was 
very weak. Cf. A.L. Burkov, ‘Implementation of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Russian Courts’ (2006) 1 Russian Law: Theory and Prac-
tice, pp. 68–76. The author found that overall both the Supreme Court (there were 3,911 cases 
under scrutiny) and the Arbitrazh courts (38,068 cases) in practice have not invoked the ECHR 
at all (71). Out of  the total of  the Arbitrazh courts decisions, only 23 mentioned the  ECHR, 
of which only 8 contained the specific reference to an Article of the Convention (there were no 
references to the ECtHR case law). In other 15 cases the courts only briefly cited the arguments 
of a party based on the ECHR. The worst examples, according to Burkov, were when a court 
stated that a particular act was not contrary to the ECHR as a whole (70–71); see also A. Burk-
ov, ‘Motivation for Direct Application of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms in Russian Courts’ (2012), p. 12, Y.B. Baltic Int’l L. pp. 229–247.
224 There is still quite a number of scholars (the sovereigntist school) hostile towards the idea 
of direct application of international law. Cf. L. Mälksoo, Theory of International Law in Con-
temporary Russia (Oxford University Press 2015) 112.
225 Cf. ibidem, p.  162. The  reactions started to be more hostile towards the  ECtHR after Il-
aşcu v Moldova and Russia (App. no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004) where the ECtHR held Russia 
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6.2. Strong Dissenting Dialogue – the Answer to the ECtHR 
Markin and Anchugov Cases
The execution of the ECtHR judgments passed against Russia seems to con-
stitute a peak of the opposition to the interference of international law in domes-
tic matters mentioned above. In 2013 the Russian Constitutional Court marked 
the  boundaries on the  competence of  the Russian courts to apply international 
law, specifically the ECtHR judgments.226 The Constitutional Court ruling is a re-
sponse to the 2012 Grand Chamber judgment of the ECtHR in Konstantin Markin 
v Russia227 in which the ECtHR found that Russia violated Art. 8 and Art. 14 ECHR 
denying a military serviceman a three-year parental leave to take care of his three 
children because under Russian law such leave could only be granted to the  fe-
male military personnel. Previously in 2009, the Constitutional Court, relying on 
national security, declared the Law on the Status of Military Personnel and relat-
ed laws to comply with the Constitution, especially with its Art. 19 on non-dis-
crimination.228 In  the 2010 Chamber judgment in  Konstantin Markin v  Russia 
the reasoning of the Russian Constitutional Court was described as ‘unconvinc-
ing’229 and founded upon ‘gender prejudices’, that is on the perception of women 
as primary child-carers and men as primary breadwinners.230 Further, the ECtHR 
recommended to amend Russian law with a view to putting an end to the discrim-
ination against male military personnel as far as their entitlement to parental leave 
is concerned.231 
responsible for the torture of a group of pro-Romanian Moldovan politicians in Transdn-
istria. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning the ECtHR 
for a  ‘double standard’ used against Russia. The  statement reads: “In connection with 
the  ruling on the  ‘case of  Ilascu’ Moscow expresses bewilderment at the  inconsisten-
cy, contradictoriness, subjectivity and  the obvious political engagement of  the Europe-
an Court of  Human Rights in  Strasbourg. Juridically this verdict, mildly speaking, is  far 
from irreproachable.” Statement by the  Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs FA (8 July 
2004), <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/0/aedaea734e366074c3256ecb0054ed80> 
(access: 13 June 2015). The  other ‘difficult’ cases dealt with by the  ECtHR are: Catan 
and  Others v  Moldova and  Russia, App. no. 43370/04, 8252/05, 18454/06 (19 October 
2012), Kononov v Latvia, App. no. 36376/04 (17 May 2010), Janowiec and Others v Russia, 
App.  no.  55508/07 and  29520/09 (21  October 2013), OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS 
v Russia, App. no. 14902/04 ( just satisfaction, 31 July 2014).
226 Cf. I.V. Vorontsova (n. 205); L. Mälksoo, ‘Casenote on Markin v Russia’ (2012) 106 American 
Journal of International Law, pp. 836–842; G. Vaypan, ‘Acquiescence Affirmed, Its Limits Left 
Undefined: The Markin Judgment and the Pragmatism of the Russian Constitutional Court 
vis-à-vis the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) II(3) Russian Law Journal 130 et seqq. 
227 Konstantin Markin v Russia, App. no. 30078/06 (ECtHR, 22 March 2012).
228 Case 187-O-O/2009 (Constitutional Court, 15 January 2009).
229 Konstatntin Markin v Russia, App. no. 30078/06 (ECtHR, 7 October 2010) para. 56.
230 Ibidem, para. 58.
231 Ibidem, para. 67.
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The reaction from the Constitutional Court followed. Inter alia the President 
of the Court, Valery Zorkin, in an emotional article argued that the decision does 
not respect Russia’s sovereignty and its legislature, the Strasbourg Court had even 
crossed the red line of Russia’s sovereignty.232 Moreover, he warned that if Russia’s 
“historical, cultural and social situation” were to be further ignored, Russia might 
be forced to bypass judgments of the ECtHR.233
In March 2012 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR affirmed the Chamber judg-
ment, however, it softened the  rhetoric. In  the atmosphere of  strong reactions 
against the ECtHR decisions, the Supreme Court adopted on 27 June 2013 the Rul-
ing no. 21 of the Plenary Session On Application of the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and Proto-
cols thereto by Courts of General Jurisdiction which confirmed that the decisions 
of  the ECtHR are binding on general courts and  these courts have to take into 
account the case law of the ECtHR. 
In 2013 the Constitutional Court had another occasion to deal with Markin 
case, this time the petition for the reopening of procedure in his case as a con-
sequence of the ECtHR’s judgment. The Circuit Military Court in St. Petersburg 
asked the Constitutional Court for reconciliation in the light of the contradicting 
judgments by the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR. The Constitutional Court 
found that the common courts are obliged to reopen proceedings in connection 
with the ECtHR judgment. If, however, the court is not capable to enforce a de-
cision without, at the same time, disregarding provisions of domestic law in the 
form of  a  binding interpretation of  the Constitution rendered by the  Constitu-
tional Court, it must request the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutional-
ity of such provisions.234 The Court observed that since, basically, the same rights 
and  freedoms are  provided for in  the Russian Constitution and  in the  ECHR, 
the court faces the question of constitutionality of  relevant domestic law provi-
sions. Solely the Constitutional Court under the established case law could decide 
such question.235
In 2013 in Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia the ECtHR found the norm of the 
Russian Constitution to be incompatible with the Convention. The case concerned 
two prisoners convicted to the death penalty i.a. for murder. Their death sentence 
was then commuted to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The applicants complained 
in particular that their disenfranchisement had violated their right to vote and had 
prevented them from participating in a number of elections. The ECtHR in line 
232 V. Zorkin, ‘The Limit of Giving In’ [‘Predel ustupchivosti’] Rossiiskaia gazeta (22 March 2010), 
<http://www.rg.ru/2010/10/29/zorkin.html> (access: 20 June 2016).
233 Cf. L. Mälksoo, ‘Russia and European Human-Rights Law: Progress, Tensions and Perspec-
tives’, [in:] L. Mälksoo (ed.), Russia and European Human Rights Law: The Rise of the Civiliza-
tional Argument (Brill Nijhoff 2014), pp. 5–6.
234 Case 27-П/2013 (Constitutional Court, 6 December 2013), <https://rg.ru/2013/12/18/ks-dok.
html> (access: 25 September 2016). 
235 Ibidem, para. 3, 3.1.
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with its previous decisions in  i.a. Hirst and Scopolla236 held that Russia’s blanket 
ban on convicted prisoners’ voting rights enshrined in Art. 32(3) of the Russian 
Constitution237 was incompatible with the  ECHR.238 Following Markin and  An-
chugov cases a group of deputies for the State Duma (the lower house of the Rus-
sian parliament) inquired the Constitutional Court on the enforcement of ECtHR 
judgments in Russia. In 2015 the Constitutional Court made it clear that the Con-
stitution had a priority over the judgments, with the consequence that a decision 
from the ECtHR that contradicted the Russian Constitution could not be executed 
in Russia.239 The Constitutional Court stated that when the content of judgments 
of  the ECtHR, including the  part of  prescriptions addressed to the  respondent 
State and based on the provisions of the ECHR, interpreted by the ECtHR within 
the framework of a specific case, “unlawfully, from the constitutional-point of view, 
affect principles and norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russia 
may, as an exception, deviate from fulfilment of obligations imposed on it, when 
such deviation is the only possible way to avoid violation of fundamental princi-
ples and norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”240 The Constitu-
tional Court observed that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, namely 
Art. 26 on pacta sunt srevanda and Art. 31(1) on treaty interpretation, should be 
respected both by Russia and the ECtHR. The judgment of the ECtHR which ap-
plies the interpretation of the Convention exceeding the limits of the general rule 
of interpretation and diverging from imperative norms of customary law (such as 
the principle of sovereign equality and respect for rights inherent in sovereignty 
and the principle of non-interference with internal affairs of States) cannot be re-
garded as obligatory for execution.241 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court referred to Art. 46 VCLT for authority that 
a State may block operation of separate provisions of international treaty in its re-
spect, referring to the fact that the consent to obligatory character of this treaty was 
expressed by it in violation of one or another provisions of its internal law with re-
gard to the competence to conclude treaties, if this violation was obvious and con-
cerned a norm of internal law of a particular importance. In view of the Consti-
tutional Court, the  provisions of  Chapters 1 and  2 of  the Russian Constitution 
belong to such norms. Their alteration by means of constitutional amendments 
is not allowed. It may be carried out exclusively by adopting a new Constitution.242
236 Hirst v the United Kingdom (no. 2), App. no. 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005); Scoppola v Italy 
(no. 3), App. no. 126/05 (ECtHR, 22 May 2012).
237 The provision reads: “citizens detained in a detention facility pursuant to a sentence imposed 
by a court shall not have the right to vote or to stand for election.”
238 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, App. no. 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECtHR, 4 July 2013). 
239 Case 21-П/2015 (Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015) paras 2.2, 3, 4.
240 Ibidem, para. 2.2.
241 Ibidem, para. 3.
242 Ibidem.
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To support its findings the Constitutional Court referred to the well-known 
cases concerning other jurisdictions e.g. to the  three decisions of  the German 
Constitutional Court of 11 October 1985, 14 October 2004, 13 July 2010 indicating 
the limited legal force of the ECtHR judgments. The Russian Court emphasized 
that in particular when deciding on the execution of the ECtHR judgment in Gör-
gulu v  Germany243, the  German Constitutional Court formulated the  principle 
of priority of the national constitution over the decisions of the ECtHR. The Ger-
man Court noted that the ECHR is a part of the German federal law and has to 
be used for the  interpretation of  the provisions of  the German Constitution on 
fundamental rights.244 The  decisions of  the ECtHR are  not always obligatory. 
Domestic judges have to consider and  carefully apply them to the  internal leg-
islation. A  similar attitude, according to the  Russian Constitutional Court, was 
taken earlier by the German Constitutional Court in reference to EU law in Sol-
ange-I judgment.245 The Russian Court noted as well the judgments of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, the  first of  2012 disregarding the  decision of  the ECtHR 
in Maggio and others v Italy (on trans-border pension payments)246 and the second 
one of 2014 regarding the ICJ judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State.247 
In both cases, as the Russian Court observed, the Italian Constitutional Court un-
derlined that “the observance of international obligations may not be the reason 
of reduction of the level of protection of rights which has already been embedded 
in internal legal order.”248 Furthermore the Russian Constitutional Court discussed 
the Austrian case249 and the decision of the Supreme Court of the United King-
dom250 disregarding the ECtHR judgment – Hirst v The UK (no. 2) on the voting 
rights of prisoners.251 They were invoked for the same authority that the decisions 
of the ECtHR are not perceived as binding in an absolute manner. They have only 
to be “taken into consideration”. “It is deemed possible to follow these decisions 
only in the event if they do not contradict fundamental material and procedural 
norms of the national law.”252 
In the other parts of the judgment the Constitutional Court discussed its own 
cases especially Markin and Anchugov. The latter lead, in the view of the Court, 
to a real conflict between the Constitution and the ECtHR’s interpretation of the 
Convention. In a situation of a conflict the Constitutional Court feels entrusted 
243 Görgulu v Germany, App. no. 74969/01 (ECtHR, 26 February 2004). 
244 Case 2BvR 1481/04 (German Constitutional Court, 14 October 2004) para. 307.
245 Solange I 2 BvL 52/71 (German Constitutional Court, 29 May 1974) para. 271.
246 Case 264/2012 (Italian Constitutional Court, 19 November 2012); Maggio and others v Italy, 
App. no. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08 (ECtHR, 31 May 2011).
247 Case 238/2014 (Italian Constitutional Court, 22 October 2014); Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State, Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening (ICJ, 3 February 2012).
248 Case 21-П/2015 (Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015) para. 4. 
249 Case B267/86 (Constitutional Court, 14 October 1987).
250 Judgment of 16 October 2013 UKSC 62.
251 Hirst v the United Kingdom (no. 2), App. no. 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005).
252 Case 21-П/2015 (Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015) para. 4.
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by the Russian Constitution to resolve it and “in the extremely rare cases deems it 
appropriate to use ‘the right to objection’ for the sake of making its contribution 
(following colleagues from Austria, Great Britain, Germany and Italy) to the for-
mation of  balanced practice of  the European Court of  Human Rights, but not 
for the sake of self-isolation from its decisions, which reflects consensus worked 
out by States-parties to the  Convention, but proceeding from the  need of  con-
structive interaction and mutually respectful dialogue with it.”253 
However, the Constitutional Court suggested also to the  federal legislator to 
envisage a special legal mechanism of determination of the question of possibility 
or impossibility to execute the ECtHR judgment rendered against Russia.254 
Following the  decision of  the Constitutional Court, the  amendments to 
the 1994 Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Rus-
sian Federation” were adopted and entered into force on 15 December 2015.255 
The  amendments provide the  Constitutional Court (which otherwise could 
only perform a  constitutionality control over the  treaties which have not yet 
entered into force)256 with a new power to declare the decisions of international 
bodies dealing with the protection of human rights and freedoms as unenforce-
able at the request of the federal executive authority which has a competence 
to protect the  interests of  the Russian Federation before such courts or other 
bodies.257 
The solution adopted by Russia is unique. No other member of  the Council 
of Europe has conferred such powers on a national court. Under the 2015 law, if 
the Constitutional Court declares a ruling unenforceable, no steps to implement 
253 Case 21-П/2015 (Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015) para. 6. Venice Commission, English 
translation after Interim Opinion on the amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law on 
the Constitutional Court of  the Russian Federation, CDL-AD(2016)005-e (106th Plenary Ses-
sion, Venice, 11–12 March 2016), <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.
aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)005-e> (access: 25 September 2016), para. 26. 
254 Ibidem.  
255 The  Federal Law no. 7-KFZ (CDL-REF(2016)006 introducing amendments to the  Federal 
Constitutional Law no 1-FKZ of 21 July 1994 “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation” (CDL-REF(2016)007 was passed by the  State Duma on 4 December 2015, rat-
ified by the Federation Council on 9 December, signed by the President on 14 December 
and published the following day). The law entered into force on 15 December 2015. It was 
adopted a year after the ECtHR ordered Russia to pay 1.87 billion euro in compensation to 
shareholders of the oil company Yukos for violation of their property rights when the com-
pany went bankrupt (OAO Neftyanaya kompaniya YUKOS v Russia, App. no. 14902/04 (EC-
tHR, 24 June 2014)).
256 Article 125(2)(d) of the Constitution and Art. 3(1)(1)(d) of the Federal Constitutional Law “On 
the  Constitutional Court of  the Russian Federation” prohibits the  constitutionality control 
of a treaty already in force for the Russian Federation. 
257 The competence is based on Art. 79 of the Constitution, which authorizes the accession of the 
Federation to international organization only if the compliance with the constitutional rights 
and freedoms and the basic fundamental principles is ensured. 
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the ruling can be taken (both general and individual measures of execution) unless 
the Constitution is amended.258 
The decision of  the Constitutional Court and  the new law of  2015 
are  not  the  only examples of  the strong dissenting dialogue of  the State or-
gans with the  ECtHR but certainly the  strongest one. The  saga is  not over 
as in  2016 the  Constitutional Court invoked its new powers deciding upon 
the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the ECtHR’s ruling on An-
chugov and Gladkov v Russia cannot be implemented with regard to the meas-
ures of general character contemplating the amendments to Russia’s legislation 
which would allow to restrict electoral rights not of all prisoners. This would 
be contrary to the absolute ban enshrined in Art. 32(3) of the Constitution.259 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment is based on the arguments of State sov-
ereignty, supremacy of  the Constitution, control of  the scope of  the consent 
given by the State to be bound by the treaty and subsidiary role of the ECtHR. 
It contains detailed discussion of the relevant domestic decisions of the ECHR’s 
State parties and the ECtHR case law. The Constitutional Court repeated that 
“if it deems it necessary to enjoy the right to objection as an exceptional case, 
it is only in order to make contribution to the crystallization of the develop-
ing practice of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of suffrage 
protection, whose decisions are  called upon to reflect the  consensus having 
formed among States Parties to the Convention.”260 The Court assured that it 
recognizes the objective necessity of  the ECtHR’s need to identify structural 
defects of national legal systems and to suggest the ways to remove them. But 
the  Constitutional Court also considered problems connected with possible 
258 On 15 March 2016, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commis-
sion) adopted “Interim Opinion on the Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law on 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.” It found the law of 2015 contrary to Art. 26 
and Art. 27 VCLT and Art. 46 ECHR. The Commission emphasized that the State as a whole (all 
State organs) is bound to respect international treaties binding upon it and it cannot invoke 
a norm of its internal law to justify its failure to perform according to a treaty (in this case 
the ECHR). Under Art. 46 ECHR the State is bound by the interpretation of the Convention giv-
en by the ECtHR. The State has to execute the judgment, only the modality of execution is at 
States’ discretion, however, not unfettered. The Russian Federation should have recourse to 
dialogue, instead of resorting to unilateral measures, which are at variance with Art. 31 VCLT, 
which stipulates that a State has to interpret the treaty ‘in good faith’.(Opinion no. 832/2015, 
CDL- AD(2016)005, paras 96–100). See also Final Opinion no. 832/2015 of 10–11 June 2016 on 
the amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law of the Constitutional Court.
259 Case 12-П/2016 (Constitutional Court, 19 April 2016) “On the resolution of the question of pos-
sibility to execute the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 4 July 2013 in the 
case of Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Fed-
eration in respect to the request of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.” Venice 
Commission, ‘Judgement No. 12-П/2016 of 19 April 2016 of the Constitutional Court’, <http://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)033-e> (ac-
cess: 24 September 2016).
260 Ibidem, para. 4.4.
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deviations from the principle of subsidiarity, on the basis of which the ECtHR 
is called upon to exercise its powers.261 The main problem for the Constitu-
tional Court was, as it seems, the  lack of  competence of  the ECtHR to give 
the ruling in abstracto. The task of the ECtHR in that particular case was, in the 
opinion of the Constitutional Court, not to review, in abstracto, the compati-
bility of Art. 32(3) of the Constitution with the Convention but to determine, 
in concreto, the effect of those provisions on the applicants’ rights secured by 
Art.  3 of  Protocol No. 1 to the  Convention. The  Constitutional Court not-
ed that starting from standards established by the  ECtHR itself, disenfran-
chisement for serious crimes that is, crimes punishable by three or more years 
of  imprisonment, does not violate the principle of proportionality. That was 
exactly the case of Mr. Anchugov and Mr. Gladkov who were sentenced to fif-
teen years of imprisonment (as commutation of death sentences) for particu-
larly grave crimes. Consequently, their rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Proto-
col No. 1 had not been infringed upon. Therefore, in that sense the judgment 
in their case is essentially the act of an in abstracto review of a norm exercised 
by the ECtHR.262 
Those developments indicate that Russian judges are  well prepared to ad-
judicate on international law issues but also that they use international law as 
a  political tool. That occurred in  Inpredserwis v  The  Consulate General of  the 
Republic of Poland and in Markin and Anchugov saga. The selective application 
of international law seems also characteristic for Russia. International law is ap-
plied to the extent it suites the case, e.g. to focus attention on formal, less im-
portant issues, instead than on the substance of the case. We will illustrate this 
phenomenon invoking the Crimea case in which the judges of the Constitutional 
Court justified the Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine.
6.3. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and Politics – the Crimea Case
The decision of  the Constitutional Court of  2014 concerning Crimea 
is a landmark historic judgment,263 however, not on account of the development 
of international law, which it could have marked. The Constitutional Court de-
cided on the  ‘accession’ to the Russian Federation, as Russian judges called it, 
not on an ‘illegal annexation’ on 18 March 2014 of  the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The act constituted an illegal annexation 
in the opinion i.a. of one hundred States, which, from the beginning, condemned 
261 Ibidem, para. 5.5.
262 Ibidem, para. 6.
263 Case 6-П/2014 (Constitutional Court, 19 March 2014) “On the verification of the constitution-
ality of the international treaty, which has not yet entered into force, between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Rus-
sian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation.”
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Russian activities on the Ukrainian territory and subsequently supported the UN 
GA resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014.264 The Resolution entitled “Territorial 
integrity of Ukraine” affirmed the UN GA commitment to the sovereignty, po-
litical independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its inter-
nationally recognized borders and  underscored invalidity of  the Crimean ref-
erendum held on 16 March 2014. Furthermore, the judgment did not take into 
account that few days earlier the Constitutional Court of Ukraine had declared 
unconstitutional The Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Re-
public of  Crimea No.  1702-6/14 “On holding of  the all-Crimean referendum” 
of 6 March 2014.265 
The decision of the Constitutional Court concerns only the procedure to con-
clude the treaty and legal effects of a clause on provisional application of this treaty. 
The title of the judgment sounds quite innocent: “On the verification of the consti-
tutionality of the international treaty, which has not yet entered into force, between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the accession of  the Re-
public of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent 
entities within the Russian Federation.” In reality the Constitutional Court was to 
confirm legality of the annexation of Crimea deciding on the date when ‘the acces-
sion’ became effective. The Court dealt with the case i.a. on the basis of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties selecting from it only the provisions on the pro-
cedure and the form and leaving out the consideration of the treaty making powers 
in Crimea or the substance of a treaty (if international law is indeed part of Russia’s 
264 A/RES/68/262. Cf. e.g. “The Opinion of the Legal Advisory Committee to the Minister of For-
eign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Rus-
sian Federation in  light of  international law” (22 June 2014), <http://www.msz.gov.pl/re-
source/d93bc452-c276-4f5a-8551-a04464c6b202:JCR> (access: 21 July 2016).
265 Case 2-rp/2014 (Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 14 March 2014). The Court observed that 
the Ruling contradicts not only the Constitution of Ukraine but “also the fundamental prin-
ciples of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state, constituted in international law in-
struments, in particular the principle of mutual respect for the sovereign equality of each 
state including political independence, the ability to change the borders under internation-
al law by peaceful means and by agreement. As a result of these principles States Parties 
shall refrain from violation of territorial integrity or political independence of any state by 
use of force or threat of force or other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations, as well as actions directed against the territorial integrity or unity of any State Party 
(The United Nations Charter, the Final Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope of  1975, the  Framework Convention the  Protection of  National Minorities of  1995)”, 
para. 4.5. English translation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Judgement of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine on all-Crimean Referendum’ (15 March 2014), <http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-
feeds/foreign-offices-news/19573-rishennya-konstitucijnogo-sudu-v-ukrajini-shhodo-ref-
erendumu-v-krimu> (access: 26 September 2016). In case 3-rp/2014 (Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine, 20 March 2014) the Court found the resolution of the parliament of Crimea on 
‘declaration of  independence’ of 11 March 2014 to be contrary to the Constitution and to 
the UN Charter (principle of self-determination).
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legal system, the Court should have elaborated on the compatibility of the acces-
sion/annexation with the UN Charter).
The Constitutional Court avoided any references to international law especially 
the UN Charter or the ICJ’s case law, except for the law of treaties. In that sense 
the decision is the example of a failed dialogue.
The Constitutional Court found the Agreement on the accession of the Re-
public of  Crimea to the  Russian Federation of  18 March 2014 in  compliance 
with the  Russian Constitution in  terms of  procedure of  signing, conclusion 
and entry into force of a  treaty, separation of State power into legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial, delimitation of competence between federal State organs 
and content of  its norms. As far as the  law of  treaties is concerned, the Con-
stitutional Court took for granted that the document signed by the President 
of the Russian Federation constitutes an international treaty. It did not examine 
the Agreement in terms of powers of the other party. The Court had to assess 
constitutionality of Art. 1 and Art. 10 of the Agreement. Under Art. 1(1) of the 
Agreement the Republic of Crimea becomes the member of the Russian Fed-
eration on the  date of  the signing of  the Agreement. Article 10 provides for 
the Agreement to be provisionally applied and to enter into force on the date 
of ratification. The Constitutional Court observed that the accession of Crimea 
to the Russian Federation took place following the procedure of the ratification 
of a treaty. The procedure complies, first of all, with the VCLT which in Art. 25 
confirms that a treaty may be provisionally applied pending its entry into force. 
The Court noted that also the Russian law authorises the provisional applica-
tion of a treaty (Art. 23 of Federal Law of 15 July 1995 no. 101-FZ “On Inter-
national Treaties of the Russian Federation”) and invoked for support its 2012 
judgment.266 In  the judgment the Court emphasised that the Russian Federa-
tion may agree to the provisional application of  treaties, if the subject matter 
of a treaty is of special interest to its parties and because of that interest the par-
ties wish to give effect to its provisions not waiting for its ratification and entry 
into force. Since the  provisional application of  the Agreement complies both 
with international and domestic law, Crimea acceded to the Russian Federation 
on 18 March 2014.267
It is interesting to note that the decision of the Constitutional Court provoked 
strong reactions of  the other European constitutional courts. On the  initiative 
of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine the “Joint Statement on respect for the ter-
ritorial integrity and international law in administering constitutional justice” was 
adopted and signed by the presidents of the constitutional courts i.a. of Lithuania, 
Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Ukraine, Cyprus, Azerbaijan. The Joint Statement la-
belled the role of the Russian Constitutional Court as unprecedented, condemning 
the Court for taking part in the annexation of Crimea and violating international 
266 Case 8-П/2012 (Constitutional Court, 27 March 2012).
267 Case 6-П/2014 (Constitutional Court, 19 March 2014) para. 3. 
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law also by recognizing the Republic of Crimea as a legal entity and the Agreement 
as an international treaty.268 
The case illustrates as well that the dialogue between judges may take different 
forms and is much easier nowadays i.a. due to the development of different forms 
of cooperation between judges, including e.g. the Conference of European Consti-
tutional Courts.
7. Ukraine
7.1. The Legal Setting for Judicial Dialogue
Two studies in  this volume are  devoted to the  application of  internation-
al law in  Ukraine (see further in  this volume Kolysnik, Tsymbrivskyy). That 
is why here we will only emphasize some aspects characteristic for the judicial 
dialogue from the perspective of this country. Ukraine is a former Soviet Re-
public. After the World War II it was granted a limited power to partake in in-
ternational relations including international treaties making. This power was 
obviously based on the Soviet concept of the relationship between international 
and municipal law. 
The country gained independence in 1991 and  in 1996 adopted its Consti-
tution. The  provisions of  the Ukrainian Constitution on international law re-
semble the  provisions of  the Russian Constitution, but seem narrower –  they 
refer to a specific category of treaties as a part of the Ukrainian legislation (not 
the  Ukrainian legal system) and  lack references to the  universally recognized 
principles of  international law. However, Art. 18 of the Ukrainian Constitution 
refers to the respect of the generally acknowledged principles and norms of in-
ternational law. Yet, this provision concerns only external relations.269 Article 9 
of the Ukrainian Constitution addresses only treaties and provides that: 
268 Joint Statement Concerning Respect for Territorial Integrity and International Law in Administer-
ing Constitutional Justice, <http://www.lrkt.lt/en/news/other-news/the-president-of-the-con-
stitutional-court-supports-the-initiative-of-the-constitutional-court-of-ukraine-at-the-con-
ference-of-european-constitutional-courts-to-condemn-the-annexation-of-the-crimea/471> 
(access: 15 June 2016).
269 Art. 18 of the Constitution reads: “The foreign political activity of Ukraine is aimed at ensuring 
its national interests and security by maintaining peaceful and mutually beneficial co-oper-
ation with members of the international community, according to generally acknowledged 
principles and norms of international law.” English version: Council of Europe, ‘The Ukrainian 
Constitution’, <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/profiles/ukraineConstitution_
en.asp> (access: 25 September 2016).
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International treaties that are  in force, agreed to be binding by the  Verkhovna Rada 
of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine. The conclusion of international 
treaties that contravene the Constitution of Ukraine is possible only after introducing rele-
vant amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.270 
The Constitution mentions expressly only treaties ratified by the  President 
upon the  prior consent of  the Parliament (the Verchovna Rada) and  is silent 
on other treaties and  customary international law. It  has been therefore up to 
the judges to infer the authorisation to apply them from other provisions of the 
Constitution.271 
The first step in  the process seems to be the 2001 opinion of  the Ukrainian 
Constitutional Court on compliance with the Constitution of  the Rome Statute 
of  the International Criminal Court (ICC). The  Constitutional Court rejected 
the argument that Art. 27 of the Rome Statute on irrelevance of official capacity 
for the jurisdiction of the ICC violates the constitutional provisions on immunities 
of the MPs, the President of Ukraine and the judges. The Court cited Art. 18 of the 
Constitution and indicated pacta sunt servanda principle as an example of gener-
ally recognized principles of  international law. Then the Court emphasized that 
Ukraine is bound by various international treaties providing for responsibility for 
crimes laid down in the Rome Statute and the prohibitions of such crimes are also 
regarded as customary norms of  international law. The  Court observed that 
the crimes’ “criminal nature according to Article 18 of the Constitution of Ukraine 
is  not dependent on accession of  Ukraine to the  Statute and  its entering into 
force.”272 The judgment implies that Ukraine is bound by customary law and this 
law has to be taken into account by the judges. 
There are no other judgments of the Constitutional Court on customary in-
ternational law and there exist no relevant guidelines for the judges. Moreover, 
270 Ibidem.
271 Some Ukrainian scholars are of the opinion that the Act of Declaration of the Independence 
of Ukraine of 24 August 1991 and the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 July 
1990, have to be taken into consideration in that regard. The preamble to the Constitution re-
fers to the Act of 1991 (which in its turn is adopted “[i]n view of […] implementing the Declara-
tion of State Sovereignty of Ukraine”). The preamble reads: “The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 
on behalf of  the Ukrainian people –  citizens of  Ukraine of  all nationalities, […] guided by 
the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine of 24 August 1991, approved by the na-
tional vote of 1 December 1991, adopts this Constitution – the Fundamental Law of Ukraine.” 
The  1990 Act contains a  number of  references to international law, both in  general terms 
and to specific principles of international law and international agreements. The most im-
portant is as follows: “The Ukrainian SSR recognizes the prevalence of general human val-
ues over class values and  the priority of  generally recognised norms of  international law 
over the  norms of  domestic law” (R. Khorolskyy, ‘Country Report Ukraine’ para.  I.1, citing 
i.a.  M.  Buromenskyy, International Law: Manual for students [in Ukrainian] (Kharkiv 2005), 
pp. 73–79). Khorolskyy suggests that the Constitutional Court does not share this opinion. 
272 Opinion on the  conformity of  the Rome Statute with the  Constitution of  Ukraine, Case 
3-в/2001 (Constitutional Court, 11 July 2001) para. 2.2. 
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the law is in that respect ambiguous. Some laws provide for application of cus-
tomary law  but they restrict references e.g. to international commercial cus-
toms273 or customs of  merchant shipping.274 The  ambiguity is  growing if one 
notes the deletion in 2010 of the reference to “international customs that are rec-
ognized in Ukraine” as applicable law from Art. 4 of the Law on international 
private law.275 The reasons for such amendment are not known; the preparato-
ry materials only mentioned the  objection of  the parliamentary legislative.276 
In such situation it is not astonishing that ordinary courts do not apply interna-
tional customary law.277
The legal position of the treaties other than referred to in Art. 9 of the Con-
stitution is also not clear. In line with Art. 151 of the Constitution it seems that 
the Constitutional Court may review constitutionality of all the treaties in force 
or those which had been submitted to the Verchovna Rada for consent.278 Besides, 
the Constitution refers once to international treaties of Ukraine and on other oc-
casions to treaties “ratified” by the Verchovna Rada.279 In 2004 Ukraine attempted 
to clarify this ambiguous regulation and adopted the Law on international treaties 
of  Ukraine, the  act replaced previous regulations.280 The  Law distinguishes be-
tween treaties concluded by the President, the Government or ministers. It defines 
different procedures for their conclusion but it also contains the provision on legal 
effects of treaties in domestic law. Art. 19 (1) specifies that treaties in force con-
cluded with consent of the Verkhovna Rada are a part of domestic law and “apply 
in a manner consistent to the norms of national legislation”.281 In case of conflict 
with domestic law, the treaty norm prevails. 
The language of  the provision remains ambiguous. Furthermore, as in  Rus-
sia, in  Ukrainian system there are  separate endorsements of  international law 
273 Art. 4(5) of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine, Law no. 1798-XII (6 November 1991). 
274 Art. 6 of the Code of Merchant Shipping of Ukraine, Law no. 176/95-ВР (23 May 1995). 
275 The Law of Ukraine no. 2709-IV (23 June 2005) amended by the Law no. 1837-VI “On Amend-
ments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine concerning regulation of issues of private inter-
national law” (21 January 2010). 
276 Cited by Khorolskyy R. (n. 7).
277 Ibidem, para. III.13.
278 Art. 151 of the Constitution reads: “The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, on the appeal of the 
President of Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, provides opinions on the con-
formity with the Constitution of Ukraine of international treaties of Ukraine that are in force, 
or the international treaties submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for granting agree-
ment on their binding nature.” Text available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/
ccpe/profiles/ukraineConstitution_en.asp> (access: 25 September 2016).
279 See e.g. Art. 26, Art. 85(32), Art. 106(3), Art. XV of the Constitution.
280 The Law of Ukraine no 1906-IV (29 June 2004). The Act replaced two previous acts: “On Effect 
of International Treaties on the Territory of Ukraine” of 1992 and “On International Treaties 
of Ukraine” of 1994. 
281 Text available at <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1906-15> (access: 25 September 
2016); “і застосовуються у порядку, передбаченому для норм національного законо-
давства.”
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in civil, criminal, administrative, commercial procedural laws regulating applica-
tion of various sources of international law, their legal effects, reopening of pro-
ceedings following decisions of international courts etc. All these codes refer only 
to treaties “consent to which binding character was granted by the  Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine”.282 The position of other treaties than ratified upon consent of the 
Parliament is still not clear. 
Accordingly, the provisions of Ukrainian law on application of  international 
law do not establish neither a clear, nor a friendly legal basis for Ukrainian judges 
to apply and  interpret international law. The  commentators concordantly indi-
cate the  reluctance of Ukrainian judges to apply international law.283 They con-
nect it with general problems within the judiciary, e.g. deficiencies in legal training 
of judges, but also signal the progress achieved i.a. owing to the US involvement284 
and the EU aid in the reform of the Ukrainian judiciary of 2010 (i.a. administra-
tive courts were established and an electronic database holding all national court 
decisions was created) and the development of the various forms of cooperation 
including judicial cooperation.285 
7.2. The Birth of Judicial Dialogue in Ukraine 
In 2011 R. Petrov and P. Kalinichenko observed that: 
Ukrainian courts refer mainly to international agreements which are duly signed and rat-
ified by the  Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and  which are  self-executing with-
in the Ukrainian legal system. Even in these cases, the correct application of international 
282 The  formula reflects Art.  85(32) of  the Constitution. Art.  2, Art.  8 of  the Civil Procedur-
al Code of Ukraine, Law no. 1618-IV (18 March 2004); Art. 1, Art. 9 the Criminal Procedural 
Code of Ukraine, Law no. 4651-VI (13 April 2012); Art. 4 of the Commercial Procedural Code 
of Ukraine, Law no. 1798-XII (6 November 1991; Art. 5, Art. 9 of the Code of Administrative 
Proceedings of Ukraine, Law no. 2747-IV (6 July 2005). 
283 R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko, ‘The Europeanization of Third Country Judiciaries through the Ap-
plication of the EU Acquis: The Cases of Russia and Ukraine’ (2011) 60 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly 344.
284 N. Prescott, ‘Orange Revolution in  Red, White and  Blue: US Impact on the  2004 Ukrainian 
Election’ (2006) 16 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 238. 
285 R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko (n. 284), pp. 330–331. The authors observe that “these changes 
have not altered the reputation of the Ukrainian judiciary as one of the most corrupt in-
stitutions in the country. EU experts warn that the Ukrainian judiciary faces serious prob-
lems in the quality and substance of the legal training of its judges, as well as their regular 
professional training and funding. As a result, judicial decisions in Ukraine do not always 
comply with rule of  law standards, and are often made arbitrarily. Independent surveys 
show an alarming level of widespread corruption among judges (40 per cent of judges ad-
mitted having been offered bribes – there are no statistics on judges admitted having been 
taken bribes in Ukraine and Russia). As a consequence, the majority of Ukrainians do not 
have trust in the judicial system, but consider it corrupt, politically biased and non-trans-
parent”, ibidem.
I. The Central and Eastern European Judiciary… 83
agreements is not guaranteed, since one of the most important impediments for the appli-
cation of international law by the Ukrainian judiciary is the correct understanding of these 
international conventions by national judges. International and European organizations re-
alize this problem and target their assistance towards eliminating the incorrect application 
of international and European law by Ukrainian judges. This has led to the rise of judicial 
activism among Ukrainian judges in  the “post-Orange Revolution” period, such as in  the 
Yuschchenko, where the Ukrainian Supreme Court opened a door for Ukrainian courts to 
apply the judgments of other international tribunals and courts.286 
The 2004 judgment of the Ukrainian Supreme Court in Yuschenko v Central 
Election Committee of Ukraine287 is probably not the first case in which Ukrain-
ian courts relied on foreign and  international decisions but certainly it is  an 
important judgment for democracy in Ukraine.288 The decision is deeply root-
ed in  the US jurisprudence (Bush v  Gore, Marbury v  Madison),289 which was 
certainly known to the judges who had participated before in various seminars 
and  trainings organised with the US support.290 Since the US Court decisions 
are  not mentioned in  the judgment, the  case is  as an example of  a  silent di-
alogue. It  concerned the  results of  the second round of  the 2004 presidential 
election in Ukraine. The election was won by a narrow margin by Yanukovych 
but numerous factors indicated that his victory was gained through fabrication 
of  results, allowing many individuals to vote twice, through threats and  coer-
cion, not mentioning, as appeared at the later stage, poisoning with dioxin of the 
counter-candidate – Yushchenko. 
Yushchenko appealed to the  Ukrainian Supreme Court claiming violations 
of the election laws and asking the Court for an injunctive and a declaratory re-
lief. In its response the Supreme Court recalled that it may control the acts of the 
government (in that respect i.a. the case is compared to Marbury v Madison291) 
286 R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko (n. 284), p. 344. Repeated in P. Van Elsuwege, R. Petrov, Legislative 
Approximation and Application of EU law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union, 
Toward a Common Regulatory Space (Routledge 2014), p. 147.
287 Yushchenko v Central Election Committee of Ukraine (Supreme Court, 3 December 2004). See: 
N. Prescott (n. 285), pp. 219–248.
288 E.g. case 11-rp/99 (Constitutional Court, 29 December 1999) on death penalty, cited below.
289 Respectivly, Bush v Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000), Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), 
p. 178. The latter case triggered the development of the American model of constitutional 
review performed by ordinary courts.
290 N. Prescott (n. 285), p. 240, see also p. 233. The author on page 244 underlines that “The Unit-
ed States prepared Ukraine for cases like Yushchenko by helping Ukraine shape its Constitu-
tion, by assisting the judges in issuing unbiased decisions, and by encouraging the Ukrainian 
Supreme Court to assert its Marbury v Madison power.”
291 The case is important also for the determination of the role of the court: “It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws 
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.” Marbury v Madi-
son, op. cit., p. 177.
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and  has the  power to influence the  outcome of  the elections (in that respect 
the case is compared to Bush v Gore). It was the first time for the Ukrainian Su-
preme Court to assert its power to interpret the election laws and the Constitu-
tion and to adjudicate on the validity of election, including its conformity with 
the Constitution. Moreover, it exercised its power of judicial review independent-
ly from the Constitutional Court (the Supreme Court had not referred the case 
to the Constitutional Court). The Court found the election invalid and ordered 
the runoff.292 
The Ukrainian judges are  still reluctant to rely on foreign and  interna-
tional decisions.293 In  2003 Wilkinson identified main reasons for such situ-
ation: the  lack of  translation of  international case law and  jurisprudence into 
Ukrainian to help judges to adapt their decisions to the best European stand-
ards, the delays in adapting national legislation to ratified treaties, and –  the 
most important – the belief that international case law is not relevant to civil 
law systems.294 In that respect, he also pointed to the lack of proper Ukrainian 
term for case law. The closest Ukrainian word, yurisprudentsiya, signifies only 
the philosophy of  law, and not the  judicial precedents. The  translators some-
times use the term yurisdichna praktika. But this term in Ukrainian law is only 
meant to be descriptive, not emphasizing the legal force of jurisprudence con-
stante. In other words, the Ukrainian judges were not acquainted with the doc-
trine, which assumes that the judge should give weight to a rule that is accepted 
and applied in a long line of cases, and should not overrule or modify its own 
decisions without serious reasons. Instead, the judges have been guided in the 
application of selected statutes by the Supreme Court’s plenum resolutions (or-
ders), which are binding.295 
Thanks to international support at least some of these reasons seem nowadays 
to be, to a certain extent, overcome (accessible translations of cases, better knowl-
edge of case law owing to legal trainings etc.). However, the most difficult barriers, 
the long lasting habits, are still impeding application of foreign and international 
courts’ decisions. It is interesting to note that in 2013 in the Report for the XVIth 
Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, the Constitution-
al Court of Ukraine justified its reluctance in referring to the decisions from oth-
er jurisdictions by ‘objective reasons’. The most important one seems to be still 
the perception of the role of case law in continental law systems:
The Constitutional Court of  Ukraine has not referred to the  jurisprudence of  the con-
stitutional courts of foreign countries in its decisions, which may be viewed as the result 
of objective factors. One of them is related to the legal nature and legal consequences of its 
292 Yuschenko v Central Election Committee of Ukraine (Supreme Court, 3 December 2004). 
293 R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko (n. 284), p. 344.
294 D. Wilkinson, ‘Interpreting Ukrainian legislation in  light of  international law and  jurispru-
dence’, НАУКОВІ ЗАПИСКИ, Том 22, Частина II, УДК 341.231.14, pp. 224–225. 
295 Ibidem, p. 224.
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decisions. Since the  latter in  accordance with the  Constitution of  Ukraine (Article 150) 
shall be binding on the territory of Ukraine, it is legally impermissible to refer to the legal 
sources which are not obligatory for our country in the text. Another factor is determined 
by the fact that the Ukrainian legal system belongs to the Roman-Germanic legal family, 
in which the case-law (jurisprudence) historically has not played such a role, as in the coun-
tries of Anglo-Saxon legal family (common law system). At the same time, in examining 
cases the Constitutional Court of Ukraine takes into account the foreign practice of consti-
tutional justice regarding relevant issues. References to the legal positions of constitutional 
courts of other countries may be found in dissenting opinions of judges of the Constitution-
al Court of Ukraine.296
Against this background, it is  not surprising that in  most cases in  which 
the Ukrainian judges rely on foreign or international jurisprudence, this fact is not 
expressly mentioned (silent dialogue). Similarly, it becomes understandable why it 
was necessary in Ukraine to adopt a clear obligation to follow the ECtHR case law. 
In fact, the Law “On execution of decisions and application of case law [in Ukrain-
ian – practice] of the European Court of Human Rights” was adopted in 2006.297 
The Constitutional Court confirmed the use of silent dialogue and indicated 
that the effect of the ECtHR case law for the first time was recognised by it in the 
decision of  1999 on death penalty.298 The  Constitutional Court admitted that it 
avoided direct reference to the ECtHR judgment in Soering v United Kingdom but 
that it was highly influenced by it.299 The  Court confirmed that it transplanted 
i.a. the concept of the rule of law from the ECtHR case law with such elements as 
justice, certainty, clarity and unambiguousness of legal norm, principle of propor-
tionality, and principle of trust of citizens in the State.300 In recent years, the Con-
stitutional Court refers not only more frequently to the ECtHR case law, but also 
indicates specific decisions.
For example, in 2015 the Constitutional Court broadly referred to the ECtHR 
case law to review the constitutionality of the provisions of the Code of Adminis-
trative Proceedings providing for one instance proceedings in certain administra-
tive law cases.301 The Court discussed carefully the European standard of the right 
296 The Report of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine for the XVIth Congress of the Conference 
of  European Constitutional Courts “Cooperation of  Constitutional Courts in  Europe –  Cur-
rent Situation and  Perspectives” (Constitutional Court, 2013), <https://www.vfgh.gv.at/
cms/vfgh-kongress/downloads/landesberichte/LB-Ukraine-EN.pdf> (access: 10 July 2016), 
para. II.1.23.
297 Law of Ukraine no. 3477-IV of February 2006.
298 Case 11-rp/99 (Constitutional Court, 29 December 1999). 
299 The Report of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (n. 297); case Soering v United Kingdom, 
App. no. 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989).
300 E.g. cases of the Constitutional Court: 15-rp/2004 (2 November 2004), 3-rp/2003 (30 January 
2003), 5-rp/2005 (22 September 2005), 6-rp/2007 (9 July 2007), 16-rp/2012 (29 August 2012), 
8-rp/2010 (11 March 2010).
301 Case 3-rp/2015 (Constitutional Court, 8 April 2015).
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to a fair trial. It observed first that the ECHR does not oblige States to establish 
courts of appeal or cassation, nevertheless, a State, which does institute such courts 
is  required to ensure that persons amenable to the  law shall enjoy before these 
courts the fundamental guarantees contained in Art. 6. The Constitutional Court 
referred for authority to specific paragraphs of the ECtHR judgments in Delcourt 
v Belgium and Hoffmann v Germany.302 The Court then underlined that the right 
to judicial protection includes, in particular, a possibility to challenge court deci-
sions in appeal and cassation, which is one of the constitutional guarantees of im-
plementation of rights and freedoms, their protection from violations and illegal 
encroachments, including from false and unjust judgments.303
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court, when referring to para. 57 of Ashen-
don v the United Kingdom of 28 May 1985 (the name of the case is incorrect and it 
is difficult to establish which case the Court wanted to indicate) and Krombach 
v  France, established the  constitutional standard for a  permitted restriction to 
the right to appeal or submission of a case for cassation conforming to the ECHR 
standard (whilst a right can be restricted by law, the restriction must pursue a le-
gitimate aim, and not infringe upon the very essence of  the right to a  fair trial, 
and there should be a proportionate correlation between that aim and introduced 
measures).304 On such basis the Constitutional Court found the provisions under 
review to be disproportionate. 
In the mentioned above 2013 Report, the Court reported many detailed refer-
ences in its own decisions to the ECHR and other treaties and e.g. to the Council 
of Europe recommendations. The Court underlined that it is bound to consider 
judgments of the ECtHR as Ukraine ratified the ECHR, recognized the jurisdic-
tion of the ECtHR and also because Art. 55 of the Constitution guarantees the con-
stitutional right of  every person after exhausting all domestic legal remedies to 
appeal for the protection of his or her rights and freedoms to the relevant interna-
tional judicial institutions. Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 92 of the Constitution, 
the Law “On Execution of Judgments and Application of Case-Law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights” was adopted. This law binds courts when consid-
ering cases to which the Convention is applicable and the case law of the ECHR 
as a source of law (Art. 17(1))305 and obliges courts to execute judgments against 
Ukraine (Art. 2).
302 Delcourt v Belgium, App. no. 2689/65 (ECtHR, 17 January 1970) para. 25; Hoffmann v Germany, 
App. no. 34045/96 (ECtHR, 11 October 2001) para. 65.
303 Case 3-rp/2015 (Constitutional Court, 8 April 2015) para. 2.1. 
304 Ibidem, para. 2.2. See also ibidem, para. 2.3, where the  Court discussed proportionality 
of  administrative penalties and  referred to the  ECtHR decisions: Case Krombach v  France, 
App. no. 29731/96 (ECtHR, 13 February 2001) para. 96 is properly cited.
305 Art. 17(1) of the Law “On Execution of Judgments and Application of Case-Law of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights” reads: “While adjudicating cases courts shall apply the Conven-
tion and the case-law of the Court as a source of law.” Art. 18 provides for detailed rules on 
usage of the Ukrainian translations and of the original texts of the Court’s decisions. English 
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The other interesting thing about Ukraine is the reception of the CJEU case 
law through the case law of the ECtHR306 or the references to the obligation to 
follow the case law of  the ECtHR contained in  the Law of 2006 (it shows how 
in the view of the potential EU membership, the courts desperately needed au-
thorization for such references).307 That was the practice of administrative courts, 
which started to rely on European standards i.a. on the rule of law, the principle 
of certainty or the principle of State liability towards individuals. In the Person 
v Kiev City Centre for Social Assistance, the Administrative Court of the Kiev Dis-
trict imported the principle of legal certainty from the CJEU case law. It held that 
the rights of the disabled to claim social and financial assistance from the State 
flow from the principle of  legal certainty since a State cannot justify its failure 
to guarantee constitutional rights by the absence of a specific national law. For 
authority the Court referred to the landmark decision of the CJEU in van Duyn 
v the Home Office,308 where, as the Ukrainian Court explained, it is specified that 
nationals may rely on the  State’s obligations, even in  cases when these obliga-
tions are provided in law without direct effect.309 There are probably many other 
CJEU judgments better suited for the reference in this case than van Duyn, but 
the lengths, to which the judges went to make the State responsible towards indi-
viduals is remarkable.
Last but not least, one must indicate the  recent judgments of  the Ukrainian 
courts dealing with the consequences of the occupation of Ukrainian territories. 
In particular, the recent case law has dealt with recognition of official documents 
issued on the occupied territories. They applied the so-called Namibia exception 
elaborated in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Namibia. In this Opinion the ICJ ob-
served that though the official acts of  the occupant are  illegal and  invalid, “this 
invalidity cannot be extended to the acts, such as, for instance, the  registration 
of  births, deaths and  marriages, the  effects of  which can be ignored only to 
translation of the Law available at <http://sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/etc/2006_law_ukraine.htm> 
(access: 25 September 2016).
306 Cf. case 1-rp/2011 (Constitutional Court, 26 January 2011) on commutation of death penal-
ty to life imprisonment, which refers to Scopolla v Italy, App. no. 10249/03 (ECtHR, 17 Sep-
tember 2009) and through this decision to the judgments (cited in its para 38) of the CJEU 
(Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02, C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others, 3 May 2005) for authority 
that the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty formed a part 
of the constitutional traditions common to the EU Member States.
307 Cf. R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko (n. 284), p. 349.
308 C-41/74 van Duyn v the Home Office (CJEU, 4 December 1974).
309 Due to anonymization, the name of the applicant is not mentioned in the names of the cas-
es. Case 4/337 (Kiev Administrative Court, 26 June 2008) cited by R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko 
(n. 284). The authors emphasise that the judgment became a pattern for subsequent deci-
sions of administrative judges (cf. cases of the Kiev Administrative Court: 5/435 (10 November 
2008), 5/503 (24 November 2008); 2/416 (25 November 2008); 5/451 (1 December 2008)). See 
other examples ibidem, p. 349.
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the detriment of  the inhabitants of  the Territory.”310 Ukrainian courts took into 
account the documents issued on the occupied Ukrainian territories to confirm 
deaths, births, marriages, divorces etc. emphasising that to disregard them would 
be contrary to human rights and the principle enshrined in the ICJ opinion. (See 
further in this volume Kolysnik).
8. Conclusions
The application of  international law in  the countries under our review takes 
place in  various constitutional and  legislative settings. Depending on the  per-
ceived relationship between international and domestic law, domestic courts apply 
international law directly (however, the scope of international law which is applied 
varies) or by virtue of  some form of  domestic incorporation as in  Hungary or 
even in Russia or Ukraine where, despite the existence of constitutional provisions, 
some sort of statutory or other endorsement (like the resolutions of the plenum 
of supreme courts) seems to be required. We do not intend to identify the mod-
els followed in these States into monistic or dualistic since each practice exhibits 
straits of both. The application of international law does not depend as much on 
the monistic or dualistic scheme but on the broader, legal and also political con-
text as visible by examples of Hungary, Russia or Ukraine. The judges can be more 
(as in Poland and the Czech Republic) or less open to considerations of interna-
tional law (as in Hungary, Lithuania, Russia or Ukraine). In some countries they 
are more driven by parochial interests than in the others but the attitude towards 
international law varies also among the courts (constitutional, supreme, ordinary 
etc.) and individual judges in each State. 
The legal settings (possibly with the exception of Ukraine) are open towards 
considerations based on international law but what matters in the end is practice. 
The  latter is  dependent on the  particular judicial culture and  the awareness on 
the part of the judges of peculiarities and complexity of international law. In most 
cases judges confine themselves to a  ‘simple’ referring to international treaty or 
other international law documents. And in  the majority of  cases it is  probably 
enough. Judicial interactions require good expertise in  international law. That 
is why they are not frequent and are usually characteristic of higher courts. Yet, 
it must be submitted that in  all examined countries the  judges look to foreign 
or international courts’ case law if confronted with new or more complex issues 
310 Legal Consequences for States of  the Continued Presence of  South Africa in  Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 
21 June 1971) para. 125. 
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such as the one in Natoniewski, or the Polish Abortion and status of foetus cases or 
in Ukrainian cases concerning the recognition of the documents issued on the oc-
cupied territories of the country. 
The judicial deference to foreign or international case law is a means of appli-
cation of law, a method used by courts for various purposes. The Central and East-
ern European judiciary use it similarly to other European courts. The purposes 
range from determining the understanding of an international law norm (inter-
pretation), establishing the standard of protection of a right, to supporting court’s 
own reasoning, either concurring or dissenting with the  decision of  the other 
court. Under each jurisdiction we were able to find important judgments which 
are worth discussion since they enrich the State practice under customary law con-
cept (e.g. Natoniewski, Nigerian Embassy), signify developments of  international 
law (e.g. the Czech Supreme Administrative Court case on asylum), or crystallise 
the perception of certain rights, institutions or effects of international law in do-
mestic law, such as the Czech, the Hungarian, the Lithuanian or the Russian cases 
concerning the status of  the ECtHR’s decisions in respective domestic laws. We 
also traced exasperating symptoms of politically biased judgments using selective-
ly international law for political purposes (e.g. Russian cases).
Finally yet importantly, it must be emphasised that language issues continue 
to matter. The  interaction between judges depends both upon judges’ linguistic 
skills as well as on good quality translations of their decisions into foreign languag-
es. Judges in Central and Eastern Europe should be more focused on interaction 
and ensure a good quality of their decisions on important issues of international 
law as well as their availability to the public. In that respect, it must be positively 
noted that many important decisions of  the constitutional courts are nowadays 
available at least in English.
In the light of the output of the research presented in this contribution, it is pos-
sible to conclude with regard to judicial dialogue, that it occurs more frequently 
in the more recent case law of the Central and Eastern European judiciary. 
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Pl. ÚS 34/04 (14 July 2005)
Pl. ÚS 43/04 (14 July 2005)
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Pl. ÚS 28/13 (10 July 2014)  
1 ÚS 860/1520 (27 October 2015) 
3 ÚS 1136/13 (8 December 2015) 
II. ÚS 3626/13 (18 January 2016)
Supreme Court
8 Ob 657/87 (28 June 1988)
11 Tcu 95/2003 (17 July 2003) 
11 Tcu 167/2004 (16 December 2004) 
21 Cdo 2215/2007 (25 June 2008) 
30 Cdo 2594/2009 (24 March 2011)
23 Cdo 888/2011 (31 January 2013)
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Supreme Administrative Court
6 Ads/2003 (23 February 2005)
2 Azs 343/2004 (4 August 2005)
1 Ao 1/2006 (18 July 2006) 
2 As 12/2006 (29 March 2007)
9 Azs 23/2007 (14 June 2007)
1 As 39/2006 (14 June 2007) 
6 As 55/2006 (11 July 2007)
1 As 13/2007 (29 August 2007)
1 Azs 40/2007 (19 September 2007)
6 Azs 215/2006 (24 October 2007)
5 Azs 28/2008 (13 March 2009) 
6 Azs 40/2010-70 (29 March 2011)
3 Ads 130/2008-204 (25 August 2011)
9 Azs 107/2014-43 (29 May 2014) 
Hungary 
Constitutional Court 
23/1993 (X. 13.) AB (13 October 1993)
53/1993 (X. 13.) AB (13 October 1993)
36/1996 (X. 13.) AB (4 September 1996)
4/1997 (I. 22.) AB (22 February 1997)
30/1998 (VI. 25.) AB (22 June 1998)
48/1998 (XI. 23.) AB (18 November 1998)
13/2000 (V. 12.) AB (12 May 2000)
14/2000 (V. 12.) AB (12 May 2000)
5/2001 (II. 28.) AB (12 March 2001)
57/2001 (XII. 5.) AB (5 December 2001)
22/2003 (IV. 28.) AB (28 April 2003)
988/E/2000 (7 October 2003)
50/2003 (XI. 5.) AB (5 November 2003)
7/2005 (III. 31.) AB (29 March 2005)
116/B/2006 (I. 9.) AB (9 January 2006)
6/2007 (II. 27.) AB (27 February 2007)
20/2007 (III. 29.) AB (29 March 2007)
21/B/2008, 154/2008 (XII. 15.) AB (15 December 2008)
53/2009 (V. 6.) AB (6 May 2009)
61/2011 (VII. 13.) AB (13 July 2011)
22/2012 (V. 11.) AB (11 May 2012)
45/2012 (XII. 29.) AB (28 December 2012) 
1/2013 (I. 7.) AB (4 January 2013) 
4/2013 (II. 21.) AB (21 February 2013)
12/2013 (V. 24.) AB (21 May 2013)
13/2013 (VI. 17.) AB (11 June 2013)
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Lower courts
25.P.22.432/2008/61 Fejer County Court
25.P./2008/80 Fejer County Court
Lithuania
Constitutional Court
19/94 (20 April 1995) 
22/94 (24 January 1995) 
8/95 (17 October 1995)
13/2000-14/2000-20/2000-21/2000-22/2000-25/2000-31/2000-35/2000-39/2000-8/01-31/01 
(12 July 2001) 
41/2000 (25 November 2002) 
24/04 (25 May 2004)
17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04 (14 March 2006) 
09/2008 (29 November 2010) 
21/2008 (28 September 2011) 
8/2012 (5 September 2012)
1/2013 (26 February 2013)
Poland
Constitutional Court
K 8/91 (7 January 1990) 
K 26/96 (28 May 1997)
P/8/0 (4 October 2000)
SK 31/99 (24 October 2000) 
K 33/02 (19 December 2002)
K 12/03 (18 February 2004)
K 18/04 (11 May 2005) 
K 11/10 (19 July 2011)
Supreme Court 
Judgment of 22 October 1925 (Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich 1926-V, no. 342)
Judgment of 2 March 1926 (Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich 1926-V, no. 418) 
Judgment of 14 December 1928 
Judgment of 23 October 1929
CR 1272/57 (15 May 1959)
2 CZ 70/61 (12 June 1961)
ICR 58/70 (18 May 1970) 
III CZP 71/73 (5 October 1974)
III CRN 139/79 (10 October 1979)
I PRZ 8/87 (25 August 1987)
I. The Central and Eastern European Judiciary… 95
II KRN 274/91 (17 October 1991)
I PRN 54/93 (15 June 1993)
II PK 100/05 (29 November 2005) 
Natoniewski, III CSK 293/07 (13 March 2010)
IV CSK 465/09 (29 October 2010)
II CSK 456/13 (24 July 2014)
Supreme Administrative Court
OSA 2/98 (17 May 1999)
V SA 726/99 (7 December 1999)
V SA 859/99 (1 February 2000)
I SA/Łd 1707/02 (26 March 2003) 
GSK 56/04 (21 April 2004) 
II SA 4156/03 (16 November 2004)
II GSK 54/05 (8 February 2006) 
I GSK 813/07 (22 July 2008) 
I FSK 92/09 (11 March 2010)
II GSK 640/13 (24 June 2014)
Lower Administrative Courts
I SA/Bd 275/05 (Bydgoszcz Administrative Court, 20 July 2005)
I SA/Go 559/06 (Gorzow Administrative Court, 22 March 2007) 
I SA/Sz 414/07 (Szczecin Administrative Court, 3 October 2007) 
III SA/Lu 16/13 (Lublin Administrative Court, 30 April 2013)
IV SA/Wa 1074/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 7 October 2014)
IV SA/Wa 1260/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court, 23 October 2014) 
The Russian Federation 
Constitutional Court
B267/86 (14 October 1987)
87-O (3 July 1997) 
187-O-O/2009 (15 January 2009)
8-П/2012 (27 March 2012)
27-П/2013 (6 December 2013)
6-П/2014 (19 March 2014)
21-П/2015 (14 July 2015) 
12-П/2016 (19 April 2016)
Supreme Court
Judgment
987-АПГ 12-2 (7 November 2012) 
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Rulings of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court 
No. 8 (31 October 1995)
No. 5 (10 October 2003) “On the Application of Universally Recognized Principles and Norms of In-
ternational Law and  of International Treaties of  the Russian Federation by Courts of  General 
Jurisdiction”
No. 5 (10 October 2003) “On the Application of Universally Recognized Principles and Norms of In-
ternational Law and of International Treaties of the Russian Federation by Courts of General Ju-
risdiction” amended by the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court no. 4 (5 March 2013)
No. 23 (19 December 2003) 
No. 3 (24 February 2005) “On Judicial Practice in  Cases of  Protection of  Honour and  Dignity 
and Business Reputation of Citizens and Legal Entities”
Arbitrazh Courts
St. Petersburg Arbitrazh Court
A56-48129/2014 [3783/2015-44531(1)] (9 February 2015) 
The Supreme Arbitrazh Court 
Circular
“On the  Implementation of  the International Treaties of  the Russian Federation Referring to 
the Questions of Arbitration Procedure” (11 June 1999)
Ukraine 
Constitutional Court
11-rp/99 (29 December 1999) 
3-в/2001 (11 July 2001) 
3-rp/2003 (30 January 2003)
15-rp/2004 (2 November 2004) 
5-rp/2005 (22 September 2005) 
6-rp/2007 (9 July 2007) 
8-rp/2010 (11 March 2010)
1-rp/2011 (26 January 2011) 
16-rp/2012 (29 August 2012) 
2-rp/2014 (14 March 2014)
3-rp/2015 (8 April 2015)
Supreme Court
Yuschenko v Central Election Committee of Ukraine (Supreme Court, 3 December 2004)
Kiev Administrative Court
4/337 (26 June 2008) 
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5/435 (10 November 2008) 
5/503 (24 November 2008)
2/416 (25 November 2008) 
5/451 (1 December 2008)
Courts of other jurisdictions
Canada
Supreme Court 
Provincial Judges Reference (17 September 1997) 3 S.C.R. 
Italy
Constitutional Court 
74/1958 (20 December 1958)
264/2012 (19 November 2012) 
238/2014 (22 October 2014) 
Germany 
Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE)
Solange I 2 BvL 52/71 (29 May 1974) 
Schwangerschaftsabbruch I 1 BvF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6/74 (25 February 1975) 
Philippinische Botschaft 2 BvM 1/76 (13 December 1977) 
Böll 1 BvR 797/78 (3 June 1980) 
Hitler-T-Shirt 1 BvR 680/86 (3 April 1990) 
Schwangerschaftsabbruch II 2 BvF 2/90 and 4, 5/92 (28 May 1993) 
rEGMR-Entscheidungen 2 BvR 1481/04 (14 October 2004) 
1 BvR 204/03 (23 March 2006) 
1 BvR 150/03 (1 June 2006) 
2 BvR 2202/08 (18 May 2009) 
France 
Cour de Cassation
Islamic Republic of Iran v Société Eurodif and others, 82-12462 (14 March 1984)
Slovakia
Constitutional Court 
Pl. ÚS 12/05 (4 December 2007)
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United Kingdom 
House of Lords 
Alcom Ltd. v Republic of Colombia (12 April 1984)
Reynolds v Times News Papers Limited (28 October 1999) 
R v Asfaw (21 May 2008) 
Supreme Court
UKSC 62 (16 October 2013) 
High Court of Justice
Adimi, R v Uxbridge Magistrates Court & Anor (Queen’s Bench Division, 29 July 1999)
The United States of America
Supreme Court
Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 178
Foster & Elam v Neilson 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)
Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
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